Skip to content

Filter

8 results found
Page 1 of 2
Commentary

The unintended consequences of deterring cyber attacks through nuclear weapons and international law

Using nuclear deterrence to prevent cyber attacks presents not only ethical and strategic challenges but also significant legal concerns. International law imposes strict limits on the use of force, making a nuclear response to cyber attacks highly questionable. Attribution remains difficult, escalation risks are high, and proportionality concerns persist. YGLN member Verena Jackson writes that a more effective approach would focus on strengthening international norms, improving attribution mechanisms, and—above all—prioritising cyber resilience over expanding nuclear deterrence.

6 February 2025 | Verena Jackson
Commentary

Deterrence without destruction: Rethinking responses to biological threats

Scientific advances have renewed a discussion around the possibility of potentially devastating biological attacks. Eva Siegmann writes that nuclear deterrence is inadequate to deter biological threats. Instead, the threat of biological weapons should be addressed via international efforts rooted in transparency and cooperation. Leveraging the mechanisms of the Biological Weapons Convention and implementing deterrence-by-denial strategies can effectively mitigate risks.

28 November 2024 | Eva Siegmann
Commentary

Nuclear vs cyber deterrence: why the UK should invest more in its cyber capabilities and less in nuclear deterrence

The threats the UK faces today are more nuanced and diverse than in the Cold War era, ranging from state-sponsored cyber-attacks to sophisticated disinformation campaigns. ELN Policy Fellow Nikita Gryazin argues that these challenges require a shift in focus from traditional nuclear deterrence to modern defensive and offensive cyber capabilities.

23 September 2024 | Nikita Gryazin
Commentary

Nuclear posture and cyber threats: Why deterrence by punishment is not credible – and what to do about it

The United Kingdom’s latest nuclear doctrine suggests that severe cyber-attacks on their national or critical infrastructure could provoke a nuclear response. Despite this, cyber-attacks against the UK have surged over the past decade. Eva-Nour Repussard, YGLN member and Policy Fellow at BASIC, writes that instead of deterrence by punishment, the UK should seek to increase its resilience to cyber-attacks and focus on a strategy of deterrence by denial regarding cyber threats.

19 September 2024 | Eva-Nour Repussard
Commentary

Deterrence of non-nuclear strategic threats: the case against deterring new technologies

The US, Russia, and the UK have explicitly stated their intention to deter non-nuclear strategic threats from new technologies with nuclear weapons. ELN Senior Policy Fellow Julia Berghofer writes that this could have destabilising effects, opening the door to new vulnerabilities and escalation risks. The N5 should discuss these policies as part of their longstanding dialogue on nuclear doctrines, and a public debate is required to explore potential alternative approaches.

23 July 2024 | Julia Berghofer
Policy brief

Resisting the risks of nuclear mission creep: UK deterrence and emerging strategic threats

In recent years the US and the UK have said they might deter threats arising from emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) with nuclear weapons. This policy shift signals an increased emphasis on nuclear deterrence and challenges the UK’s non-proliferation and disarmament commitments. Instead of aiming to deter the extreme use of EDTs with nuclear weapons, this policy brief argues that the UK and other nuclear weapons states should focus on developing their national resilience to mitigate threats.

8 December 2023 | Julia Berghofer