Since its adoption in 1999, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), also known as the Ottawa Treaty, has been recognised as a landmark achievement in international humanitarian law (IHL). With over 160 State Parties, it represents a rare global consensus that the humanitarian costs of anti-personnel mines (APM) far outweigh any limited military utility. Yet this consensus is under pressure with Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia having started withdrawal procedures, and Finland and Poland expressing their intention to leave the accord in the future. Commentators and state actors argue that withdrawal from the APMBC might be justified on the grounds of national security, particularly in the face of renewed interstate tensions, threats of invasion, and border insecurity.

Those claims are unjustified. States on the path to leaving the APMBC should reconsider their decision because anti-personnel landmines are militarily outdated, operationally problematic, and strategically counterproductive. Withdrawal from the Convention would not enhance their security but instead risks eroding humanitarian protection, damaging international law, and resulting in severe diplomatic and economic costs.

The military case for withdrawal

Proponents frame their arguments around three main points. First, they claim that mines enhance border security by providing an inexpensive means to deny access, slow advances, and buy time for reinforcements. In this view, landmines represent a “force multiplier” for states with limited resources. Second, some emphasise reciprocity. States outside the APMBC, including powerful military actors such as Russia, still produce and deploy AP mines despite their limited tactical advantages. Supporters of a withdrawal argue that compliance leaves adherents strategically exposed, particularly when neighbours or potential adversaries face no such restrictions.

Third, advocates suggest that banning all categories of APM is too rigid, particularly considering “smart” or self-destructing mines. They argue that newer technologies mitigate humanitarian risk and should be available as defensive options. Together, these arguments frame the Treaty as privileging humanitarian idealism over military pragmatism. This view of the APMBC is flawed, short-sighted, and counterproductive from a security perspective.

Why withdrawal is misguided – A counter-argument

Limited and outdated military utility

Evidence from Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans, and, more recently, Ukraine demonstrates that landmines rarely deliver decisive results. At best, they delay advancing forces; at worst, they constrain defenders, complicate command and control, and create fratricide risk. Modern combat engineer assets, such as explosive linear charges, armoured mine ploughs, and modern breaching tactics, along with precision-weapon systems, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets, diminish the marginal advantages that landmines once provided. In recent military operations in Ukraine, both sides have demonstrated the ability to breach complex mine belts when they possess the requisite engineering assets, training, and coordination. Where breaches have failed, analysis consistently points to insufficient integration or mass, not the inherent effectiveness of the landmines themselves. In several cases, the delay imposed has instead constrained the defender, fixing them to contaminated ground, limiting their own freedom of movement, and increasing the risk of fratricide and blue-on-blue incidents. From a modern operational perspective, delay without exploitation is not a military success; it is a signal of limited defensive depth and capability.

For such a marginal military gain, the humanitarian toll remains staggering. According to the Landmine Monitor 2025, there has been a sharp rise in casualties, with 6,279 people killed or injured by landmines and explosive remnants of war in 2024, the highest annual total since 2020. The increase was largely due to mines in conflict-affected countries, particularly those outside the treaty ban, especially Myanmar, where massive use continues, and Syria, where civilians are increasingly at risk as they return home, either to or through contaminated lands, following the end of the Assad regime. Civilians made up 90% of global casualties in 2024, almost half of them children. Beyond the immediate loss of life and injury, landmines block returns, limit humanitarian access, and perpetuate displacement. Communities in affected areas often live with the constant anxiety that daily activities, such as walking to school, collecting firewood, or farming, could result in injury or death. This persistent fear contributes to elevated rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and chronic anxiety among both adults and children. Communities living under a mine threat also experience disrupted schooling, constrained mobility, and diminished social cohesion. States considering withdrawal need to weigh these immense long-term costs against uncertain short-term military gains from using landmines.

While landmines can be cheap to deploy, often costing as little as $3 to $75 per device, the long-term costs of clearance and survivor assistance are orders of magnitude far higher. These costs extend to lost agricultural productivity, reduced trade, and delayed reconstruction. Far from being cost-effective, landmines impose long-term financial burdens that can last generations. Explosive residues such as TNT and RDX contaminate soil and water, while mine belts fragment habitats, disrupt livestock, and heighten fire risks. These effects not only harm our environment, impact food security and long-term health, but they are also difficult and expensive to remediate.

Landmines as weapons of the past

The idea of reintroducing landmines is effectively an attempt to revive a 20th-century weapon in a 21st-century context. Contemporary doctrines emphasise mobility, adaptability, and precision. Mines, by contrast, are static, indiscriminate, and unreliable.

Crucially, treaty-compliant defensive alternatives already exist and have been proven effective. Command-detonated, soldier-in-the-loop munitions, such as command-initiated AP mines without tripwires or victim-activation mechanisms, remain lawful under the treaty, as do non-explosive obstacles, persistent surveillance systems, and mobile rapid-response patrols. When integrated into a layered defence architecture, combining drones, ground sensors, physical barriers, and well-trained, well-equipped quick-reaction forces, these measures provide far greater precision, discrimination, and reversibility than static minefields. Unlike legacy mines, they allow commanders to retain control over escalation, de-confliction, and disengagement. Importantly, such systems are not theoretical: they are being employed with increasing frequency and effectiveness on today’s battlefield, including in Ukraine, where they have demonstrated that area denial and force protection can be achieved without the long-term humanitarian and operational liabilities associated with anti-personnel landmines.

Perhaps the gravest risk lies in undermining International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Abandoning the APMBC would legitimise the view that humanitarian norms are negotiable under pressure. If one treaty falls, others, such as the prohibitions on cluster munitions and chemical weapons, may also be weakened. For European states, especially, withdrawal would fracture alliances, erode mine action donor trust in demining action, and risk diplomatic isolation.

The Ottawa Treaty was never about denying states the right to self-defence. It was about recognising that certain weapons are so indiscriminate and disproportionate in their effects that they cannot be justified. The fact that most mine victims today are civilians, many of them children, reinforces the humanitarian logic behind the ban. To walk away now would send the wrong message, suggesting that questionable security gains take precedence over humanitarian concerns.

Calls to withdraw from the APMBC rest on flawed assumptions and a narrow conception of security. Landmines may seem appealing as cheap, simple tools of defence, but the reality is that they are militarily outdated, strategically counterproductive, and devastating in humanitarian, economic, and environmental terms. Withdrawal would not strengthen security but would undermine international law, erode alliances, and cause generational harm. The balance of evidence is clear; anti-personnel mines belong to history, not to the arsenals of the future. Instead of abandoning the Ottawa Treaty, states should reaffirm their commitment, strengthen compliance, and invest in modern, treaty-compliant border security measures that protect both their citizens and their international credibility.

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.

Image credit: Wikimedia Commons / U.S. Navy USNFE-6FPA by Arif Patani