Nuclear Deterrence and Risk Reduction
Nuclear deterrence continues to underpin Euro-Atlantic security, but the environment in which it operates is becoming more complex and volatile. Intensifying geopolitical competition, rapid technological change, and increasing integration of conventional and nuclear postures are reshaping deterrence dynamics, while compressed decision-making timelines heighten the risks of misperception and unintended escalation.
Deterrence is often treated as stable and predictable. In practice, it is shaped by human judgement, cognitive bias, organisational pressures, and ambiguous signalling. Measures intended to reassure or stabilise can be interpreted in unintended ways, creating escalation pathways that are difficult to anticipate or control.
The ELN’s Nuclear Deterrence and Risk Reduction Programme examines how deterrence functions in real-world conditions, focusing on how decision-makers interpret signals, assess risk, and make escalation judgements under uncertainty. It brings together policy analysis, behavioural insights, and practitioner experience to identify where risks are most acute.
Through research, dialogue, and convening, the programme translates analysis into practical recommendations shaped with those directly responsible for security decision-making. By leveraging ELN’s unique network and access, it drives real-world policy impact, working to reduce nuclear risks, strengthen crisis management, and help prevent catastrophic conflict.
Programme Publications
Is this the end of automatic Atlanticism in Germany?
Germany is entering a new era in its relationship with the United States. The old Atlanticist reflex has not disappeared, however it no longer reflects the instincts of the next generation of senior officials. For them, the moral clarity of the Cold War is not the starting point. It is an era of disruption, doubt, and strategic volatility. Berlin should take this into account, writes Vincent Tadday. The future of the transatlantic relationship will not be secured by waiting for the past to return.
Different roles, shared outcomes: Europe in the Indo-Pacific
At NATO headquarters and in European chancelleries, a new consensus has emerged: the security of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific is indivisible. Yet Europe’s major powers are responding to this reality in strikingly different ways. As Harvard Kennedy School Fellow Joel Christoph writes, this divergence is not a weakness to be papered over. It is an asset that should be organised.
At cross purposes? The TPNW and US alliance commitments
As the US behaves with increasing unpredictability, it is becoming necessary for its allies to develop more independent foreign policy paths. Taking a leadership role on the TPNW could be part of that shift, writes Davis Ellison. This does not mean allies should immediately join the treaty, but rather that the assumption of incompatibility has unnecessarily constrained debate.
Related Content
Why the NPT and TPNW must work together to prevent nuclear insecurity
At a time of heightened nuclear risk, the credibility of the non-proliferation regime increasingly depends not on treating the NPT and TPNW as rival models, but on finding ways for them to function in a mutually reinforcing way. As Simabatu Mayele Sims Nono writes, reshaping the NPT-TPNW relationship can turn it from a source of fragmentation into a lever for stabilisation.
ELN reflections: 2026 NPT Review Conference
Amid mounting geopolitical tensions and deepening scepticism about multilateral diplomacy, diplomats, experts, and civil society representatives are gathering in New York for the 2026 NPT Review Conference to confront growing divisions over disarmament and non-proliferation. In these reflections, ELN staff who attended the RevCon examine the mounting risks facing the global nuclear order, and consider what they reveal about the future of the NPT regime.
Understanding Hungary’s political earthquake and the rise of Péter Magyar
Balázs Csuday writes that Péter Magyar’s landslide victory has upended Hungary’s political order, opening the door to constitutional conflict, institutional upheaval, and a major foreign policy reset after 16 years of Viktor Orbán’s rule. The result could reshape Hungary’s relationship with the European Union and reverberate across Europe’s populist right.