The European Leadership Network and the 2025 NPT Preparatory Committee
Join the ELN for two side events at the third NPT PrepCom in New York.
Join the ELN for two side events at the third NPT PrepCom in New York.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the OSCE has faced a deep crisis. Russia and Belarus have violated key norms of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, undermining the OSCE’s role in crisis management. Alexander Graef argues that breaking the impasse requires decisive political leadership and multi-level diplomacy. He also argues that growing military activities in Europe highlight the need for military-to-military contacts for managing escalation risks, in which the OSCE can facilitate necessary dialogues and support future monitoring activities as it has in the past.
A new report published from the European Leadership Network’s New European Voices on Existential Risk (NEVER) project calls for a systemic international approach to be taken to address man-made existential risk. The risks from nuclear weapons, climate change, biological threats, and AI are interconnected and cross-cutting lessons should be drawn.
In 2024, the European Leadership Network (ELN) delivered an intergenerational networking programme designed to support emerging leaders in the fields of security, foreign policy, and existential risk. The programme brought together 25 participants from across the New European Voices on Existential Risks (NEVER) Network and the Younger Generation Leadership Network (YGLN).
This policy brief analyses the integration of AI into nuclear command, control and communications systems (NC3), exploring potential benefits and significant risks. Former ELN policy fellow and Non-Resident Expert on AI at CNS Alice Saltini highlights the need for a better assessment of risks and the establishment of thresholds for integration to prevent miscalculations and nuclear escalation. It proposes that the EU leads international dialogue on AI risks in the nuclear domain in relevant international discussions.
Using nuclear deterrence to prevent cyber attacks presents not only ethical and strategic challenges but also significant legal concerns. International law imposes strict limits on the use of force, making a nuclear response to cyber attacks highly questionable. Attribution remains difficult, escalation risks are high, and proportionality concerns persist. YGLN member Verena Jackson writes that a more effective approach would focus on strengthening international norms, improving attribution mechanisms, and—above all—prioritising cyber resilience over expanding nuclear deterrence.