In March 2024, ELN partnered with CARPO and the Stimson Center on a track 1.5 on Iran and nuclear diplomacy. This workshop report draws on the main findings.

Key takeaways

• Iran’s leadership appears still to be interested in future talks with the US over its nuclear programme. While the IRGC generally opposed the JCPOA, they may be open to a new agreement. However, Iran will broadly want to maintain the progress it has made in its nuclear capabilities since it stopped complying with the JCPOA (after the US withdrawal). For key Western countries, this is unacceptable, so there is a wide gap in the starting positions for negotiations.
• Meanwhile Iran is stacking up bargaining chips to give itself more negotiating power – a risky process as these bargaining chips can themselves be seen as escalatory behaviour, whether they are advances in nuclear capabilities, the stronger role of Iran’s allied network of non-state armed groups (which is driven in part by the war in Gaza and by developments in their home countries, not only by decisions taken in Tehran), or state hostage-taking.
• When it comes to nuclear diplomacy with Iran, the key player is the US. However, Europe can play a role in encouraging the US and Iran to engage in effective diplomacy; in passing messages and supporting track two contacts; and in working with regional countries to encourage regional dialogue and détente, which will in turn reduce nuclear risks.
• Europe can also help to reinforce the importance of the wider multilateral non-proliferation regime, including as an argument for why China and Russia should be supporters rather than spoilers if a revived or new nuclear agreement is on the cards. P5+1 cooperation is much harder today, but it is not necessarily the case that Russia or China would spoil renewed nuclear diplomacy with Iran.
• While the role and cohesion of the E3 is particularly important, smaller neutral states can also play a role, including through support of track 1.5 and track 2 initiatives.
• It is easy to assume that there will be no serious movement on US-Iran diplomacy until after the 2024 presidential election. Yet certain factors are likely to apply to any US administration – whether it is led by Biden or Trump – including the desire to prevent a region-wide war.
• The political context for nuclear diplomacy has generally deteriorated since the JCPOA was negotiated: the non-proliferation regime faces wider strains and the P5 are deeply divided, while the number of issues of contention between Iran and Western countries has multiplied (in the region, in Iran’s internal repression, and with Iran becoming a weapons supplier to Russia).
• However, one area where there has been progress has been in Iran’s relations with its Gulf Arab neighbours. A process of dialogue and détente, particularly between Iran and Saudi Arabia, has survived October 7^th, the Gaza war and the growing violence in the region. Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain suspicious of Iran and relations could fracture again over the role of Iran-backed armed groups such as the Houthis, but there are at least diplomatic channels for the regional countries to try to de-escalate tensions.
• Regional dialogue will not substitute for US-Iran dialogue, but it could potentially help reinforce the need for it – especially if Saudi Arabia is willing to use its influence with the next US president to support nuclear diplomacy with Iran (as well as seeking more US security guarantees and its own civilian nuclear capabilities).
• Regional dialogue could also be leveraged to create incentives that could reinforce a wider international understanding with Iran – for example through economic cooperation projects with Gulf Arab countries (if US sanctions can be eased) and through civilian nuclear cooperation projects.
• Further ideas can be found in Barbara Slavin’s How To Prevent A Nuclear Crisis With Iran: https://www.stimson.org/2024/how-to-prevent-a-nuclear-crisis-with-iran/
• Since October 7^th and the Gaza war both the US and Iran have signalled they want to avoid a direct confrontation or an all-out regional war. If these positions are sustained (which is by no means certain), this experience could potentially help to establish some basis of confidence in future negotiations, especially under a second Biden administration.
• Nonetheless, the situation will remain risky and fragile. There is no diplomatic or political path in sight to resolve the conflict between Iran and its network on one hand, and Israel on the other, and there will continue to be a view among some in Israel that Israel may need military action to remove the threats on its borders, primarily from Hizbollah (to pre-empt the risks of a future attack against Israel). Even when a ceasefire is achieved in Gaza, it is likely that Israeli-Palestinian violence will continue.
• NB: the growing crisis in the region may be changing this “wait and see” attitude, especially as speculation has grown about Israel possibly attacking Iranian nuclear sites and since Iranian officials have said they would reconsider their stance on their nuclear programme if that happened.

Read the report here

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated in this report represent the views of the author rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.

Image credit: Wikimedia Commons / Omid Vahabzadeh