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Page 5 of 34
Policy brief

The challenge of Russian dual-capable missiles

In a new policy brief, ELN Senior Associate Fellows Simon Lunn and Nicholas Williams examine the dual-capable nature of Russia’s medium and short-range missiles, and their implications for NATO’s strategy. Acknowledging the relationship between the nuclear and conventional dimensions, and in the context of Putin’s menacing references to Russia’s nuclear weapons, it looks at the impact on NATO strategy at both levels.

17 July 2024 | Simon Lunn and Nicholas Williams
Russia-West relationsArms ControlConventional Arms ControlDefenceDeterrenceEastern EuropeEuropeINFMilitary DoctrineMissilesNATONuclear Arms ControlNuclear SecurityRisk ReductionRussiaRussia-West RelationsSecurityUkraineWMDsSenior Associate Fellow
Commentary

The fast and the deadly: When Artificial Intelligence meets Weapons of Mass Destruction

Ahead of the German Federal Foreign Office’s Artificial Intelligence and Weapons of Mass Destruction Conference 2024, the ELN’s Policy and Research Director, Oliver Meier, argues that governments should build guardrails around the integration of AI in the WMD sphere, and slow down the incorporation of AI into research, development, production, and planning for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

27 June 2024 | Oliver Meier
EDTsEmerging Disruptive Technologies and Risk ReductionArms ControlBiosecurityEmerging technologiesInternational LawNuclear Arms ControlNuclear SecurityNuclear WeaponsRisk ReductionWMDs
Commentary

Time to engage seriously with the TPNW’s security concerns

Alexander Kmentt, Director for Disarmament, Arms Control, and Nonproliferation at the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ELN Senior Network member, writes that opponents of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in nuclear-armed states should stop dismissing the treaty outright. Instead, they should begin addressing the legitimate security concerns surrounding deterrence that are raised by its supporters.

4 June 2024 | Alexander Kmentt
NPTGlobal SecurityArms ControlDefenceDeterrenceDiplomacyInternational LawMilitary DoctrineNPTNuclear Arms ControlNuclear DisarmamentNuclear SecurityNuclear WeaponsRisk ReductionSecurityWMDsELN
Commentary

Iran: The implications of President Raisi’s death

The ELN’s Policy and Impact Director, Jane Kinninmont, analyses why the deaths of Iran’s President and Foreign Minister, Ebrahim Raisi and Hossein Amirabdollahian, doesn’t necessarily represent a shift in global politics. She explains that the probable candidates to replace Raisi are likely to endorse a continuation of current Iranian foreign policy, and any changes will be hard to notice for external observers.

22 May 2024 | Jane Kinninmont
IranGlobal SecurityArms ControlDefenceDiplomacyForeign policyIranJCPOAMiddle EastNPTNuclear Arms ControlNuclear SecurityNuclear WeaponsRisk ReductionSecurityUnited StatesWMDs
Report

Track 1.5 on Iran and nuclear diplomacy: Workshop report and recommendations

In March 2024, ELN co-hosted a track 1.5 dialogue on Iran’s nuclear diplomacy. Key takeaways from the group of multinational experts included the acknowledgement that Iran remains open to talks but seeks to preserve nuclear gains, widening gaps with Western positions. Participants also noted that regional dialogue and European support may help, though risks of escalation remain high amid US-Iran tensions, Israeli concerns, and regional instability.

27 March 2024
IranIranMultilateral Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-ProliferationArms ControlDefenceDeterrenceDiplomacyEUForeign policyIranJCPOAMiddle EastMilitary DoctrineNATONuclear Arms ControlNuclear DisarmamentNuclear SecurityNuclear WeaponsRisk ReductionWMDsSenior Associate Fellow
Commentary

The NPT needs a common understanding of “nuclear threats”: Questions and tasks for the 11th NPT Review Cycle

YGLN members Maren Vieluf and Ananya Agustin Malhotra argue that NPT states need to start talking about whether or not “defensive” and “offensive” nuclear threats can be distinguished. If NPT states can find agreement on this matter, it could bridge the gap between states condemning any and all nuclear threats under any circumstances and those states that stand firmly behind “defensive” nuclear threats and allow for further progress to be made in the 11th NPT Review Cycle.

15 February 2024 | Maren Vieluf and Ananya Agustin Malhotra
NPTGlobal SecurityMultilateral Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-ProliferationArms ControlCTBTMissilesNPTNuclear Arms ControlNuclear DisarmamentNuclear SecurityNuclear WeaponsRisk ReductionWMDsYGLN