It is an extraordinary situation: the president and foreign minister have suddenly died in one of the most geopolitically significant countries in a conflict-torn region, and yet the prevailing view is that the geopolitical impact is minimal. Why?

The Iranian political system, always heavily controlled, has increasingly seen a consolidation of power by the most hardline and militaristic forces. They are not necessarily against some kind of transactional understanding with the US and the broader West. However, they are against a full normalisation. They are firmly against any deeper transformation of relations, such as a so-called “grand bargain”, especially if this encourages domestic political forces to argue that the easing of foreign threats could also increase freedoms for citizens or reduce the need to support armed groups around the region.

In this context, Raisi, a pillar of the hardline establishment with a long track record of signing off on executions, was widely seen as a manifestation of what the system wanted rather than a charismatic individual who helped to shape it. Speculation that he could have been a contender to be Iran’s next Supreme Leader was something of a backhanded compliment, as the theory was that the IRGC and military would favour his candidacy because he would be pliable, biddable, and unwittingly facilitate a gradual and long-term shift of power from the religious leadership to the military and paramilitary factions. The Supreme Leader’s succession is a more significant and deeper question for Iran than the presidency. Thus, while numerous opposition activists have celebrated Raisi’s death, they don’t see it as transformative. But it still matters within limited parameters.

Looking first of all to the presidency, since Raisi’s election in 2021, efforts to revive the 2014 nuclear deal became significantly more complicated. While the US’s 2018 withdrawal initiated the deal’s breakdown, Western diplomats also say that the Raisi government deliberately placed unrealistic demands on the table. That is partly because Raisi’s administration was more closely aligned with the IRGC, which has always been sceptical about the nuclear deal (in part since their companies are economic beneficiaries of sanctions).

The transition from President Rouhani, who had staked his credibility on the nuclear deal and the easing of sanctions, to President Raisi, who focused on Iran’s relations with the non-Western world, made a tangible difference to prospects for nuclear diplomacy. The prevailing analysis is that this primarily reflected underlying shifts in the system, including in the thinking of the Supreme Leader, who gave his blessing to nuclear diplomacy and then felt burned.

At the same time, personalities and their preferences did make some difference within those parameters. For example, some have argued that Raisi’s negotiators showed a combination of ideology and naivete in putting forward some of their demands but, over time, managed to reach a tacit understanding with the US (which fell apart after October 7th). Meanwhile, the foreign minister had none of his predecessor’s ease in dealing with Western officials or media but made progress in building regional relationships with a network of relations across the Gulf from his time focusing on the Gulf in the foreign ministry (although also bitter relations with Bahrain from being ambassador there during the country’s 2011 uprising).

It is expected that the only candidates who will be authorised to stand, let alone win, will be people who promise continuity in Iran’s foreign policy, back the “axis of resistance”, and emphasise that Israel is a threat (which was less of a focus under Rouhani). While the selection of candidates is likely to be tightly limited, they could have different degrees of pragmatism – and skill – especially in terms of their appetite for negotiating with the West, the types of understanding that they might be able to reach over the nuclear programme, and the degree to which they want to balance ties with Russia and China with those with the West.

Currently, there is little ambition in Europe or the US when it comes to nuclear diplomacy with Iran. Iran is instead increasingly seen through the lens of deterrence and defence and is generally seen as a threshold nuclear state. At the same time, it’s not generally believed that Iran has taken a decision to weaponise.

Iran’s interest may be better served by keeping the option of weaponisation on the table as a latent threat – so that currently, its “nuclear option” is the option to weaponise rather than the option to bomb. This gives Iran some potential leverage for future negotiations with the US. Conversely, taking clear steps to weaponise, such as pulling out of the NPT or testing a nuclear weapon, would have costs for Iran. These include the risk of direct strikes by the US and/or Israel and political and reputational costs with “global south” countries that support the NPT and often the TPNW. This points to a key question, the answer to which could change over time: will Iran’s leadership, now and in the future, tend to assume that weaponisation would bring existential threats closer or fend them off?

In the meantime, the failure to sustain or revive the JCPOA has undermined the belief – on all sides – that a similar deal is currently possible. Iran has advanced its nuclear programme significantly since then, and meanwhile no longer seems convinced by the JCPOA’s underlying bargain of economic benefits in exchange for constraints and monitoring of the nuclear programme. Nor are the other conditions in place: the united front of the P5+1 and the shared willingness to compartmentalise Iran’s nuclear programme from other issues. Attention is therefore on either “no deal” scenarios, which could see rising pressure on Iran, potentially including the invocation of JCPOA snapback sanctions, or on tacit understandings for Iran to freeze its programme where it is.

The political turmoil in the region adds further complex dynamics – probably for the worse, with no ceasefire in sight in Gaza and the looming risk of another Israel-Hizbollah war – but there may also be opportunities to explore how regional dynamics might lend themselves to more ambitious “grand bargain” style diplomacy in the future.

Détente has held between Iran and Saudi Arabia (and is unlikely to change with the anticipated succession in Saudi Arabia), which could present new avenues to at least reduce the risks of weaponisation – with the alternative being an arms race and a polynuclear Middle East. One argument made by some in the Iranian political opposition is that going nuclear would erode Iran’s deterrence over its immediate neighbours, as they would follow suit and become nuclear peers, whereas conventionally they are inferior. But it is Israel more than Saudi Arabia that influences Iran’s calculations here.

There is, of course, uncertainty about the impact of this year’s US elections, as with so many areas of global politics. The US administration has consistently signalled that it does not want to be drawn into a war with Iran, and that could potentially be a basis for an expanded understanding if there is a second Biden term. A future Trump administration might be tempted to return to a policy of supporting regime change or considering military strikes, especially if Iran specialists reappointed from last time have their way. Conversely, or even simultaneously, Trump might want to become a dealmaker with Iran, but that would not rule out potential coercive measures, which he could see as a route to a stronger negotiating position in the future.

And while the assumption is that the death of the president changes very little, there is still an element of uncertainty about domestic politics inside Iran. The system appears to be tightly controlled, yet there will be internal competition for power as speculation grows about the role of the next Supreme Leader. Different factions will be positioning themselves to influence the choice (which is voted by a state body, the 88-member Assembly of Experts, not simply or directly installed by the existing Leader, although, of course, he has ways of exerting influence). The perception of a system that is doubling down, focused on continuity, and barely affected by the shock death of the head of state may mask more turbulence than is immediately apparent from the outside.

The opinions articulated above represent the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the European Leadership Network or any of its members. The ELN’s aim is to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time.

Image credit: Wikimedia Commons / Farsnews