As the catastrophic risks of climate change slowly enter the public mainstream and plausible and sufficient mitigation scenarios remain out of reach, ever more attention is paid to geoengineering techniques that purport to minimise or regulate some climate change effects. Such hopes often underestimate the geopolitical risks that geoengineering could bring and reveal a more considerable misunderstanding about the existential threat posed by the climate crisis. Policymakers must anticipate and respond to the dangers of geoengineering just as much as to the risks of the climate crisis.
Geoengineering techniques such as Solar radiation modification (SRM), which I will focus on, purport to be a relatively painless solution that circumvents the difficult decisions of decarbonisation by simply reducing the impacts of climate change, such as extreme temperature rise. Crucially, geoengineering claims to cut the Gordian knot, which is the geopolitics of climate governance: instead of needing to find a collective agreement on emission reduction, individual actors could take unilateral action to prevent global climate impacts.
Policymakers must anticipate and respond to the dangers of geoengineering just as much as to the risks of the climate crisis. Jakob Gomolka
It should come as no surprise then that geoengineering has become en vogue among private institutions with grand ambitions but without the means to impact global politics themselves. Leading universities like Harvard host research programmes, and private entrepreneurs have launched unauthorised experiments. Pioneering think tank initiatives straddle the fine line between informing about geoengineering and legitimising its usage by calling additional attention to it. On the other hand, conservative-leaning institutes have been openly positive. This shift towards normalising geoengineering is perhaps exacerbated by the fact that while some scientists are warning about the dangers of geoengineering, others are afraid that even critical discussion could inadvertently contribute to its advent.
In the best case, SRM could address some of the main threats of climate change. For example, by distributing sulphur dioxide in the atmosphere to reflect more sunrays, SRM would reduce the greenhouse effect and thereby reduce temperatures. (While there are other SRM methods, such as installing space mirrors, spraying sulphur dioxide remains the most plausible option). This could potentially help to prevent reaching critical thresholds like the 1.5 °C limit. Limiting global warming would also prevent crossing tipping points that could unlock even more greenhouse gasses, accelerate ice melting, and even disrupt global ocean circulation. SRM could thus significantly contribute to preventing the truly existential threat of 5 °C of unmitigated climate change and all the consequences of such global warming. Yet geoengineering is the wrong kind of response because it does not adequately address the most significant risks of the climate crisis.
Preventing potential extreme long-term temperature rises is important. Still, we should take seriously the security and, indeed, the existential threat of more immediate impacts that are already beginning to show. The climate crisis primarily manifests through disorder; even relatively minor global heating interrupts complex atmospheric dynamics. Extreme weather events and catastrophes already occur much more often and severely with relatively minor warming, claiming loss of life and devastation of infrastructure. Disrupted water cycles and irregular seasons also wreak havoc on agriculture.
Geoengineering is the wrong kind of response because it does not adequately address the most significant risks of the climate crisis. Jakob Gomolka
Potentially capping temperature rises would do little to alleviate this chaos. Even if SRM could prevent further tipping points from being reached, it is unlikely to undo the damage already done and embedded into our enormously complex climate system. Disruption would most likely persist. Furthermore, climate change is only the harbinger of a larger looming environmental crisis as humanity crosses the planetary boundaries, which cannot be addressed by geoengineering but will continue to endanger human security in manifold ways.
These disruptions of the global climate system meet an equally complex and fragile system in the form of the international order. The impacts of climate change manifest themselves as scarcities of fertile or liveable land, water, and food. Resource scarcity can be a driver of both domestic chaos and interstate competition. And as these impacts get worse, states could grow more hostile towards those they identify as culprits. At worst, this interstate competition could exacerbate the risk of nuclear warfare, with further catastrophic consequences for the climate and humanity.
Even if SRM could prevent further tipping points from being reached, it is unlikely to undo the damage already done and embedded into our enormously complex climate system. Jakob Gomolka
Geoengineering could counterintuitively contribute to these risks by heightening state tension. There is strong reason to believe that SRM would lead to regionally different outcomes regarding temperature and water. Moderate temperatures in one place would lead to drought elsewhere; the sort of geoengineering that would be good for one state would likely prove harmful for others. The introduction of geoengineering might thereby deepen precisely the same geopolitical tensions that its advocates hoped to circumvent.
Indeed, if the breakdown of the international order is one of the greatest risks of the climate crisis, SRM technologies would significantly increase existential threats. Unilateral action on geoengineering could be seen as hostile by other nations subsequently suffering adverse consequences. Even more so than resource competition, this could trigger interstate conflict up to war, which, under the circumstances of great power competition and climate change, would be a threat to humanity’s very survival.
There is strong reason to believe that SRM would lead to regionally different outcomes regarding temperature and water. Moderate temperatures in one place would lead to drought elsewhere; the sort of geoengineering that would be good for one state would likely prove harmful for others. The introduction of geoengineering might thereby deepen precisely the same geopolitical tensions that its advocates hoped to circumvent. Jakob Gomolka
Policymakers concerned with existential risks should anticipate discussions about geoengineering now and try to instil norms against untested and unilateral use by supporting a global memorandum. Yet, whilst policy experts have tended to highlight the need to discuss the uncertain climate impacts of SRM, we should also be discussing its geopolitical risks. The only safe use of geoengineering would be one which is based on complete international agreement. Looking at the most recent debates at UNEA, such consensus still seems far away. And if the geopolitical divides which speak against geoengineering deployment are ever healed, the international community would be better off collectively mitigating climate change rather than risking the uncertain outcomes of atmospheric manipulation.
Establishing a strong geoengineering governance regime that requires international consensus for any action is now an imperative and necessary measure to reduce existential risks. The ensuing conversation about the geopolitics of climate change in general and geoengineering impacts and their threats to global security in particular could, in fact, be a means of forging a stronger common will in an increasingly divided world.
The opinions articulated above represent the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the European Leadership Network or any of its members. The ELN’s aim is to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time.
Image credit: Lal Nallath / Shutterstock.com
