Getting Deterrence Right: How bias influences Russian nuclear thinking
This project explores how cognitive and institutional biases shape Russian nuclear decision-making. By integrating insights from behavioural science into deterrence analysis, it seeks to improve understanding of how Moscow evaluates escalation risks, including both how Russia signals and how it interprets Western actions, and what this means for UK and allied deterrence strategy.
Moving beyond traditional rational-actor models, the project examines how perceptions, misperceptions, and risk tolerance influence nuclear signalling, escalation behaviour, and the interpretation of potential adversary actions.
Why this matters:
Western deterrence theory has often assumed that potential nuclear-armed adversaries are mostly risk-averse and will mostly seek to avoid escalation. This assumption, rooted in Cold War-era strategic thinking, can create what we describe as a “stability bias” — the expectation that nuclear-armed states will ultimately behave cautiously in order to prevent catastrophic outcomes. However, this assumption may not fully reflect today’s strategic environment, where political pressures, perceptions of vulnerability, and differing strategic cultures can shape how risks are understood and managed.
At the same time, changes in Western deterrence posture — including nuclear modernisation, evolving declaratory policy, and NATO’s enhanced forward presence — also influence how potential adversaries interpret signals and assess escalation dynamics. This project therefore examines not only Russian nuclear signalling behaviour, but also how Russia perceives and responds to Western actions.
Behavioural research shows that decision-makers rarely assess risks in purely rational terms. Instead, their perceptions are shaped by cognitive biases, institutional cultures, emotions, and concerns about status and reputation. In the nuclear domain, these psychological and organisational factors can influence how escalation signals are interpreted, how threats are perceived, and how much risk decision-makers are willing to accept.
When potential adversaries interpret signals through different cognitive lenses, misaligned perceptions can emerge. Russia may view Western reassurance measures as evidence of encirclement, while Western policymakers may assume that Moscow evaluates escalation risks in the same way they do. These gaps in perception can create dangerous dynamics during crises.
Understanding how such biases operate, both in shaping Russian behaviour and in influencing how Russia interprets Western actions, is therefore essential for reducing the risk of miscalculation and strengthening the credibility and effectiveness of deterrence.
How:
The research will address two questions central to UK and allied deterrence:
- Which biases and escalation logics most influence Russian nuclear choices?
- What are the implications for the UK’s deterrence strategy?
To achieve this, the project combines empirical research, conceptual development, simulation, and expert engagement into a single integrated analytical approach.
- Empirical research
First, the project systematically maps Russian nuclear signalling and escalation behaviour in interactions with the West since 2014. This provides an empirical foundation for identifying recurring patterns — or escalation logics — and understanding how Russia communicates risk and resolve in different contexts.
Alongside this, the project examines how Russia interprets Western deterrence posture and signalling, recognising that escalation dynamics are shaped as much by perception as by action.
- Conceptual development
Building on this empirical base, the project develops a Nuclear Deterrence Bias Framework and a structured Bias Matrix to identify and assess the cognitive biases most likely to influence Russian nuclear decision-making. These tools translate behavioural science insights into a form that can be applied directly to deterrence analysis.
- Simulation exercises
The project then uses structured simulation to explore how different biases shape escalation pathways in crisis scenarios. By testing how outcomes vary when biases are present, amplified, or removed, the simulation helps reveal where misperception and risk tolerance may alter strategic decision-making.
- Expert collaboration
Throughout, the research is supported by a dedicated interdisciplinary working group and a series of expert interviews, drawing on the European Leadership Network’s extensive networks of deterrence specialists, behavioural scientists, and policy practitioners. This ensures that findings are rigorously tested, benefit from diverse perspectives, and remain closely grounded in both theory and policy relevance.
Together, these approaches will provide a more nuanced understanding of how Russian nuclear behaviour is shaped by both signalling practices and the interpretation of external actions, and where Western assumptions may diverge.
Staff Contacts
