The YGLN is composed of 150 members in their early careers who are rising stars and specialists in security policy, economics, journalism, law and civil society. Formed in 2014, the YGLN was created to bridge the divide between Russia and the West and establish a much-needed platform for understanding and dialogue.
Following the release of the UK’s Strategic Defence Review, we asked members to reflect on if its recommendations strengthen security and its implications for multilateral nuclear disarmament.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the OSCE has faced a deep crisis. Russia and Belarus have violated key norms of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, undermining the OSCE’s role in crisis management. Alexander Graef argues that breaking the impasse requires decisive political leadership and multi-level diplomacy. He also argues that growing military activities in Europe highlight the need for military-to-military contacts for managing escalation risks, in which the OSCE can facilitate necessary dialogues and support future monitoring activities as it has in the past.
In light of the US and Armenia starting a new Strategic Partnership, YGLN member Daniel Shapiro explores the move by Armenia and other states in the Caucasus to diversify their alliances, especially in light of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Russian and US officials met in Saudi Arabia last week to discuss the future of Ukraine and European security, without Europeans present. On the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we asked members of our network: how should Europeans react and how can they make their voices heard on Ukraine?
This policy brief analyses the integration of AI into nuclear command, control and communications systems (NC3), exploring potential benefits and significant risks. Former ELN policy fellow and Non-Resident Expert on AI at CNS Alice Saltini highlights the need for a better assessment of risks and the establishment of thresholds for integration to prevent miscalculations and nuclear escalation. It proposes that the EU leads international dialogue on AI risks in the nuclear domain in relevant international discussions.
Using nuclear deterrence to prevent cyber attacks presents not only ethical and strategic challenges but also significant legal concerns. International law imposes strict limits on the use of force, making a nuclear response to cyber attacks highly questionable. Attribution remains difficult, escalation risks are high, and proportionality concerns persist. YGLN member Verena Jackson writes that a more effective approach would focus on strengthening international norms, improving attribution mechanisms, and—above all—prioritising cyber resilience over expanding nuclear deterrence.
