Editor’s note: The views expressed in this commentary are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position of the Austrian Foreign Ministry.
At its core, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) makes the argument that the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons are too grave and their risks too high for nuclear deterrence to be a sustainable basis for international security. This is underpinned by a growing body of new scientific evidence, demonstrating how these consequences would be more global, cascading and catastrophic than previously understood. The same goes for the increasingly complex risks associated with nuclear weapons. All States and peoples anywhere on Earth are at risk of becoming collateral damage in a multitude of ways in even a “limited” regional nuclear exchange. The Treaty’s conclusion is, thus, that the nuclear deterrence security paradigm is not only highly precarious, fragile and unsustainable but also seriously affects and diminishes the security of non-nuclear states and, ultimately, all humanity. This concern is not only justified, given that nuclear risks are on the rise, but it also expresses a legitimate and evidence-based security perspective. TPNW supporters have highlighted this perspective countless times, in the treaty itself, through national or joint statements, and in the declarations adopted at their First and Second Meetings of States Parties.
Nuclear-armed states and their allies continue to oppose the TPNW. They have so far shown little readiness to engage with the above-mentioned security concerns formulated in and through the Treaty. While the humanitarian consequences are acknowledged in general terms, the argument is turned on its head to underscore the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. Similarly, nuclear-armed States promote nuclear risk reduction as an important area of work. Still, the proposed scope entirely leaves out those risks that result from the possession of nuclear weapons and the practice of nuclear deterrence. Instead of engagement, the critique dismisses the Treaty as not taking today’s security environment into account.
The Treaty’s conclusion is, thus, that the nuclear deterrence security paradigm is not only highly precarious, fragile and unsustainable but also seriously affects and diminishes the security of non-nuclear states and, ultimately, all humanity. This concern is not only justified, given that nuclear risks are on the rise, but it also expresses a legitimate and evidence-based security perspective. Alexander Kmentt
TPNW sceptics have obvious political reasons why they do not want to engage with the treaty. However, this also points to a more fundamental divide about security and the role of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-armed States posit arguments about security, stability, and the value of nuclear deterrence that are very much at odds with the notions of security, threat perceptions, and nuclear risks highlighted by the TPNW and widely shared among non-nuclear states.
At their Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2023, TPNW States Parties decided to address this divide about security and nuclear weapons in a structured and substantive way. They established a consultative process to work on the security concerns of states under the TPNW. To this end, they will address two main issues: Firstly, that it is necessary to better “promote and articulate the legitimate security concerns and threat and risk perceptions enshrined in the Treaty resulting from nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence”. The second aspect of the consultative process’ mandate is to “challenge the nuclear deterrence security paradigm by highlighting the new scientific evidence about the humanitarian consequences and risks of nuclear weapons and juxtaposing this with the risks and assumptions that are inherent in nuclear deterrence”. The latter point on the nuclear deterrence security paradigm is ambitious but also highlights the key transformational potential of the TPNW and its underlying arguments.
One of the key political challenges for the TPNW and its future prospects is, thus, to move today’s nuclear weapons discourse to a facts-based engagement with the juxtaposition mentioned in the above paragraph. Weighing the alleged security benefit of nuclear deterrence against the mounting evidence that challenges this claim is crucial, especially in the current geopolitical situation, the increasing nuclear risks and the re-emphasis on nuclear deterrence that some actors advocate. The result could be a productive conversation about security and nuclear weapons and the veracity of arguments for and against nuclear deterrence.
Nuclear-armed States posit arguments about security, stability, and the value of nuclear deterrence that are very much at odds with the notions of security, threat perceptions, and nuclear risks highlighted by the TPNW and widely shared among non-nuclear states. Alexander Kmentt
One good starting point for an inclusive dialogue would be to acknowledge the lack of certainty on many issues related to nuclear deterrence. Security and threat perceptions are subjective and vary considerably. Nuclear deterrence is very context-specific, based on assumptions around human behaviour and stability. Whether it works or how it works is always uncertain. By contrast, we know for sure that it could fail, and if it does, there is clear evidence of the ensuing global consequences. What conclusions should then be drawn from the fact that there is no proof for the effectiveness or the ineffectiveness of nuclear deterrence, and to what extent can the “not knowing” be a point of convergence for the nuclear weapons debate?
Moreover, nuclear weapons proponents have successfully claimed realism as the basis for the nuclear deterrence security paradigm while portraying the pursuit of nuclear abolition and nuclear disarmament as idealist, unrealistic, or naive. The increasing body of scientific evidence about the magnitude and complexity of the humanitarian consequences and mounting and complex risks associated with nuclear weapons challenges claims of nuclear deterrence stability. Add to this the assumptions and risk-taking that are woven into nuclear deterrence theory, the possibilities of bias and overconfidence, as well as the added layers of risks due to new technologies; consequently, this adherence to a belief in nuclear deterrence looks, at best, increasingly shaky. At worst, it seems like dogmatic group-think that marginalises and rejects dissenting views and postulates a high-risk bet with the security of humanity as a whole as a sustainable approach to international security. Therefore, from the perspective of the TPNW, a move away from this security paradigm looks like a significantly more realist approach than the continued idealist belief in the stability and sustainability of nuclear deterrence.
The increasing body of scientific evidence about the magnitude and complexity of the humanitarian consequences and mounting and complex risks associated with nuclear weapons challenges claims of nuclear deterrence stability. Alexander Kmentt
The consultative process is set up as an initially internal discussion among TPNW States Parties with the involvement of other stakeholders, such as the TPNW’s Scientific Advisory Group, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), and experts. Its mandate is to develop a report with a comprehensive set of arguments and recommendations for the Third Meeting of States Parties in early 2025. To this end, States Parties have agreed on a work programme of guiding questions and virtual consultations. This process could lead to a more joined-up consolidation of TPNW States Parties’ own security perspectives and support their efforts to attract additional ratifications.
Most importantly, it is intended to strengthen their demand for substantive engagement with the Treaty’s security arguments that has thus far been lacking from the TPNW sceptics. This engagement will need to be pursued by TPNW supporters through a discursive and political process using all available fora where nuclear weapons and security can be addressed, including within the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Given the past reluctance of opponents of the Treaty, it will undoubtedly be challenging and require patience. Nevertheless, it is more urgent than ever, given the precarious state of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and the high level of nuclear risks. And, it is ultimately a key raison d’être of the TPNW.
The global nuclear weapons discourse should progress in a way that recognises that all States have a legitimate stake in this existential issue. We urgently need this conversation to uphold the nuclear taboo and to counter the slide into nuclear arms racing and possible nuclear conflict. TPNW States Parties are investing in such a discourse. Current TPNW sceptics should change their stance and start engaging substantively with these legitimate security arguments.
The opinions articulated above represent the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the European Leadership Network or any of its members. The ELN’s aim is to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time.
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