The ELN’s first impact report details the organisation’s accomplishments in reducing the risk of existential conflict and the power of our unique network, even at moments of deep geopolitical tension.
Any monitoring mission deployed to observe an end to the hostilities in Ukraine is likely to incorporate a range of remote-sensing technologies to support its verification activities. Drawing on insights from the Norwegian research institute NORSAR’s real-time monitoring of the 2022 Ukraine conflict, this policy brief by Ben D.E. Dando, Kjølv Egeland, and Sebastian Schutte, finds that scientific advances and a growing availability of relevant data have made ‘seismo-acoustic’ analysis a cost-effective means of complementing, backing up, and in some cases replacing other ceasefire monitoring technologies.
In times of eroding arms control measures, nuclear-weapons states should consider enhancing transparency around their nuclear safety, security and reliability mechanisms (‘fail-safe’) to strengthen the risk reduction agenda. This policy brief, by ELN Senior Policy Fellow Julia Berghofer, shows how France and the UK can advance fail-safe individually and bilaterally, as well as in the P3 and P5 contexts. Non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT and members of NATO could also support this.
Fail-safe reviews aim to strengthen safeguards to prevent the unauthorised, inadvertent, or mistaken use of a nuclear weapon. In collaboration with NTI, EASLG, and APLN, the ELN has been working to highlight the benefits of independent, internal “fail-safe” reviews in nuclear-armed states. These summaries are from ELN and APLN nuclear fail-safe workshops with non-governmental partners in China, India, Pakistan, France, and the UK.
This policy brief explores the integration of digital twin technologies into nuclear decision-making processes, assessing their potential to reduce risks stemming from emerging disruptive technologies (EDTs). It argues for international dialogue, transparency, and responsible innovation to prevent misuse, enhance NC3 resilience, and strengthen strategic stability through informed, scenario-based crisis simulations.
At the 2025 NPT Preparatory Committee in New York this month a key issue likely to spark debate is the increasing salience of nuclear weapons. All five nuclear-weapon states under the NPT are increasing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies, at odds with the commitments accepted under the NPT. This new policy brief from the ELN’s Protecting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty project examines this challenge and offers recommendations for states to address it within the NPT framework.
This commentary collection compiles nine articles by ELN network members and external collaborators as part of the ELN’s Protecting the Non-Proliferation Treaty project. The collection was originally published for the 2025 NPT Preparatory Committee.
In January 2025, the ELN with support from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF), convened a roundtable to discuss ways forward for a resumption of Iran-US nuclear negotiations. European, American, Asian, and Middle East experts discussed the role of Gulf actors in developing a new deal, Iran’s shift in priorities under President Pezeshkian, and the implications of the changes in the regional architecture as a result of the war in Gaza.
Engaging China on multilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation has become more urgent, but also more difficult. Even in times of increased competition between China, Russia, and the US, Europeans have agency and will need to up their level of ambition in pursuing their own interests in making multilateral instruments more resilient. ELN Policy & Research Director Oliver Meier and Michael Staack call for focused, substantive, and flexible dialogues between Europeans and Chinese.