In a new policy brief, ELN Senior Associate Fellows Simon Lunn and Nicholas Williams examine the dual-capable nature of Russia’s medium and short-range missiles, and their implications for NATO’s strategy. Acknowledging the relationship between the nuclear and conventional dimensions, and in the context of Putin’s menacing references to Russia’s nuclear weapons, it looks at the impact on NATO strategy at both levels.
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) leaders meeting at their July Summit in Washington DC have faced a wide range of issues, including global and regional threats, the ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine, Putin’s nuclear threats, a worsening economic climate, and an almost total absence of dialogue and negotiations on arms control. Given the persistence of Russian aggression in Ukraine and hostility to NATO at many levels, their attention focussed primarily on the need to ensure the continuing credibility of NATO’s strategy of deterrence and defence.
A key challenge to the credibility of NATO’s posture lies in the deployment by Russia of substantial numbers of dual-capable medium and short-range missiles, which, in the absence of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) limits, could be perceived as giving Russia a decisive advantage at critical stages of any crisis or conflict. Russia’s superiority in dual-capable missiles poses a threat to both the nuclear and conventional levels of NATO’s strategy. Ahead of NATO’s next summit in the Netherlands in 2025, NATO leaders should what measures are necessary to counter the resulting vulnerabilities and ensure the Alliance’s strategy remains credible. A first step has already been made. The United States will begin episodic deployments of the long-range conventional missile capabilities in Germany in 2026, as part of planning for enduring stationing of these capabilities in the future.
This brief examines the dual nature of the Russian missiles and the threat they pose to NATO’s strategy. It discusses this threat in the context of Putin’s menacing references to Russia’s nuclear weapons and the influence it is suggested these have exerted on Alliance policymaking – a situation exacerbated by the uncertainty inherent in dual capability. Acknowledging the relationship between the nuclear and conventional dimensions, it looks at the impact on NATO strategy at both levels, recognising the overall synergy in times of crisis and war but noting the inevitable blurring of intent and consequence caused by dual capability.
For conventional forces, the missile threat has particular consequences for NATO’s strategy of reinforcement, highlighting the importance of missile defence, but also the possible need for NATO ground-launched capabilities with sufficient precision and fire-power to offset Russian capabilities. At the nuclear level, the brief discusses whether the asymmetry in non-strategic nuclear forces could be perceived as a vulnerability in NATO’s nuclear posture and could revive traditional European fears of being decoupled from United States nuclear protection. However, it recognises that discussions of NATO’s nuclear policy now take place in an Alliance of 32 members, many of whom may not share the anxieties of the past but bring their own contemporary concerns and priorities. Evidently, the Alliance’s strategy will continue to require a balanced mix of deterrence and reassurance.
It assesses the potential reaction of alliance members to a new focus on strengthening NATO’s nuclear posture as the key element in deterring Russian use of its non-strategic nuclear weapons. It also examines the planned improvements to NATO’s Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA) mission, which is designed to make NATO’s nuclear posture more robust, representing a substantial enhancement in capability. The priority in discussions on the Alliance’s strategy will be inevitably on military measures of deterrence and defence. However, despite the inherent difficulties in this field, the potential contribution of arms control must not be forgotten. European security will not be served if the numbers of non-strategic dual-capable forces are left to run free.
Read the full policy brief here.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated in this policy brief represent the views of the author(s) rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
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Image credit: Wikimedia Commons / Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation
