The fall of the Assad government was a serious blow to Moscow’s image in the MENA region and on the international stage. It was a major reality check for those who believed the Kremlin’s support could be the key to political survival. Yet, Assad’s fall is unlikely to be a turning point in Russia’s presence in the wider Middle East. The significance of Syria as a factor shaping Moscow’s presence in the region has changed greatly since the mid-2010s, and Russia has established more wide-ranging relationships across the region.
The list of Russia’s losses from Assad’s fall is relatively clear. Russia will probably be asked to leave its Khmeimim and Tartus military bases. Russia has already made some preparations for that: media reports argue that Russia is gradually withdrawing its military equipment from these bases. The Kremlin’s image as a player that ‘leaves none behind’ is gone. According to some rough estimates, Russian potential economic losses amount to billions of dollars in loans and investments. Meanwhile, the Kremlin’s propaganda faces a new challenge on the domestic political track on how to explain why the Russian victory over the opponents of the Damascus regime, proclaimed by Putin on several occasions in 2016–17, has now given way to Assad’s fall. However, the real significance of these losses for the Kremlin might be less crucial than they seem.
Assad's fall is unlikely to be a turning point in Russia’s presence in the wider Middle East. Nikolay Kozhanov
First, Moscow does not have to make any special efforts to explain the reasons for the Syrian failure to the domestic audience. The Russian authorities have already developed a simple formula for the answer: ‘we were only providing limited support but it was Assad’s responsibility to fight and manage the country (oh, by the way, we can also help his successors)’. Given the absence of any substantial discussion on Assad’s fall in the Russian public space so far, such an argument works quite well with ordinary Russians who are more preoccupied with the ongoing war in Ukraine and less interested in Syria.
Second, economic factors were never the primary motive for the Russian leadership to hold on to Syria until the end. Putin has not treated the economic considerations as important for Russia’s foreign policy unless they are related to the survival of his own regime. The Kremlin instead perceived the Syrian economy as a (useless?) trophy.
Third, the loss of military bases in Syria could indeed be a sensitive blow to Russian interests, but in Africa rather than in the Middle East: Khmeimim was an important element in Russia’s military logistics, facilitating the delivery of heavy equipment needed to support Russian (and their allies’) operations in Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa (Libya, Mali, Niger, Sudan and the Central African Republic). However, Russia can compensate for this loss by restructuring its logistics: it is expensive but entirely possible. Moreover, no one in Syria is closing Russia’s bases yet (although Moscow has minimal chances of holding them in the medium term). In any case, in a practical sense, the use of these bases is very difficult for Russia while the war in Ukraine is ongoing because the Russian Black Sea fleet is locked in its bases.
In practice, regional players have long understood the limitations of Moscow's capabilities. Nikolay Kozhanov
Finally, the question of whether Russia has lost face remains open. Undoubtedly, the blow to Russia’s image in the international arena was significant. Moscow was reminded of the inadequacy of its claims to the status of a ‘great power’. Yet, if talking about the Middle East, it is difficult to lose something that you never had. After the deployment of Russian troops in Syria in 2015, the Middle East and Africa region quickly realised that Russia was not the USSR 2.0 or an alternative to the United States. Moscow could be a supplier of military force and a chance to change some political balance, but it could not be a source of tangible financial support, an economic growth sponsor, a social change engineer, or even an external guarantor of ‘eternal rule’ for the autocratic regimes. Moreover, even in the Persian Gulf region, after 2015, I repeatedly heard from Arab diplomats: “Moscow is an active player, and its initiatives are interesting, but it is not always able to fulfil its promises and deliver.” In other words, expectations of Russia’s role have always been tempered with some realism.
Indeed, the deployment of Russian troops in Syria became a serious bid for Russia to be an important force in the region. However, the speeches of Middle Eastern (and African) leaders about Russia’s greatness during their visits to Moscow (or Putin’s visits to the region) were more designed to indulge the ego of the Russian leadership. In practice, regional players have long understood the limitations of Moscow’s capabilities. Similarly, the failed attempt by Haftar to take Tripoli in 2019-2020 showed that Moscow’s support is far from a guarantee of success. The fall of the Damascus regime has only confirmed this more concretely.
On the other hand, by 2024, Syria had lost its exclusive importance as an asset helping Russia to project its power in the region. Eight years after the invasion, a host of new – more important – factors shaping the Kremlin’s relations with the region emerged. These include Russia’s role within OPEC+, its increased importance for some regional states’ food and energy security, and Moscow’s intense diplomacy. Its transport corridor initiatives, increased trade and investment cooperation with the regional players, as well as a pro-Palestinian stance on Gaza also drove Russia’s relations with the region. Even in Iran, Syria has ceased to be one of the leading platforms for developing bilateral dialogue.
Moscow will maintain its presence in the region, it will force other players to reckon with it, albeit as a second-class player. Nikolay Kozhanov
Moreover, in terms of Moscow’s priorities, the centre of Russia’s interests in the Middle East moved away from North Africa and the Levant to the Persian Gulf and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. There, the political environment seriously favours the development of regional ties with Russia, even without the Syrian factor. For several reasons that deserve a separate discussion, the same Arab monarchies of the Gulf are actively diversifying their foreign policies. Due to different security considerations, they do not want to be solely and exclusively dependent on one partner, and so are creating niche opportunities for cooperation with Russia and expressing interest in working with non-Western blocks such as the SCO and BRICS+, where Moscow’s positions are also strong. Although the GCC countries do not like the ongoing economic war between Russia and the West, they still gravitate more towards Moscow, seeing parallels with their own political and economic systems as well as assuming that, under certain circumstances, they may also become a target for external economic pressure.
Given these factors, even with the loss of Syria, Moscow will maintain its presence in the region. It will force other players to reckon with it, albeit as a second-class player. It is important to have a more nuanced view of Russia and Russia’s capabilities to pursue its regional policies rather than either blindly believing in its past greatness in the Middle East or accepting the false assumption by some analysts that the fall of Assad’s regime means the demise of Russia’s presence in the region.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image credit: Wikimedia Commons / Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
