Nuclear and New Technologies
In 2020, the European Leadership Network (ELN) in cooperation with partners set out on a journey to unpack technological complexity as it impacts nuclear decision-making and propose practical policy approaches to deal with related risks.
Project Team
The challenge we want to address
Nuclear decision-making is complex. Disruptive technologies pose both risks and opportunities to nuclear decision-making which need to be better explained, understood, gamed, and mitigated. The project’s focus is on the – so far under-examined – implications of the technological complexity that emerges when nuclear decision-making is affected by a plethora of new technologies which are all evolving rapidly and simultaneously. Building on existing work that looks at the impact of individual technologies on nuclear policy, this project assesses the impact of these technologies in the aggregate, seeks to overcome related risks and explores opportunities offered by technologies to mitigate these risks.
Leveraging on the ELN’s deep expertise, convening power, and network of seasoned, high-level practitioners from multiple countries and utilizing ELN’s partner organizations strengths, we have embarked on a path to study, analyze, describe, train, and recommend decision-makers on nuclear policy challenges of technological complexities.
The project will develop, test-drive, propose and promote practical policy approaches that governments might pursue to begin to responsibly regulate and steer the weaponization of potentially disruptive technologies and their use in nuclear decision making.
The objectives of this multi-year project are to reduce risk in the nuclear decision-making, identify mitigation strategies, de-escalation solutions and manage potential and unintended escalation. We also strive to engage and raise the voice of younger generation experts in the discussion.
To commence work, the ELN in partnership with the German Federal Foreign Office has organized and hosted a “Rethinking Arms Control” workshop in March 2021. This closed-door meeting brought a diverse group of experts of scholars, practitioners, former nuclear weapons decision-makers, and emerging leaders to ideate and analyse the challenges, opportunities, and pitfalls of technological complexity. The summary of the proceedings and major takeaways from the workshop ARE highlighted in the following report: New Technologies, Complexity, Nuclear Decision Making and Arms Control: Workshop Report, June 2021
How we want to achieve the goal
The project is built upon four strands which – like four legs of a stool – support the main goal. These are:
- Baselining Exercise
- Big Data Analysis of Emerging and Disruptive Technologies
- Methodologies to Deal with Multi-tech Complexities
- Mitigation Strategies & Arms Control
We begin by asking what the science (strand 1), practioners (strand 2) and current policies and tools (strand 3) tell us about the impact of and ways of dealing with technological complexity in nuclear decision making. We then craft policy approaches that governments might pursue (strand 3 and 4).
This comprehensive approach allows us to unpack technological complexity by harnessing the brightest minds around the world, test policy approaches with people who “have been there and done it” and use our networks to develop and promote solutions with current decision-makers.
Funding from the German Federal Foreign Office, the MacArthur Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the Heinrich Böll Foundation and in-kind contributions from project partners make this work possible.
The Four Strands
Nuclear and New Technology Publications
Commentary
AI enables strategic stupidity. That should terrify Europe
AI-enabled warfare is giving the United States unprecedented tactical reach while eroding strategic restraint, writes Erasmus University Rotterdam Professor Michal Onderco. From the Caracas raid to strikes in Iran, reduced risks enable operations with minimal casualties. That ease lowers the bar for war, leaving allies exposed to miscalculation and dependence on a partner willing to act without planning the aftermath.
Report
Towards a better understanding of human bias in nuclear decision-making and its interaction with emerging and disruptive technologies
This report by Ganna Pogrebna and ELN Senior Policy Fellow Rishi Paul presents findings from an ELN workshop that examined the ‘human’ and ‘machine’ components of bias and their points of interaction. The report highlights how human judgment and AI systems can interact in ways that reinforce, rather than reduce, risk.
Commentary
The AI lens of cognitive warfare: Why LLMs language bias is a security risk
In a new study testing six leading AI models, YGLN member Ihor Samokhodskyi found that the language in which users ask AI chatbots questions about Russia’s war in Ukraine affects the likelihood that answers contain disinformation or propaganda. Samokhodskyi writes that this is a cognitive warfare problem that shapes how millions of users understand contested events. Europe needs to take three policy steps to address this.
Commentary
The NPT can’t ignore emerging technologies anymore
As State Parties prepare for the 2026 Review Conference, Bailey Schiff and Diya Ashtakala write that engaging with emerging technologies, which are already transforming military programmes, as well as verification and civilian nuclear programmes, offers a way to break entrenched debates. Revisiting longstanding challenges regarding non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology through the framework of emerging technologies may be one of the few practical paths to relieve pressure on the NPT by opening space for innovation and debate across the three pillars.
Commentary
Why states should remain in the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention: humanitarian and security imperatives
On Saturday, 10 January, Finland’s withdrawal from the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention or ‘Ottawa Treaty’, will come into effect. This follows the earlier withdrawals of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. Gary Toombs writes that while landmines may seem appealing as cheap, simple tools of defence, in reality, they are militarily outdated, strategically counterproductive, and devastating in humanitarian, economic, and environmental terms. States on the path to leaving the treaty should reconsider, as withdrawal would not strengthen their security but would undermine international law, erode alliances, and cause generational harm.
Commentary
Network Reflections: What to watch in 2026
At the start of the new year, members of the European Leadership Network’s senior and younger-generation leaders’ networks offer their perspectives on their defining issue or policy trend to watch in 2026.
Project Partners
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European Leadership Network (ELN)
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Federal Foreign Office
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The Arms Control Association (ACA)
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The Council on Strategic Risks (CSR)
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The Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)
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The Oracle Partnership
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Professor Andrew Futter, University of Leicester
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The British American Security Information Council (BASIC)
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The Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (HBS)
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The Younger Generation Leaders Network on Euro-Atlantic Security (YGLN)
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Dr Vladimir Kozin (Analytical Agency “Strategic Stability")
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