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Policy brief | 16 December 2024

Stop the bleeding: How to protect existing NPT disarmament agreements and commitments

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Steps to protect the Article 6 acquis on nuclear disarmament are a necessary, though probably not sufficient, condition for success of the 2026 NPT Review Conference (RevCon). Focusing on preserving New START core obligations and the norm against nuclear testing embodied in the CTBT, ranks high both on desirability and achievability. These issues are, therefore, a good place to start any effort to protect the NPT and pursue ways to strengthen the treaty.

The nuclear disarmament acquis is threatened from many directions. All nuclear weapon states are modernising their nuclear arsenals, preparing to keep them in service for several decades. Moscow backtracked from key disarmament commitments, including next steps on arms control and the CTBT. China is building up its nuclear arsenal, raising fears of an unprecedented three-way arms race between China, Russia, and the United States (US). All of these developments contravene the spirit and, in some cases, the letter of agreements and commitments made under the NPT.

In such a volatile environment, it is useful to consider steps that states parties may take to protect the nuclear disarmament acquis under different scenarios.

There is still considerable uncertainty under what political circumstances states parties will convene for the 11th RevCon in 2026. In such a volatile environment, this policy brief considers what steps states parties may take to protect the nuclear disarmament acquis under different scenarios.

Under a dark sky, with further retrenchment on existing commitments, NPT states parties should agree on a set of baseline measures. In particular they should:

  • Call on Russia and the US to commit publicly to observing New START limits on warheads and delivery vehicles, at least until they have agreed on a new arms control framework;
  • Make clear statements on the importance of non-testing. This holds true particularly for those states that have political clout in China, Russia and the US or are allied with them.

Under a grey sky, where the disarmament context would be similar to today’s environment, NPT members should:

  • Call on all nuclear weapon states to freeze the size of their nuclear arsenals, at least until the US and Russia have agreed on a follow-on agreement to New START;
  • Recommit to maintaining all existing moratoria on nuclear weapon test explosions.

Under a blue sky, where Russia and the US may have resumed talks on an arms control framework for New START and China has signalled its willingness to be more transparent about the goals and scope of its nuclear build-up and modernisation programme, NPT members should:

  • Agree to begin discussions on a roadmap for nuclear disarmament in the 12th Review Cycle, taking into account proposals and suggestions from all states;
  • Call for the verifiable closure of all nuclear weapon states’ test sites.

Read the policy brief here.

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated in this policy brief represent the views of the author rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.

Image: An aerial view after the first atomic explosion at Trinity Test Site, N.M., 1945. Associated Press / Alamy Stock Photo

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