The European Leadership Network’s Nuclear and New Technologies Project aims to reduce nuclear risk by helping states in identifying and addressing potential pathways to nuclear use, as well as mitigating mistakes or miscalculations that could arise from the complex interplay between EDTs and nuclear decision-making. As EDTs increasingly intersect with nuclear systems, they introduce new layers of technological complexity that can exacerbate pressures and escalate crises to the nuclear level.
Traditional deterrence models, grounded in static historical data and assumptions, are no longer adequate to navigate this evolving landscape. Digital twins — real-time, continuously updated virtual models of nuclear decision-making environments — offer a dynamic, scenario-based learning tool that enables decision makers to stress-test NC3 systems, model crisis dynamics, and refine response strategies in real time. By providing structured, evidence-based insights that were previously unavailable, digital twins enhance the capacity of Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to anticipate and mitigate escalation risks. Originally developed for engineering and manufacturing, digital twins have been adopted in urban planning, aerospace, and military strategy due to their ability to test scenarios, adapt to new data, and enhance strategic foresight.
The ELN and AICF’s recent expert testing of a baseline prototype digital twin, between October 2024 and February 2025, replicated aspects of high-level nuclear decision making; it identified that one of their most valuable applications lies in crisis escalation modelling, where they replicate possible nuclear escalation pathways under diverse conditions, including miscalculations, misperceptions, misinterpretations, as well as technical failures and cyber threats. By creating virtual environments that replicate operational complexities of NC3, digital twins can therefore enable opportunities for policymakers, decision-makers, and defence analysts to explore vulnerabilities, assess system integrity, and refine decision-making frameworks to ensure that command structures remain secure and functional under pressure.
This policy brief highlights the critical need for incorporating digital twins as a nuclear risk reduction tool and outlines the potential benefits they offer in strengthening strategic stability. Recognising that states have limited experience in managing security dialogues around the application of digital twins in nuclear decision-making, the policy brief offers preliminary recommendations to address this gap at various levels.
Recommendations
1. The Stockholm Initiative has demonstrated a strong interest in addressing the impact of EDTs on nuclear risks and strategic stability, alongside its commitment to advancing nuclear risk reduction measures. It has previously urged the NWS to implement and innovate practical steps to minimise nuclear risks, particularly in pursuit of long-term disarmament goals.
To advance these objectives, the Stockholm Initiative could create a working group that focuses on identifying and prioritising Guardrail and Self-Assessment (GSA) Framework measures that could be integrated into digital twins developed by NWS and used for EDT – nuclear crisis simulations and NC3 risk assessments, as well as failsafe reviews. While the United States recently undertook such a review under the Biden administration, the other P5 members have yet to follow suit. The Stockholm Initiative could play a constructive role by re-engaging the P5 to include failsafe measures in their discussions, promoting greater transparency in national practices and encouraging the adoption of a best-practice approach to nuclear weapons safety.
2. The P5 have initiated discussions to enhance transparency around their nuclear doctrines. These efforts should be expanded to include structured exchanges on risk reduction notifications and data sharing, critical components of sustained, long-term risk reduction. As a priority, the NWS should also integrate discussions on the effects of EDTs on nuclear risks into their agenda. Building on this, they should then intensify their commitment to their NPT disarmament obligations, facilitate confidence-building between them, and explore the potential of digital twins as an avenue for exploring the impact of EDTs on nuclear decision-making processes and NC3 systems.
Although the use of digital twins presents opportunities for nuclear risk reduction, there is a real risk that NWS could misuse the technology to enhance warfighting strategies. Such actions could lower the nuclear threshold and deepen mistrust, with each state suspecting adversaries of using data generated from digital twins as justification for developing pre-emptive strategies. To mitigate the risk of an AI/NC3 race to the bottom and open avenues for shared ‘rules of the road’, the NWS should commit to sustained dialogue focused on the responsible and transparent use of these technologies. This commitment would lay a foundation for dialogue on the responsible integration of digital twins into their individual nuclear safety and security frameworks.
A P5 effort to explore these technologies in dialogue could play a pivotal role in fostering trust and mutual understanding, while serving as the starting point for a transparent exchange of relevant risk reduction data. Such dialogue would not only strengthen confidence among the NWS, but also create a shared, evidence-based foundation for informed and responsible nuclear decision-making.
3. State Parties to the NPT had agreed in the 2022 draft statement that the NWS should take steps to better understand and mitigate vulnerabilities arising from potentially disruptive technologies and cyber capabilities as they pertain to nuclear weapons. The 2022 Review Conference draft final document reflected an agreement that the NWS would enhance efforts to report on their nuclear arsenals and capabilities, while safeguarding national security, and provide greater transparency on national measures related to nuclear disarmament, including nuclear policies, doctrines, and risk reduction efforts. To build on this convergence of positions, NPT State Parties should establish an intersessional working group to examine these issues in depth. The working group should be open-ended to enable representatives from both NWS and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) to participate and be co-chaired by one member from each group. Its mandate could be twofold: first, to explore how digital twin technologies can contribute to advancing the Treaty’s objectives; and second to identify practical steps for facilitating technical exchanges between NWS and NNWS on digital twin data related to the effects of technological complexity on nuclear escalation dynamics and risk reduction. It could report to NPT meetings of states parties, leading up to the 12th NPT Review Conference.
4. NWS should initiate internal dialogues to assess the feasibility of integrating the proposed Digital Twin Nuclear Decision Framework (DT-NDF) into their national nuclear decision making processes and identify concrete steps to doing so Elements of these dialogues should adopt a multi-stakeholder format, ensuring the inclusion of a diverse range of relevant participants, including civil society experts with expertise in digital twin technologies. For the civil society level, a working group could be created to study issues such as transparency in AI-assisted decision-making, preventing misuse of digital twins in the nuclear domain, and ensuring secure and tamper-proof digital twin models.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated in this policy brief represent the views of the author rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image credit: Wikimedia Commons / Flintmichigan and Wikimedia Commons / Martin Vorel
