The upcoming EU-Western Balkans Summit in Montenegro on 5-6 June comes at a moment when Europe is confronting war on its borders, geopolitical fragmentation, economic insecurity, and growing competition from external powers. The summit is increasingly viewed as a strategic test of whether the European Union still has the political will and credibility to complete the integration of the Western Balkans – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia.

Montenegro is hosting the event, which the EU itself has framed as recognition of Podgorica’s progress toward membership. EU institutions have recently moved to begin drafting Montenegro’s accession treaty. This is the clearest sign yet that the Union wants at least one Western Balkan success story in the near future.

This also reflects a wider geopolitical shift inside Europe. For years, EU enlargement policy toward the Western Balkans suffered from hesitation and internal divisions within the Union itself. Over the last decade, it has practically lost all credibility.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine fundamentally changed that calculation. Enlargement is now framed as a geopolitical necessity. EU leaders increasingly argue that leaving the Western Balkans in a grey zone creates strategic vulnerabilities that external actors – particularly Russia, but also China, Turkey, and the Gulf states – can exploit politically, economically and through disinformation campaigns.

The evolving geopolitical environment in the Western Balkans has also been shaped by shifts in United States policy. The “America First” approach led by President Donald Trump has created perceptions of reduced long-term US strategic engagement in the Balkans and greater uncertainty regarding transatlantic coordination. These days, the US places stronger emphasis on transactional diplomacy rather than on the broader state-building and democratization agenda. Days before the summit, we are witnessing US engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina that does not appear to be fully coordinated with the EU.

Some Western Balkan contingents have already travelled to Washington to discuss government-to-government agreements, while others are preparing to do the same. Local leaders are using this moment to hedge their policies, opting for shortcuts offered by the US administration while setting aside EU-brokered procurement policies. This leaves the door open for similar arrangements with other powers present in the region besides the EU and the US – above all China. If this process continues, it will strengthen autocratic tendencies in the region and further decouple the EU and the Western Balkans, as well as the EU and the US, in the region itself.

The summit in Montenegro will be dominated by the language of security, resilience, and strategic alignment. The official themes already announced include “shared prosperity and stability”, regional resilience, connectivity, and alignment with EU policies. The key message from Brussels is that the Western Balkans are expected to align more clearly with the EU’s geopolitical orientation.

Simply put, this is not enough. To me, this is the moment when the European Union itself must take greater geopolitical responsibility for integrating the Western Balkans.

In practical terms, this means continuing bipartisan engagement with the US, as long as possible, particularly in telecommunications and the development of AI, while recognising the strengths of the American tech sector. It also means providing unequivocal support for Montenegro’s EU membership by signing its accession agreement by 2028, engaging decisively with malign actors in the region, and strongly backing those governments that remain genuinely committed to accession negotiations with the EU.

None of these actions would violate the existing enlargement criteria or process. Yet while pursuing this track, it is equally important to focus on several intermediate steps that could have a transformative effect and restore credibility to the EU accession process.

First, the EU and the Western Balkans should jointly develop a “Draghi-like report for the Western Balkans”. Such a report should revisit development policies across the region and align them both with citizens’ needs and with the conclusions of the Draghi report on European competitiveness. The objective would be to encourage policymakers to view Western Balkan and EU economies as part of a single economic space – developed on the basis of shared legislation, common environmental standards, and deeper structural integration.

Second, and in parallel with – not instead of – EU membership, the Union should continue advancing the Common Regional Market for the Western Balkans. The longer-term objective should be gradual integration into the European Economic Area and, ultimately, into the European Single Market. This process should move forward irrespective of accession timelines, since it already rests on existing enlargement criteria and obligations.

Third, the rule of law must remain central to every future stage of EU engagement with the region. Greater integration into the EU Single Market would significantly reduce opportunities for corruption while delivering substantial benefits to citizens and businesses both in the Balkans and across the Union.

Fourth, the EU should immediately begin developing a roadmap for bringing the Western Balkans into the Schengen Area. Beyond facilitating mobility, such a process would strengthen the security of both EU and Western Balkan citizens through closer institutional coordination and common standards.

Finally, the EU should develop a comprehensive “Western Balkans in the EU by 2030” agenda. Such a framework would provide political direction, measurable benchmarks, and a renewed sense of strategic purpose for enlargement policy at a time when credibility has become one of the Union’s greatest challenges.

The debate over the modalities and sequencing of enlargement should not overshadow the broader strategic imperative. Advancing initiatives of this kind could help accelerate ongoing discussions on the internal reforms required for a larger EU and for a more credible enlargement policy. In turn, this would create stronger political momentum not only for the Western Balkans, but also for Ukraine and Moldova.

Recent signals from several EU member states – including proposals advanced by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz for new forms of gradual integration and institutional participation for candidate countries – suggest that parts of the Union are increasingly prepared to rethink enlargement in more geopolitical terms.

If the EU is prepared to seriously consider these actions, it could reasonably expect not only stronger political convergence with EU foreign and security policy from hesitant actors in the region, but also deeper strategic alignment between the EU and the Western Balkans in an increasingly polarized international order.

The true importance of the summit in Montenegro will be measured less by diplomatic language and more by whether the EU can finally translate geopolitical urgency into credible political action.

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.

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