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Protecting the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Our intergenerational Network is setting out to preserve the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation regime and prevent further erosion of the nuclear taboo and non-proliferation treaty (NPT). We’ll work to identify pathways to success in the eleventh review cycle, taking a holistic approach to the NPT and its three pillars.

Why?

International structures are resilient but not indestructible. The multilateral arms control regime is facing challenges and setbacks and requires investment. In 2018, US President Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which placed restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme. In 2019, we witnessed the end of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which had eliminated an entire category of nuclear weapons since the 1980s. And today, the renewal of the last remaining treaty limiting US and Russian nuclear arsenals, New START, is under threat.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, enhancing stability and transparency and preventing nuclear arms races. Our intergenerational network will seek to identify pathways to success in the coming review cycle leading to the 2026 Review Conference, helping to strengthen this critical treaty.

How?

We will be multifaceted in our approach, supporting relevant initiatives to guard against losing ground the treaty has made, identifying and pursuing new pathways to diplomatic success, and investing in the next generation of arms controllers.

We will deploy our Networks of experts, expand, and establish sub-working groups focusing on the areas members deem the most pressing, provisionally concentrating on enhancing consultations in the NPT Review Cycle, reinforcing the nuclear taboo in line with recent statements made by the P5 and G20, and considering the implications of a changed European and global security environment on the non-proliferation regime.

Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2026 Review Conference (31 July–11 August 2023)

This table provides an overview of State Parties’ proposals submitted to the Working Group on further strengthening the NPT Review Process.

View the table as a pdf

Project publications

Commentary

The CTBT: A success story and keystone for reinforcing the NPT regime ahead of the next 2026 NPT Review Conference

Despite not yet entering into force, the CTBT has seen some remarkable successes in establishing a global norm against nuclear testing and a robust verification system. However, rising geopolitical tensions underscore the urgent need for full ratification. Eleonora Neri of the Younger Generation Leaders Network (YGLN) argues for states to redouble efforts to universalise the Treaty and reinforce global non-proliferation commitments.

30 January 2025 | Eleonora Neri
Commentary

In Russia’s perceived war with the West, arms control is collateral damage

Three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and as New START enters its penultimate year in force, Nicholas Lokker writes that Russia is seeking to extricate itself from previously established arms control agreements it perceives as elements of the broader Western-dominated political and security order that it aims to overturn. He also argues that whilst Russia is unwilling to return to the negotiating table now, economics and external pressure from allies could herald a resumption of talks in future.

13 January 2025 | Nicholas Lokker
Policy brief

Stop the bleeding: How to protect existing NPT disarmament agreements and commitments

Steps to protect the Article 6 acquis on nuclear disarmament are a necessary condition for success of the 2026 NPT RevCon, but there is uncertainty under what political circumstances states parties will convene in 2026. As the nuclear disarmament acquis is currently threatened from many directions, this policy brief considers what steps states parties may take to protect the NPT under different scenarios.

16 December 2024
Commentary

Taking responsibility: How NPT members can support justice for victims of nuclear weapons – and through this, the NPT

This week, the Japanese organisation Nihon Hidankyo, founded by atomic bomb survivors (Hibakusha), will receive the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize demonstrating an increased international interest in past and ongoing harm caused by nuclear weapons. While the NPT largely remains silent on the humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons and the associated legacies of the nuclear past, Jana Baldus and Caroline Fehl write that NPT members can do more to further the cause of nuclear justice, and that doing so is in their own best interest.

10 December 2024 | Jana Baldus and Dr Caroline Fehl
Commentary

The politics of nuclear disarmament verification: How to advance nuclear disarmament

Following the UN Committee on Disarmament and International Security’s call to ascertain the views of Member States on the establishment of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts (GSTE) on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (NDV), ELN Senior Network member Michael Biontino argues that NDV, beyond its technical aspects, is an essential political element of nuclear disarmament since it builds the trust needed for disarmament agreements. In the commentary, he outlines the various ways that NDV can advance the political processes necessary for effective disarmament.

4 December 2024 | Michael Biontino
Commentary

The non-proliferation considerations of nuclear-powered submarines

The AUKUS partnership has sparked heated debate about the use of nuclear-powered submarines by non-nuclear weapon states. Alexander Hoppenbrouwers writes that the main risks of diversion of nuclear material lie outside of its use to fuel nuclear-powered submarines, and that the International Atomic Energy Agency should argue for strict verification measures on the basis of earlier negotiations on this topic.

29 October 2024 | Alexander Hoppenbrouwers
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Related content

Commentary

The UK Government’s change in nuclear policy could raise difficult questions with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) community

For the first time since the Cold War, the UK’s Integrated Review increases the limit for British nuclear warheads. While Russia’s nuclear doctrine and emerging technologies seem to be the most important driver behind the decision, it will be difficult for the UK Government to justify how this fits with NPT disarmament obligations.

22 March 2021 | Julia Berghofer
Commentary

Reflections on P5 risk reduction: milestones to date and recommendations for the eleventh NPT review cycle

The recent P5 affirmation that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” as well as the incorporation of strategic risk reduction into the nuclear doctrines and dialogues working group are impactful and are welcome first measures. The P5 must now build on this momentum to discuss a substantive programme of work which must will lead to the implementation of concrete risk reduction measures within the eleventh review cycle.

24 January 2022 | Maximilian Hoell and Goran Svilanović