This report, based on the findings of a discussion between multinational experts convened by the ELN, explores the historic, current, and future role of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and its toolbox in maintaining and strengthening European security architecture.

Over its 50-year history, the OSCE has evolved through various phases, from its early days during the Cold War to its post-Cold War “Golden Age” and now to its current challenges amid rising geopolitical tensions. Over the past ten years, this consensus-based organisation has been weakened significantly by the growing political divergences among its membership and, above all, by the deep breach in trust between Russia and the rest of Europe, precipitated by Russia’s 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine.

Nevertheless, key OSCE processes and field programmes such as electoral monitoring, crisis management on the ground, human rights advocacy, and post-conflict normalisation remain important tools in shoring up European security. The continued existence of a forum for dialogue between Russia and the rest of Europe may also prove valuable in the future, even if its current functioning is limited.

Finland’s upcoming Chairpersonship in 2025 marks the 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, a reminder that cooperation and dialogue were possible even amid the ideological divergences of the Cold War. The chairpersonship will aim to reinforce the common values captured by Helsinki – to the extent possible, given today’s ideological divergences.

Looking to the future, the discussion found that the OSCE’s role will continue to be profoundly affected by the future trajectory of Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine. Drawing on previous ELN work on scenarios for the future of European security under different war outcomes, the participants found that:

• In a scenario where the war precipitated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remains prolonged, but the wider Russia-NATO conflict is contained, the OSCE could play a significant role in addressing the human dimension of the conflict, particularly through humanitarian efforts, including assistance for those living in occupied territories.
• In a scenario involving creeping escalation between Russia and Western countries, the OSCE’s primary focus would be on reducing risks and managing tensions between Russia, Ukraine, and their respective allies. By utilising processes like the Moscow Mechanism, the OSCE could ensure transparency in prisoner-of-war treatment and collect data on war crimes.
• In a scenario of massive escalation, where there could be direct conflict between Russia and NATO countries, the OSCE’s influence would become extremely limited. Despite potential declines in funding and relevance, the OSCE’s diverse membership would keep the organisation on life-support as a crucial communication channel during and potentially after the conflict.
• In scenarios where Russia and Ukraine enter negotiations, the OSCE could potentially play an important role. The organisation’s capabilities and limitations need to be well understood: as an organisation of member states, including Russia and Ukraine, it would not realistically be able to kickstart or mediate in ceasefire or peace negotiations. However, if Ukraine, Russia, and other supporting states did embark on talks at some point in the future, the OSCE could provide technical advice and capacity to implement a future agreement, for instance, in monitoring any ceasefire. Participants noted that there is a perception, especially in Ukraine, that the OSCE failed because it did not prevent the 2022 invasion; the OSCE can mitigate this characterisation and improve its chances of being an effective partner in the implementation of a negotiated settlement by engaging in better public diplomacy, and reminding onlookers that the OSCE’s conflict prevention toolkit can only operate if there is political will to back it.

Looking ahead, the OSCE’s extensive experience in post-conflict aid and its focus on human security dimensions, like arms control, gender issues, and human rights, positions it well for a significant role in Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction and rebuilding of human security, including in disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation, and tackling the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

The OSCE’s future relevance may lie in its ability to act as a bridge between NATO’s hard security guarantees and its own soft security measures. Additionally, the OSCE’s diverse membership could make it a unique platform for dialogue between the West and Russia.

Given the anticipated insecurities and instabilities of the next 10-15 years, including the modernisation of nuclear arsenals and the impact of emerging technologies, the OSCE’s most impactful period may still lie ahead. Its varied toolbox of mechanisms and processes, combined with its unique membership dynamics, could position the OSCE as a crucial player in the future of European and global security architecture.