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Video

From Risk to Reduction: Practical steps for safer nuclear systems

Nuclear weapons aren’t going anywhere, and the way we manage them can and must keep evolving. Today’s security environment is more complex than during the Cold War: more nuclear-armed states, faster decision-making technologies, and fewer treaties providing guardrails. The good news? Proven tools exist to reduce risk, from fail-safe mechanisms to dialogue between adversaries, and they don’t all require perfect trust or total agreement. This animation explains both the challenges and the credible paths forward.

17 February 2026
2NTFailsafeEmerging Disruptive Technologies and Risk ReductionDeterrenceEmerging technologiesEuropeNuclear DisarmamentNuclear SecurityNuclear WeaponsELNYGLN
Commentary

The NPT can’t ignore emerging technologies anymore

As State Parties prepare for the 2026 Review Conference, Bailey Schiff and Diya Ashtakala write that engaging with emerging technologies, which are already transforming military programmes, as well as verification and civilian nuclear programmes, offers a way to break entrenched debates. Revisiting longstanding challenges regarding non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology through the framework of emerging technologies may be one of the few practical paths to relieve pressure on the NPT by opening space for innovation and debate across the three pillars.

13 January 2026 | Bailey Schiff and Diya Ashtakala
EDTsArms ControlEmerging technologiesGovernanceNPTNuclear Arms ControlNuclear WeaponsRisk ReductionWMDs
Commentary

Why states should remain in the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention: humanitarian and security imperatives

On Saturday, 10 January, Finland’s withdrawal from the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention or ‘Ottawa Treaty’, will come into effect. This follows the earlier withdrawals of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. Gary Toombs writes that while landmines may seem appealing as cheap, simple tools of defence, in reality, they are militarily outdated, strategically counterproductive, and devastating in humanitarian, economic, and environmental terms. States on the path to leaving the treaty should reconsider, as withdrawal would not strengthen their security but would undermine international law, erode alliances, and cause generational harm.

8 January 2026 | Gary Toombs
EDTsMultilateral Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-ProliferationArms ControlBalticsConventional Arms ControlDefenceEmerging technologiesGovernanceInternational LawSecurity
Policy brief

Guarding the unthinkable: Why regular fail-safe reviews are essential for responsible nuclear stewardship

In times of eroding arms control measures, nuclear-weapons states should consider enhancing transparency around their nuclear safety, security and reliability mechanisms (‘fail-safe’) to strengthen the risk reduction agenda. This policy brief, by ELN Senior Policy Fellow Julia Berghofer, shows how France and the UK can advance fail-safe individually and bilaterally, as well as in the P3 and P5 contexts. Non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT and members of NATO could also support this.

2 October 2025 | Julia Berghofer
FailsafeEmerging Disruptive Technologies and Risk ReductionFranceNPTNuclear SecurityNuclear WeaponsRisk ReductionUnited KingdomELN
Report

Global nuclear fail-safe: Meeting summaries and related documents

Fail-safe reviews aim to strengthen safeguards to prevent the unauthorised, inadvertent, or mistaken use of a nuclear weapon. In collaboration with NTI, EASLG, and APLN, the ELN has been working to highlight the benefits of independent, internal “fail-safe” reviews in nuclear-armed states. These summaries are from ELN and APLN nuclear fail-safe workshops with non-governmental partners in China, India, Pakistan, France, and the UK.

13 August 2025
FailsafeEmerging Disruptive Technologies and Risk ReductionNuclear SecurityNuclear WeaponsAPLNELN