The recent mineral resources agreement between the United States and Ukraine is more than just an isolated bilateral deal. Rather, it is part of a broader pattern unfolding across Eurasia as Western powers ramp up efforts to secure alternative sources of strategic raw materials in competition with China and Russia. Given the general similarities in interests between them, Western powers would do well to coordinate their efforts, investments, and diplomacy in the region better.

The deal between the United States and Ukraine that was signed at the end of April was by far the most well-publicised example of this trend. The Agreement set up a joint Reconstruction Investment Fund that would earn income from the future monetization of all relevant Ukrainian Government-owned natural resource assets and committed the US to supporting Ukraine for the long haul: the Agreement, after all, is noted to be “…a tangible demonstration of the United States of America’s support for Ukraine’s security, prosperity, reconstruction, and integration into global economic frameworks.” Additionally, despite President Trump’s oft-changing approach to Russia, the deal also assured Ukraine of the US’s interest in checking Moscow’s future influence and power in the country. Overall, Ukraine ensured the US’s financial buy-in and support, while Trump managed to get some sort of financial “return” in Ukraine, a key gripe raised during Trump’s pre-electoral campaign and the initial months of his administration.

However, the implications of the deal go beyond a transactional approach by the American government vis-à-vis Ukraine. In fact, the deal between the United States and Ukraine predates Donald Trump’s victory in the 2024 US presidential elections: already in October 2024, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky outlined a scenario in which Ukraine would enter into joint investment agreements with the European Union (EU) and the US regarding its natural resources. Additionally, while the Trump-Zelensky deal certainly garnered the most press attention, other countries had been pursuing similar initiatives independently; France, for example, had reportedly been engaged in similar discussions with Ukraine since late 2024 as well.

While the Agreement with Ukraine was the most widely reported-on deal in the US media regarding mineral interests in the post-Soviet space, Ukraine was not the only country in the region that received American attention. For one, US firms have entered into cooperation agreements with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan regarding rare earth minerals over the last few months. This has been accompanied by interest from the Trump administration in the region, including a meeting in April between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister, Bakhtiyor Saidov. Similarly, in Armenia, the local branch of Lydian International (headquartered in Colorado) has reopened its Amulsar gold mine project, while Pittsburgh-based Westinghouse has actively entered the competition to refurbish the ageing Metsamor nuclear plant.

The US is not alone in engaging with Eurasia’s mineral-rich states. Other Western states and organisations, particularly the United Kingdom (UK) and the EU, have also worked to secure critical materials, diversify supply chains, and preempt a deepening of Chinese and Russian dominance in the region’s extractive industries. The UK, for example, has taken a notably assertive posture in Tajikistan. Although no formal mineral extraction deal has been concluded yet, the March 2024 UK–Tajikistan Development Partnership marked a significant step in London’s efforts to position itself as a key player in the country’s development. The agreement emphasised political and commercial cooperation, explicitly highlighting Tajikistan’s mining potential alongside hydro‑power and agriculture. British firms have already begun moving in: Vast Resources plc, a UK‑listed company, has been exporting lead and zinc concentrate from the Takob site, and in May 2025, the company signed a non-binding memorandum of understanding, which aims to lay the groundwork for a potential “Tajik Mineral Investment Fund,” signaling an interest in shaping the country’s extractive sector from the ground up.

Additionally, in early June 2025, British and Kazakh officials met at a special session during the Astana Mining and Metallurgy Congress, hosted by the British Embassy’s Department of Business and Trade. Discussions focused on how both countries could future-proof mineral supply chains through mutual investment, research cooperation, and regulatory alignment. These efforts underscore the UK’s strategy of leveraging private-sector partnerships to build long-term access to mineral assets, even if formal agreements remain at an exploratory stage.

The EU, meanwhile, has taken a more institutional, state‑centric approach. At the Samarkand Summit in April 2025, EU leaders unveiled a €12 billion “Gateway Investment Package” for Central Asia, with critical raw materials high on the agenda. The initiative aims to reshape the EU’s connectivity with the region by focusing on energy, transport, and minerals while also emphasising human rights and governance benchmarks. The package marks a strategic pivot, elevating Central Asia as a core zone for European supply-chain diversification, particularly under the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), which aims to reduce the EU’s reliance on Chinese processing and Russian exports.

Relatedly, in March 2025, Brussels signed a €3 million agreement with Kazakhstan to support rare-earth mineral development, backed by substantial credit guarantees through the European Investment Bank. These included a €200 million EIB loan to Kazakhstan’s Development Bank with an €18 million EU guarantee. Kazakh officials, for their part, have welcomed EU interest, describing the partnership as an opportunity to build mining and processing capacity aligned with European industrial and environmental standards.

Taken together, these developments reveal diverse Western engagement with Eurasia’s resource sector. The US advances its interests through a mix of public and private initiatives, while the UK leans on private firms and overseas development assistance-backed ventures, advancing deals incrementally through commercial channels and government support. The EU, in contrast, deploys large-scale public financing frameworks and formal diplomatic summits, often with greater visibility and normative ambition. Despite their differences, all models are rooted in a similar strategic logic: to compete with China and Russia and build alternative resource partnerships with emerging Eurasian states.

Yet this convergence also introduces risks. Without coordination, Western actors may find themselves inadvertently competing for the same concessions, over-promising to fragile governments, or undercutting each other on standards. Moreover, in countries like Armenia, where the reopening of the Amulsar gold mine has drawn local scrutiny, the absence of harmonised social and environmental standards can create reputational vulnerabilities. Similarly, the Westinghouse-led bid to modernise Armenia’s Metsamor nuclear plant (potentially displacing Russia’s Rosatom) highlights the extent to which resource politics are entwined with sovereignty, infrastructure control, and strategic alignment.

If this emerging resource realignment is to succeed, it must be structured around more than fragmented bilateral deals. Instead, a transatlantic framework is urgently needed to prevent counterproductive duplication, reinforce shared norms, and better leverage collective capabilities. Establishing an EU–UK–US Critical Minerals Consortium would offer a viable mechanism to coordinate geological surveys, investment priorities, and environmental safeguards across the region. Joint financial vehicles, such as EIB-led blended finance instruments with contributions from the UK Treasury and US agencies, could help de-conflict large-scale projects.

In diplomatic terms, synchronising memoranda of understanding, technical agreements, and summit outcomes would help prevent bidding wars or contradictory messaging and generate necessary societal support. Without it, Western actors risk triggering backlash from civil society, empowering authoritarian rentier elites, or inadvertently enabling resource nationalism. The mineral map of Eurasia is being redrawn – not just by geology or market forces, but by diplomacy, investment strategy, and political will. If the West hopes to offer a viable, sustainable alternative to the China-Russia axis, it must begin acting not as a set of competing actors but as a coordinated front.

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.

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