At a time when geopolitical tensions, great power competition, and emerging technologies are heightening nuclear risks, the 2025 NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) in New York represented a critical juncture for both reflection and action. At the end of the two weeks, state parties failed to reach a consensus on recommendations to take to the Review Conference in 2026, again underscoring the NPT not merely as a legal instrument but as a political system under pressure. Throughout the first week, the European Leadership Network (ELN)’s experts, network members, and partners shared analysis and practical tools, grappling with the future of the Treaty. By hosting two formal side events, facilitating informal diplomacy, and presenting forward-looking tools that utilise the latest technologies, our focus remained firmly on reducing current nuclear risks. 

Reducing the Salience of Nuclear Weapons 

On the opening day, ELN Policy Fellow Dr. Jana Baldus chaired and spoke at a side event co-hosted with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “Reducing the Salience of Nuclear Weapons: Practical Steps for a Safer Future.” The event brought together a cross-section of NPT delegates to examine what it would mean, in real terms, for states to rely less on nuclear deterrence in the current geopolitical environment. Senior Policy Fellow Julia Berghofer presented findings from a project funded by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, exploring how states can respond to security challenges and technological threats without increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons. Senior Network member and former UK MoD official Tom McKane addressed attendees from the perspective of nuclear weapons states, encouraging debate on the drivers of deterrence and steps to take toward disarmament. YGLN member Patricia Jaworek, in addition to bringing generational diversity, spoke about disruptors to the global nuclear order, proliferation risks, and the need for dialogue to be viewed not as a reward but as an essential tool in risk management. A robust discussion and Q&A with delegates followed regarding shifting doctrines and perceptions of strategic stability.  

ELN Policy Fellow Dr. Jana Baldus responds to the question: “Are states becoming more reliant on nuclear weapons for their security?”

Reviewing the Safety, Security, and Reliability of Nuclear Weapons  

Later in the week, the ELN co-hosted a breakfast discussion with the German Federal Foreign Office at the German Mission to the UN. The event focused on how nuclear weapon states can reduce risks by enhancing transparency around their nuclear safety, security, and reliability procedures, especially in times of heightened risks stemming from new and emerging technologies. The session featured insights from U.S. Senator (Ret.) Sam Nunn and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs Deborah Rosenblum. Both stressed the moral and strategic imperative for nuclear-armed states to invest in reviewing the assumptions and mechanisms underpinning nuclear command, control and communications systems, alongside their modernisation. The discussion resonated with nuclear and non-nuclear states, underscoring a shared interest in minimising risk and enhancing transparency. 

ELN staff with Senator Sam Nunn (Ret.) and Deborah Rosenblum.

Integrating Emerging Technologies into Risk Reduction Strategies

A further ELN event presented findings from our multi-year work on the intersection of technology complexity and nuclear decision-making. On May 1, Senior Policy Fellow Dr. Rishi Paul presented “From Simulation to Strategy: How AI can unpack technological complexity and advance nuclear risk reduction”, supported by the German Federal Foreign Office.

The session featured a presentation of two ELN co-created risk reduction tools: an AI-powered simulation and a baseline digital twin prototype, developed in partnership with Adarga (presented by Louise West) and Charles Sturt University’s AI and Cyber Futures Institute (presented by Jake McNaughton).

Our panel shared findings on how AI can be used to generate synthetic data to address gaps where historical data is limited, unpack technological complexity arising from the aggregate effects of EDTs on nuclear weapons decision-making, and provide policymakers with innovative ways to model de-escalation scenarios. The discussion also explored how AI-driven simulations and digital twins can support failsafe reviews and stress-test the Guardrails and Self-Assessment Framework, helping to identify potential points of failure, assess NC3 system resilience, and ensure safeguards remain effective across a range of scenarios.

Following the event, delegates had the opportunity to engage directly with the baseline digital twin prototype, sparking valuable discussions on the role of AI in challenging assumptions, testing outcomes, and exploring alternative pathways without the risks inherent in real-world crises.

Informal Diplomacy and Forward Planning

Members of the YGLN from Germany, Russia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States also gathered at PrepCom. In addition to attending the above events and informal networking opportunities, they met with YGLN alumni and President and CEO of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Alexandra Bell, to discuss multilateralism and steps toward nuclear risk reduction, and attended the EU Mission to the UN for a briefing on approaches to the NPT.

As always, the ELN team fostered crucial connections with government officials and diplomats, engaging in quiet diplomacy in parallel with its formal events. Being in New York, the teamwe also seized the opportunity to engage with key funders and partners, holding a series of strategic conversations on the next phase of our nuclear policy work, particularly around risk reduction, transparency, and network engagement. We look forward to continuing our work on these projects to the 2026 RevCon and beyond.

Reflections from ELN Policy and Research Director

The failure to reach consensus is unfortunate but not unprecedented – past PrepComs have also ended without agreed recommendations. However, states parties missed a real opportunity by not endorsing the decision to strengthen the review process, particularly in the areas of transparency and reporting.

Despite the deteriorated international security environment, it was positive to see substantive discussions on key issues such as transparency, reporting, and risk reduction. These topics have seen growing engagement in recent years, with efforts to bridge gaps between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states. Side events and joint statements suggest these issues could form common ground at the upcoming RevCon.

It is also positive that Viet Nam was appointed early as the Chair for the 2026 RevCon, giving them time to engage with key stakeholders and regional groups.

Looking ahead, much will depend on the Chair’s ability to navigate tensions among nuclear-weapon states and address polarisation within the NPT. The course of the Ukraine war, the nuclear issue with Iran, and developments within the US State Department will all shape the outcome of the next RevCon.