Nuclear weapons are unique. The potential destructive power and long-term effects of nuclear weapons use would be catastrophic. In 2022, the five NPT nuclear weapons states reaffirmed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Despite this, there have been policy developments that suggest that nuclear weapons may be used in response to comparable threats. We believe there has not been sufficient public debate about the potential comparability of such threats, and the implications for nuclear deterrence.
What?
The ELN is currently engaged in a project responding to recent policy developments in the United Kingdom and other nuclear weapon states which may consider the use of nuclear weapons in response to comparable non-nuclear threats such as new technological threats.
The main effort of this project is to create public and parliamentary awareness and debate on the issues and feed key findings into international fora. We continue to build and evolve an ecosystem of experts, academics and practitioners who share an interest in this topic, including our intergenerational network of over 450 of Europe’s leading defence and security experts.
This project sits within our wider ‘Emerging Disruptive Technologies and Risk Reduction’ programme.
Why?
Recent developments in both the United States and the United Kingdom’s nuclear policy postures have included the possibility of the threat of the use of nuclear weapons to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction and emerging technologies which might constitute a comparable threat. With this development, it is possible that other states possessing nuclear weapons may adopt similar policies.
Whilst there are potential significant and catastrophic impacts from the malicious use of emerging disruptive technologies and other non-nuclear strategic attacks, there is a lack of consensus or transparent definition of what would quantify a comparable threat to that of nuclear weapons. It remains unclear what the threshold would be to respond to non-nuclear attacks with nuclear weapons. This ambiguity introduces an increased risk of nuclear use, which would be catastrophic to European and global security.
How?
Since 2022, the ELN has been engaged in research assessing nuclear weapon states’ policy positions on responding to non-nuclear strategic threats and whether these threats constitute a comparable risk. This work concluded that 1) more work is required to understand the potential impact of emerging technologies to cause strategic-level damage, 2) the current model of nuclear deterrence may not be suitable for non-nuclear states and actors who could use emerging technologies maliciously, and 3) a new approach is needed for governing emerging technologies and proliferation.
The ELN will continue research exploring the comparability of non-nuclear threats, the implementation of failsafe reviews in nuclear weapon states, the suitability of the deterrence model, and a review of international law and norms.
Harnessing the full power of the ELN’s network, we will conduct workshops to guide analysis, policy proposals, and op-eds to shape public and parliamentary debates. We will present our findings at a launch event in London and at various international fora.
The threats the UK faces today are more nuanced and diverse than in the Cold War era, ranging from state-sponsored cyber-attacks to sophisticated disinformation campaigns. ELN Policy Fellow Nikita Gryazin argues that these challenges require a shift in focus from traditional nuclear deterrence to modern defensive and offensive cyber capabilities.
The United Kingdom’s latest nuclear doctrine suggests that severe cyber-attacks on their national or critical infrastructure could provoke a nuclear response. Despite this, cyber-attacks against the UK have surged over the past decade. Eva-Nour Repussard, YGLN member and Policy Fellow at BASIC, writes that instead of deterrence by punishment, the UK should seek to increase its resilience to cyber-attacks and focus on a strategy of deterrence by denial regarding cyber threats.
The US, Russia, and the UK have explicitly stated their intention to deter non-nuclear strategic threats from new technologies with nuclear weapons. ELN Senior Policy Fellow Julia Berghofer writes that this could have destabilising effects, opening the door to new vulnerabilities and escalation risks. The N5 should discuss these policies as part of their longstanding dialogue on nuclear doctrines, and a public debate is required to explore potential alternative approaches.
In recent years the US and the UK have said they might deter threats arising from emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) with nuclear weapons. This policy shift signals an increased emphasis on nuclear deterrence and challenges the UK’s non-proliferation and disarmament commitments. Instead of aiming to deter the extreme use of EDTs with nuclear weapons, this policy brief argues that the UK and other nuclear weapons states should focus on developing their national resilience to mitigate threats.
To better understand emerging technologies, NEVER members Konrad, Anemone, Emil, Arthur, and Joel outline the evolution of the risk landscape around emerging disruptive technologies and draw parallels between the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and those posed by novel biotechnologies. They explore the broader challenge of governing emerging technologies and suggest potential ways forward.
In our latest commentary from the ELN’s New European Voices on Existential Risk (NEVER) network, Shane Ward and Eva Siegmann, explore how the emergence of non-nuclear strategic threats (NNST) has undermined the normative taboo surrounding the use of nuclear weapons, and why new methods extending beyond deterrence are needed to ensure international stability.
