Emerging and disruptive technologies are changing our lives – including in the worlds of defence and security. The ELN has been working since 2020 to understand how future nuclear crises may be affected by the intersection of multiple rapidly evolving new technologies.
Building on these years of work with multiple partners and dozens of international experts, this report by ELN Policy Fellow Belén Bianco and ELN Senior Policy Fellow Rishi Paul presents the Guardrails and Self-Assessment (GSA) Framework for Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDTs) to raise awareness and familiarise stakeholders at various levels with the complex interplay between a multitude of technologies, NC3 systems, and nuclear weapons decision-making. We are grateful to the German Federal Foreign Office for their support of this work.
The GSA Framework aims to raise awareness and familiarise stakeholders at various levels with the complex interplay between a multitude of technologies, NC3 systems, and nuclear weapons decision-making.
This framework sets out the various kinds of risks that new technologies could pose to nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) systems and decision-making processes. Crucially, it provides tools that states can use to help assess and guide the safe use of EDTs in nuclear-weapons systems. The framework is designed to maximise the potential benefits that can come from EDTs while reducing risks, and help manage any future escalation, without undermining the substance and practice of deterrence.
The ELN’s approach differs from previous studies because it takes a holistic view of new technologies in the aggregate. When viewed as an aggregate, dimensions of complexity emerge revealing additional types of risks that could significantly impinge on the nuclear domain. These risks underscore the urgent need for careful management and proactive policies. Such measures are essential to maximise the benefits of advanced technologies while minimising their potential harms, all without undermining the substance and practice of deterrence.
The GSA Framework can help both states with and without nuclear weapons to implement responsible behaviours, policies, and practices and increase transparency around nuclear decisionmaking, fostering a more informed debate on nuclear risks. This is particularly important for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and groups of like-minded states, such as the Creating Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) group and the Stockholm Initiative (SI).
Recommendations
Given the limited experience that states have in managing security discussions on EDTs, the report offers preliminary recommendations for how to address this deficiency at various stakeholder levels.
National implementation of measures outlined in the GSA Framework.
- Nuclear possessing states and technologically advanced nonpossessing states adopting EDTs in their militaries should work toward the domestic adoption of the measures outlined in the GSA Framework.
- They could do so by pursuing national multistakeholder dialogues that focus on identifying requirements for the implementation of the GSA Framework and potential barriers to its operation.
State Parties to the NPT should adopt a joint statement recognising the risks created by the aggregate effects of EDTs on NC3 systems and nuclear weapons decision-making. They should also convene a working group on technological complexity.
- An agreed statement between a diverse group of states would lay the groundwork to establish a working group to study the issue in depth.
- State Parties should convene a working group on technological complexity to investigate how the GSA Framework can advance disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. To ensure inclusivity and a variety of perspectives, the working group should include participation from a range of stakeholders that include academia, civil society, and the private sector.
The P5 Process should include the impact of EDTs on nuclear decision-making and NC3 in its discussions and consider risk reduction measures via implementation of the GSA Framework.
- The P5 Process should consider the risks of adopting of EDTs in the military domain and potential responses to events involving these technologies.
- The GSA Framework can guide parties through the potential risks and reveal the most appropriate risk mitigation measures.
The SI should collaborate with stakeholders in identifying GSA measures for implementation and determining which risks outlined in the Framework should be incorporated in fail-safe reviews conducted by all nuclear-weapon states.
- The SI could establish two working groups. The first would focus on identifying and prioritising GSA measures for implementation by nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states.
- The second group could conduct a study to determine which risks outlined in the GSA Framework should be incorporated into fail-safe reviews conducted by all nuclear-weapon states.
Subgroup 3 of CEND should review the GSA Framework to evaluate its implementation and feasibility for both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states and assess how the aggregate effects of EDTs influence perceptions of disarmament obligations and responsibilities.
- By incorporating a review of the GSA Framework into its workplan, Subgroup 3 could address the risks posed by the aggregate effects of EDTs on nuclear weapons decision making and NC3.
- It could also consider assessing how the aggregate effects of EDTs influence perceptions of disarmament responsibilities and obligations among nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states.
NATO should prioritise technological complexity in its innovation activities and Implementation Strategy,1 including analysing the implications of EDTs for NC3 systems and nuclear weapons decision-making.
- Analysing the aggregate effects of EDTs on NC3 systems and nuclear weapons decision-making structures as a separate priority area would complement current efforts and help converge two strategic topics for NATO: EDTs and nuclear deterrence.
- The NATO Secretary General’s Advisory Group on EDTs could lead this work, using the GSA Framework to prioritise risks and recommend guardrails for national implementation.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated in this policy brief represent the views of the author rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image: Composite made from Wikimedia Commons, Sergkarman and Pixaby