The failure of the previous two Review Cycles to agree on a final document demonstrates that the NPT Review Cycle is in danger of becoming dysfunctional. From a proposed Chairperson’s document to the need for informal venues to discuss salient issues, Michael Biontino offers practical steps for a successful 2026 Review Conference, beyond a final document.
Disagreements over gender issues in the NPT review process have become increasingly contentious, and there is a real possibility that they could derail the next Review Conference. To avoid an impasse in the consensus-based NPT review process, Sanaa Alvira and Shizuka Kuramitsu urge States parties to proactively engage through coalition-building and inclusive consultations led by NPT Chairs to address these challenges.
Ahead of the 2024 NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), Michael Biontino writes that there is an urgent need for dialogue on nuclear doctrines, declaratory policies, and security assurances between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states.
Nuclear-weapon-free zones can help strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms and are a key element underpinning the NPT. Despite this, new zones in Europe, the Middle East, and North-East Asia have not materialised so far. Tarja Cronberg writes that legally based negative security guarantees and other innovative approaches are needed.
The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) is celebrating its tenth anniversary in Geneva this week. This milestone comes with some notable outcomes and achievements. Looking back on past IPNDV activities and looking ahead to its future ones, Dr Irmgard Niemeyer outlines 10 lessons learned over the years.
On the second anniversary of Putin’s war in Ukraine, Olamide Samuel writes that the invasion has upset the fragile balance of obligations in the NPT’s bargain by dramatically increasing the perceived salience of nuclear weapons and reigniting motivations for proliferation. In response, nuclear weapon states choosing to reinforce their extended deterrence commitments inadvertently devalues the wider framework of security assurances granted to non-nuclear weapon states and the perceived value of the NPT’s grand bargain.