Hungary’s 2026 parliamentary election delivered a resounding victory for the opposition Tisza party and incoming Prime Minister Péter Magyar, marking the most significant political shift in the country since Viktor Orbán returned to power in 2010. Framing the result as a “change of regime”, Magyar and his supporters view the election as a decisive rejection of the political system built by Orbán and his Fidesz party over the past 16 years.

Tisza secured 53.1 percent of the vote and, due to Hungary’s electoral system, won a constitutional supermajority in parliament. The party will hold 141 seats in the National Assembly, while Fidesz has been reduced to 52. Magyar’s candidates won 96 of the 106 individual constituencies, leaving Orbán’s party with only 10 constituency victories. Meanwhile, much of the “old opposition” effectively disappeared from parliament altogether, leaving only the far-right Mi Hazánk party as a minor third force.

The election also reflected an unusually high level of political mobilisation. Voter turnout approached 79 percent, one of the highest participation rates in modern Hungarian history. The new parliament will convene on 9 May, when Magyar is expected to be formally sworn in as prime minister.

Why Orbán lost

Orbán’s defeat was the result of several overlapping political, demographic, and economic trends that gradually eroded the foundations of Fidesz’s dominance.

Most importantly, the election became a referendum on Orbán himself. After four consecutive electoral victories and 16 uninterrupted years in office, many voters simply wanted political change. The result resembled the political fatigue that eventually confronted long-serving European leaders such as Konrad Adenauer, Helmut Kohl, or Felipe González. The campaign increasingly revolved less around ideology and more around whether Hungary should continue under the political system Orbán had constructed since 2010.

Youth turnout proved particularly decisive. Voters under 30 overwhelmingly backed Magyar, with some estimates suggesting close to 90 percent support among younger demographics. Fidesz, by contrast, retained its strongest support among pensioners and older rural voters. The party increasingly appeared disconnected from younger Hungarians, while demographic trends further weakened its long-term electoral position. Beyond generational politics, many younger voters were also motivated by broader frustrations over economic stagnation, political centralisation, and the lack of social mobility.

Economic concerns also played a major role. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, Hungary’s economy has underperformed relative to other Central European states, particularly within the Visegrád group (the regional partnership between Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary, founded in 1991 to advance economic, security, and energy cooperation alongside Euro-Atlantic integration). Although Orbán’s government attempted repeated stimulus measures and direct financial interventions, growth remained sluggish, hovering around 0.5 to one percent in recent years. Inflation became especially politically damaging, peaking at 24.6 percent in 2023 and significantly eroding living standards.

The economy therefore became not only a question of material dissatisfaction, but also a symbol of broader political exhaustion. Orbán’s longstanding narrative of economic competence and national stability increasingly lost credibility among voters who felt Hungary was falling behind neighbouring countries.

At the same time, corruption and perceptions of elite enrichment became increasingly politically toxic. Many Hungarians grew frustrated by the visible wealth accumulated by Orbán’s inner circle and family members. While corruption has long existed across Central Europe, critics increasingly argued that the scale and visibility of perceived nepotism surrounding the governing elite had crossed a political threshold. The issue resonated particularly strongly because Orbán had long framed his political project in patriotist (‘Hungary First’) and moralistic terms.

Another important factor was growing resentment toward the highly centralised political system constructed by Fidesz. Critics increasingly viewed the Hungarian state as excessively hierarchical and personalised, with limited institutional autonomy and declining room for independent political, economic, or civic actors. For many voters, the election became not simply a rejection of Orbán personally, but of the governing model associated with him.

What Tisza represents

Understanding the nature of Tisza is essential to understanding both Magyar’s victory and the challenges his government now faces. Tisza is not a conventional ideological party, but rather a highly eclectic political movement that combines elements of grassroots mobilisation with a sophisticated campaign apparatus.

The movement brings together former Fidesz supporters, liberals, centrists, younger urban voters, and disillusioned conservatives united primarily by opposition to Orbán. In many respects, Tisza’s electoral coalition reflects the extraordinary breadth of anti-government sentiment that emerged during the campaign.

Magyar himself emerged from within the Fidesz establishment before breaking publicly with the government following a major political scandal that forced both the president and justice minister – his former wife – to resign. Following the scandal, Magyar positioned himself outside both Fidesz and the traditional opposition parties, which many voters increasingly regarded as politically exhausted and incapable of challenging Orbán effectively.

Within less than two years, Magyar succeeded in building a unified opposition force capable of defeating one of Europe’s most entrenched governing parties. This rapid political rise explains much of the “wow effect” currently surrounding him domestically and internationally.

At the same time, important tensions remain within Tisza itself. For now, anti-Orbán sentiment remains the central force holding the coalition together. Whether the movement can translate electoral momentum into stable governance remains uncertain, particularly given the difficult fiscal situation, institutional constraints, and the diverse ideological composition of the coalition itself.

Domestic expectations are exceptionally high. Many supporters expect Magyar to pursue investigations into corruption and implement forms of political lustration targeting figures associated with the Orbán era. A strong desire for accountability – and in some cases political revenge – is increasingly visible within parts of the electorate.

Tisza has also proposed significant constitutional and institutional reforms. Magyar has already called on several senior officials appointed during the Orbán era – including the president and the president of the Constitutional Court – to resign. These developments suggest that the coming months could involve intense institutional and constitutional conflict as the new government attempts to dismantle parts of the previous political system.

Implications for Europe and foreign policy

For European policymakers, the most immediate significance of Magyar’s victory lies in foreign policy and Hungary’s future relationship with the European Union.

The incoming government has signalled a major shift away from Orbán’s confrontational posture toward Brussels. Magyar has indicated that Hungary will pursue a more cooperative relationship with the European Commission and adopt a less combative approach regarding Russia’s war against Ukraine.

This does not mean Hungary is likely to abandon its emphasis on national interests or fully return to the political orientation that existed before 2010. Magyar has repeatedly stressed that Hungarian interests will remain central to government policy. However, the style and tone of engagement with European institutions are expected to change substantially.

The speed of European engagement following the election underlined the significance Brussels attaches to the transition. Shortly after Tisza’s victory, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen reportedly dispatched her chief of staff to Budapest. Magyar’s first official foreign visits are expected to include Warsaw, Vienna, and Brussels, reflecting the importance his government places on rebuilding relations with key European partners.

Much of this diplomatic effort is linked to the question of frozen EU funds. The incoming government hopes that a reset in relations with Brussels will facilitate access to financial resources currently withheld from Hungary due to longstanding disputes over rule-of-law issues and governance concerns.

Several policy areas are likely to shape relations between Hungary and the EU over the coming years, including access to EU funding, market stability, regulatory predictability, energy policy, fiscal management, monetary policy, and the longer-term possibility of euro adoption.

At the same time, expectations in Brussels should be managed carefully. Magyar represents political change, but not necessarily a complete ideological realignment. Hungary is unlikely to become an uncritical supporter of EU integration, even if relations with European institutions improve significantly.

What comes next for Orbán

Orbán’s defeat appears to have caught much of the Fidesz leadership off guard. The combination of stagnant growth, high inflation, corruption scandals, and Orbán’s close relationship with Russia ultimately proved politically toxic across much of Hungarian society, including smaller towns and rural areas that had previously formed the backbone of Fidesz support.

The election also demonstrated that Orbán’s positioning within the broader international patriotist wave was insufficient to offset domestic frustrations. While he had long portrayed himself as a pioneer of the patriotist and anti-liberal (so-called illiberal) politics later associated with figures such as US President Donald Trump, many Hungarian voters ultimately prioritised domestic economic and governance concerns over ideological alignment with global right-wing movements.

Despite the scale of the defeat, Orbán has already signalled that he intends to remain politically active. Although he will not sit in the new parliament, he is expected to focus on rebuilding Fidesz and reorganising the Hungarian right, much as he did after losing power in 2002.

Orbán may also continue playing a prominent international role, particularly through the Patriots group in the European Parliament and the broader European populist right. Whether he can successfully engineer a political comeback will depend both on Magyar’s ability to govern effectively and on whether Fidesz can reinvent itself after its most serious defeat in more than a decade.

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.

Image credit: Alain Rolland / European Union / Wikimedia Commons