Grim descriptions of the immense human suffering caused by the US nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 80 years ago dominate the discourse around their anniversaries. Every year, these attacks are a stark reminder of the existential threat nuclear weapons pose to humanity. The testimonies of survivors and the footage of the hellish aftermath in the two destroyed cities demonstrate vividly the effects of nuclear weapons like no other event.

The lessons seem clear: If two, by today’s standards, small nuclear weapons can cause such death and destruction, the consequences of the use of any number of the 12,000 nuclear weapons existing today would be catastrophic. The nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki also demonstrate that any use of nuclear weapons would almost inevitably violate basic principles of international law because it would cause unnecessary suffering, indiscriminately kill civilians and very likely would be considered disproportionate. By today’s legal standards, the US nuclear attacks on Japan would be illegal.

Yet, in striking contrast to the ritual of remembrance of the gruesome nuclear bombings on 6 and 9 August 1945, the political discourse around nuclear weapons on most other days of the year has become astoundingly light-hearted and increasingly careless.

Many decision-makers in nuclear weapons states and those allied with them speak about nuclear weapons no differently than about other weapons. They often exaggerate the security benefits of nuclear weapons, while ignoring or downplaying risks associated with their continued existence. Ethical and legal constraints on the possession and proliferation of these horrific weapons rarely get mentioned when nuclear deterrence is discussed.

Unsurprisingly, authoritarian and populist personalities like Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump speak about nuclear weapons irresponsibly, frequently issue nuclear threats or announce on social media the redeployment of nuclear weapons. After all, populists are primarily concerned about messaging to their domestic base, which thrives on tough talk and nuclear chest-thumping (watch one of the Russian propaganda talk shows for examples), and care less about the effects of their actions on the nuclear order.

From propaganda clips of Kim Jong-Un coolly promenading with his daughter in front of North Korean ICBMs to an Israeli minister casually suggesting dropping “some kind of atomic bomb” on the Gaza Strip, to “kill everyone”, the discourse around nuclear weapons has become irresponsibly sloppy.

Loose talk by those who control nuclear weapons can increase escalation risks. As Alexey Arbatov has remarked: “When it comes to nuclear weapons, words are deeds“. Strategic messaging around nuclear weapons was once carefully calibrated; today, it is often delivered without a sense check — off the cuff and on social media platforms — where nuance is lost and the potential for misunderstanding increases.

Vice versa, the unwillingness to discuss nuclear escalation risks may also raise nuclear dangers. Thus, although US intelligence services in the autumn of 2022 warned that the risk of Russia using nuclear weapons in Ukraine stood at 50 percent, many European decision-makers continued to ignore such risks, out of fear of being accused of being wobbly on supporting Ukraine and giving in to nuclear blackmail. A sober analysis of nuclear dangers in such a polarised debate has become difficult.

But the problem runs deeper and broader. It is not only decision-makers in the nine countries with nuclear weapons that display such behaviour. Politicians in non-nuclear weapon states allied with nuclear weapon states often display the same casual attitude when talking about nuclear weapons. It is then probably not surprising that the general public in Europe and elsewhere also views nuclear weapons with less concern. And if the public becomes more hawkish, domestic constraints on nuclear weapons use are loosened.

Non-nuclear weapon state representatives who nonchalantly praise the assumed security benefits of nuclear weapons for their own countries undermine global efforts to convince countries like Iran to forgo the nuclear option. “Do as I say but not as I do” is not sound policy, particularly in multilateral regimes where the same rules should apply to everybody.

Several factors may account for the drifting apart of serious commemorations and superficial political discourses around nuclear weapons. Since the end of the Cold War, more than a generation of decision-makers has not dealt with nuclear destructiveness in any serious way. Huge knowledge gaps around nuclear risks exist, and constituencies for arms control and disarmament have melted away. Last but not least: the nuclear taboo has held for eighty years, which is a remarkable record of non-use. But this very success has bred complacency. It has created the false impression that nuclear deterrence is stable, even infallible. This illusion, when combined with significant knowledge gaps, undermines the gravity of nuclear decision-making and increases the chances of dangerous miscalculation.

So, what can be done to better connect commemorative and political discourses around nuclear weapons? How can we make sure that the lessons derived from Hiroshima and Nagasaki re-enter political discussions around nuclear weapons in states with nuclear weapons or in nuclear alliances? Three talking points may be helpful.

First, it is important to remind policymakers that nuclear weapons are unique. Eighty years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons remain the only category of weapons that pose an existential risk to humanity. True, many non-nuclear weapons technologies have become more lethal and widespread; the potential of biological weapons to indiscriminately kill people has grown immensely. But there is no protection against nuclear weapons; no vaccines or protective suits can help us to survive a nuclear war.

That is why it is vital to increase the distance between the use of conventional weapons and any use of nuclear weapons. Likewise, it is crucial to prevent a mission creep of nuclear weapons and see them as a “one size fits all” solution to deterrence problems. A nuclear no-first-use doctrine is one step in this direction; further integration of conventional and nuclear warfighting is a step backwards.

Second, it is essential to highlight that luck – not the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence – is the main factor explaining the long period of 80 years of non-use. Advocates of nuclear deterrence are reluctant to give luck the credit it deserves. According to Murphy’s law, eventually, luck will run out. This is a conclusion that does not sit well with those who want to perpetuate reliance on nuclear weapons for their own security.

Relatedly, third, as the survivors of the bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki remind us: Disarmament remains the only sustainable solution to the wicked problems posed by nuclear weapons. Without steps towards disarmament, the global regime to control the spread of nuclear weapons will become increasingly frail. If the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty falls into further disregard and cynicism about its goals wins the upper hand, proliferation will accelerate. As Barack Obama argued in his 2009 Prague speech: “Such fatalism is a deadly adversary, for if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.”

The memories of the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki provide opportunities to make such paradigmatic arguments around nuclear weapons: These weapons are inhumane, and their use would violate basic norms of international humanitarian law that the international community has carefully established. Nuclear weapons pose existential risks to humanity, and if we do not seriously engage in efforts to abolish them, it is very unlikely that we will see another 80 years of non-use.

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.

Image credit: Wikimedia Commons / Maarten Heelien