The recent violations of Allied airspace represent an unprecedented escalation of tensions between NATO and Russia. Matus Halas writes that NATO must try to protect its airspace against unauthorised activities, but the inconsistency of approach within NATO makes deterrence harder. While different incursions must be treated differently, there needs to be consistency both over time and across member states.
Competing perceptions of nuclear deterrence are no longer peripheral disagreements within the NPT and are now driving deep divisions within the regime, threatening its very stability. ELN Policy Fellow Jana Baldus urges states to bridge this divide by recognising differing security perspectives and addressing concerns on all sides. Nuclear-armed states must clarify the rationale behind deterrence and confront double standards, while non-nuclear states should engage with the wider security consequences of rejecting deterrence and consider Russia’s and China’s strategies as well as those of the West.
NATO’s upcoming Summit in The Hague comes at a key point in the Alliance’s history; Russia’s continued aggression against Ukraine, American impatience with European underspending on defence, and European fears of American withdrawal from collective defence all represent major threats. Former NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations, Stephen Evans, and ELN Senior Associate Fellow former UK Ambassador to NATO, Sir Adam Thomson, argue that NATO’s history demonstrates it is capable of combining strength and flexibility in times of crisis. They argue for a ‘back to basics’ approach to ease internal tensions, strengthen partnerships and move towards a state of ‘managed co-existence’ with Russia.
Artificial intelligence, much like nuclear technologies, has the capacity to transform our world for the better, offering breakthroughs in several fields whilst simultaneously posing catastrophic risks. Nuclear policy experts, skilled in managing existential threats, are well-suited to guide AI governance. ELN Network and Communications Manager Andrew Jones argues that urgent, coordinated international action and further collaboration between experts in the nuclear and AI fields is needed before AI outpaces our ability to control it.
Using nuclear deterrence to prevent cyber attacks presents not only ethical and strategic challenges but also significant legal concerns. International law imposes strict limits on the use of force, making a nuclear response to cyber attacks highly questionable. Attribution remains difficult, escalation risks are high, and proportionality concerns persist. YGLN member Verena Jackson writes that a more effective approach would focus on strengthening international norms, improving attribution mechanisms, and—above all—prioritising cyber resilience over expanding nuclear deterrence.
Despite not yet entering into force, the CTBT has seen some remarkable successes in establishing a global norm against nuclear testing and a robust verification system. However, rising geopolitical tensions underscore the urgent need for full ratification. Eleonora Neri of the Younger Generation Leaders Network (YGLN) argues for states to redouble efforts to universalise the Treaty and reinforce global non-proliferation commitments.