Our intergenerational Network is setting out to preserve the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation regime and prevent further erosion of the nuclear taboo and non-proliferation treaty (NPT). We’ll work to identify pathways to success in the eleventh review cycle, taking a holistic approach to the NPT and its three pillars.
Why?
International structures are resilient but not indestructible. The multilateral arms control regime is facing challenges and setbacks and requires investment. In 2018, US President Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which placed restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme. In 2019, we witnessed the end of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which had eliminated an entire category of nuclear weapons since the 1980s. And today, the renewal of the last remaining treaty limiting US and Russian nuclear arsenals, New START, is under threat.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, enhancing stability and transparency and preventing nuclear arms races. Our intergenerational network will seek to identify pathways to success in the coming review cycle leading to the 2026 Review Conference, helping to strengthen this critical treaty.
How?
We will be multifaceted in our approach, supporting relevant initiatives to guard against losing ground the treaty has made, identifying and pursuing new pathways to diplomatic success, and investing in the next generation of arms controllers.
We will deploy our Networks of experts, expand, and establish sub-working groups focusing on the areas members deem the most pressing, provisionally concentrating on enhancing consultations in the NPT Review Cycle, reinforcing the nuclear taboo in line with recent statements made by the P5 and G20, and considering the implications of a changed European and global security environment on the non-proliferation regime.
Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2026 Review Conference (31 July–11 August 2023)
This table provides an overview of State Parties’ proposals submitted to the Working Group on further strengthening the NPT Review Process.
From 22 July – 2 August, diplomats and governments were in Geneva to assess and make recommendations for the full implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, at the second Preparatory Committee of the 2026 Review Conference. The European Leadership Network was well represented. Several...
This commentary collection compiles 15 articles by 18 ELN network members and external collaborators as part of the ELN’s Protecting the Non-Proliferation Treaty project. The collection was originally published for the 2024 NPT Preparatory Committee.
Recent conventional skirmishes between Iran and Pakistan highlight the fact that having nuclear weapons does not guarantee that the ‘have nots’ will refrain from pursuing military action against a nuclear-armed state and all the associated escalatory risks that entails. ELN Senior Policy Fellow Dr Rishi Paul writes that in light of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the fact that Pakistan is not a signatory to the NPT, it is incumbent upon Islamabad to build the appropriate bilateral mechanisms to prevent any potential future escalations that could come about should Iran join the nuclear ‘club’.
The US, Russia, and the UK have explicitly stated their intention to deter non-nuclear strategic threats from new technologies with nuclear weapons. ELN Senior Policy Fellow Julia Berghofer writes that this could have destabilising effects, opening the door to new vulnerabilities and escalation risks. The N5 should discuss these policies as part of their longstanding dialogue on nuclear doctrines, and a public debate is required to explore potential alternative approaches.
In advance of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2026 Review Conference, ELN Policy and Research Director Oliver Meier argues that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has thrown the nuclear non-proliferation regime into crisis. Despite this, opportunities remain to revitalise multilateral frameworks. If N5 states are willing to compartmentalise nuclear arms control, and if the existing international organisations that govern arms nuclear control are better leveraged to build on past achievements, progress on mitigating nuclear risks can still be made.
The ambition of efforts to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons will depend on the overall trajectory of international politics. But the growing role and significance of nuclear weapons is both the result and a driver of rivalry between the nuclear-weapon states. Ahead of the 2024 NPT Preparatory Committee, this policy brief outlines what measures NPT states parties could take to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons depending on the international security environment.
For the first time since the Cold War, the UK’s Integrated Review increases the limit for British nuclear warheads. While Russia’s nuclear doctrine and emerging technologies seem to be the most important driver behind the decision, it will be difficult for the UK Government to justify how this fits with NPT disarmament obligations.
The recent P5 affirmation that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” as well as the incorporation of strategic risk reduction into the nuclear doctrines and dialogues working group are impactful and are welcome first measures. The P5 must now build on this momentum to discuss a substantive programme of work which must will lead to the implementation of concrete risk reduction measures within the eleventh review cycle.
In this report, Tariq Rauf discusses organisational matters relating to the postponement of the review conference to 2021 due to the Covid-19 pandemic and considers the proposal to convene the conference in 2022 in Vienna, Austria.
