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Emerging Disruptive Technologies and Risk Reduction

Nuclear weapons have unique catastrophic effects.  Reducing risks of their use is a key element of reducing existential risks. Our researchers and members study the intersections between nuclear weapons and emerging and disruptive technologies, as a contribution to nuclear risk reduction. Our research looks in particular at the growing complexity that the simultaneous emergence of multiple disruptive technologies introduces. We aim to provide guidance for decision makers on how they can maintain strategic stability and make progress towards arms control and disarmament under such circumstances. ELN experts also examine the question of whether other technologies could eventually present similarly catastrophic risks as nuclear weapons.

 

Policy brief

Assessing the implications of integrating AI in nuclear decision-making systems

This policy brief analyses the integration of AI into nuclear command, control and communications systems (NC3), exploring potential benefits and significant risks. Former ELN policy fellow and Non-Resident Expert on AI at CNS Alice Saltini highlights the need for a better assessment of risks and the establishment of thresholds for integration to prevent miscalculations and nuclear escalation. It proposes that the EU leads international dialogue on AI risks in the nuclear domain in relevant international discussions.

11 February 2025 | Alice Saltini
Commentary

The unintended consequences of deterring cyber attacks through nuclear weapons and international law

Using nuclear deterrence to prevent cyber attacks presents not only ethical and strategic challenges but also significant legal concerns. International law imposes strict limits on the use of force, making a nuclear response to cyber attacks highly questionable. Attribution remains difficult, escalation risks are high, and proportionality concerns persist. YGLN member Verena Jackson writes that a more effective approach would focus on strengthening international norms, improving attribution mechanisms, and—above all—prioritising cyber resilience over expanding nuclear deterrence.

6 February 2025 | Verena Jackson
Commentary

Deterrence without destruction: Rethinking responses to biological threats

Scientific advances have renewed a discussion around the possibility of potentially devastating biological attacks. Eva Siegmann writes that nuclear deterrence is inadequate to deter biological threats. Instead, the threat of biological weapons should be addressed via international efforts rooted in transparency and cooperation. Leveraging the mechanisms of the Biological Weapons Convention and implementing deterrence-by-denial strategies can effectively mitigate risks.

28 November 2024 | Eva Siegmann