Formed in 2014, the YGLN is now composed of 150 members in their early/mid careers who are rising stars and specialists in security policy, economics, journalism, law and civil society. Consisting of more than 35 nationalities, the YGLN continues to provide a secure forum for future leaders to build trust and dialogue on the most pressing security challenges facing wider Europe and North America.
At a time of heightened nuclear risk, the credibility of the non-proliferation regime increasingly depends not on treating the NPT and TPNW as rival models, but on finding ways for them to function in a mutually reinforcing way. As Simabatu Mayele Sims Nono writes, reshaping the NPT-TPNW relationship can turn it from a source of fragmentation into a lever for stabilisation.
Amid mounting geopolitical tensions and deepening scepticism about multilateral diplomacy, diplomats, experts, and civil society representatives are gathering in New York for the 2026 NPT Review Conference to confront growing divisions over disarmament and non-proliferation. In these reflections, ELN staff who attended the RevCon examine the mounting risks facing the global nuclear order, and consider what they reveal about the future of the NPT regime.
The Eleventh NPT Review Conference (RevCon) begins on 27 April 2026 in New York City. Here, members of the ELN’s ‘Protecting the NPT’ project reflect on what they hope to see at this RevCon and offer advice to diplomats entering negotiations.
Russia’s ability to sustain its war in Ukraine depends on its economic base. YGLN member Sinikka Parviainen argues wartime mobilisation has enabled defence production growth despite sanctions, but deep structural weaknesses are accumulating, signalling long-term fragility. Euro-Atlantic policy should intensify targeted economic pressure while preparing for a weakened yet enduring Russian military and political threat.
The evolving confrontation between Europe and Russia is not a temporary crisis but a long-term condition that must be managed. In this report, ELN Senior Policy Fellow Alexander Graef sets out a strategy for governing a prolonged and adversarial relationship with Moscow beyond the war, focused on strengthening European political agency, credible deterrence, and governing escalation risks.
Trump’s decision at Davos to temper earlier calls for US “ownership” of Greenland has lowered the immediate diplomatic temperature. Yet Greenland continues to occupy a central place in US defence planning and geoeconomic strategy, and the broader Arctic remains shaped by renewed Russian military activity and expanding Chinese economic interests. The underlying strategic drivers, therefore, persist, even if the rhetoric has softened. YGLN members write that this will have consequences for Europe and beyond, requiring increased cooperation and strengthening alliance cohesion.
