Shortly before the expiration of the New START Treaty, Russia put a proposal on the table that would maintain the limits on deployed strategic nuclear weapons set out in the last treaty between the US and Russia for another year. While US President Trump reacted positively to the idea, most European leaders have been quiet so far. There are legitimate concerns over the sincerity of Russia’s proposal, but the West should not let go of an opportunity to leverage Russian interests. European states have a (limited) role to play here.
The Russian proposal to extend observation of New START limits
For decades, strategic limitations of nuclear weapons systems have been a proven measure to curb the arms race between the US and the Soviet Union/Russia. The numerous negotiations and agreements surrounding this issue demonstrate that Washington and Moscow have placed great importance on this type of arms control. However, they were unable to agree on a follow-up agreement for the last remaining arms control treaty, which expires in February 2026 and cannot be extended beyond this period. The absence of any limitation on strategic nuclear weapons arsenals will be a watershed moment.
It remains unclear whether we will see an immediate, dramatic change in force posture between the US and Russia in the absence of New START. But in the medium and long term, the two major nuclear powers will lack any instrument to manage strategic instability.
In this precarious situation, the Russian proposal to extend adherence to New START’s central limits for another year appears to be a timely and easy fix. This is reflected in President Trump’s nonchalant answer to a question by Russian News Agency TASS that the proposal “sounds like a good idea”.
However, so far, no formal process has started, and the details remain unclear. One must also consider the context of the proposal to assess carefully and critically whether it can be a win-win situation.
The potential benefits of a one-year extension
No one benefits from an unrestrained arms race between Washington and Moscow. As evidenced by the Cold War, massive nuclear build-ups do not increase strategic stability. They drain resources and aggravate existing tensions. An arms race between these two is set to draw in others—in this case, China. Any effort to curb the present arms race should, from the outset, be taken seriously.
The US has also long sought to compartmentalise arms control and risk reduction from geopolitical tensions. The Biden administration had offered both Russia and China the opportunity to enter into negotiations without preconditions. In theory, the initiative presents an opportunity to compartmentalise arms control from the war in Ukraine.
It is known that Russia remains interested in several areas of arms control and risk reduction. Amongst these are, for example, strategic arms limitations and adherence to the Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement. Western states should focus on these areas when attempting to make progress with Russia in the field of arms control.
Finally, the initiative could have positive side effects for the 2026 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and give a new impetus for discussions among states. There might be some level of normative power that positively influences Russian behaviour and restrains its previous blatant undermining of the NPT spirit.
The downsides of the proposal
Although the proposal appears logical at first, there are serious potential pitfalls to consider. First, Russia’s motivation remains unclear: Russia previously rejected the US’s offer to compartmentalise arms control and risk reduction, and its actions in forums like the NPT underscore that its interest lies in undermining and politicising multilateral processes rather than protecting stability.
In its current doctrine, Russia has removed any reference to arms control, raising questions about Moscow’s intrinsic motivation. Most importantly, there are no signs to date that Russia will reconsider its suspension of New START. Without this, the treaty remains subject to one-sided rules imposed by Russia. An unsuspension of New START would, in principle, include the resumption of data exchanges, notifications, inspections, and meetings of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). While on-site inspection timelines would likely not allow for another inspection until February 2026, data exchanges and notifications could resume. There is a fair point to make whether insisting on Russia’s full implementation of the treaty would be a price worth paying. However, the treaty never foresaw an option to suspend in the first place, and there is no reason for Russia not to return to full implementation if its proposal to extend adherence to the treaty limits was serious.
Yet, we can only speculate what Russia’s real motivation behind the proposal could be. Russia may seek to dominate the narrative and present itself as a “responsible” nuclear-weapon state, which means, in return, that it could blame the US for not reciprocating the initiative if the proposal is turned down. Or they simply aim to gain time, as they may not be ready to compete in an arms race with the US at present. For example, there are setbacks regarding the modernisation of the ICBM force, and Operation Spiderweb led to significant damage and destruction of the strategic bomber force.
Second, there are practical questions that remain unanswered. For instance, the matter of strategic arms limitations will arise again in just over one year. With the extension, Moscow and Washington would gain breathing space; however, negotiations would need to commence now to ensure a follow-up agreement is in place by 2027.
Furthermore, the US stated in its 2024 Report to Congress that it was unable to certify Russian compliance with the treaty. Since Russia’s suspension in 2023, there have been no more on-site inspections or data exchanges. States rely on their national technical means to assess the size of the other side’s strategic inventory. What impact will this have on the extension?
What role for Europeans?
So far, there has been a limited response from European states on the proposal. The Finnish delegation at the UNGA First Committee stated that they “take note of Russia’s offer to extend Russia’s implementation by one year”. The Estonian delegation delivered a similar statement. Other European states have simply called for negotiations on a follow-up agreement that includes China, while many did not mention it at all. Austria, on the other hand, seeks to gather cross-regional support for the Russian initiative.
While it is unlikely that there will be a unified European stance on the issue, especially as long as the details remain unclear, it is conceivable that concerns over the proposal will persist. Some might be reminded of the INF moratorium proposal, which, if agreed upon, would have been a measure one-sidedly benefiting Russia. Also, irritation over the continued lack of unsuspension of New START might prevail.
The lack of public statements from European leaders might also be a direct result of the failure to have a transatlantic exchange on the issue. Seeking the views from allies on vital arms control issues that also affect European security is no longer a natural reflex under the Trump administration. European states were almost certainly caught by surprise when Trump made his positive comment to TASS.
However, while Europeans have only a limited role to play, they must still try their best to influence the process to the extent possible before the US and Russia potentially agree to the extension. They should try to engage, even if it means accepting a potentially poisonous offer, to avoid a situation where this becomes a one-sided effort.
Concrete steps that Europeans can consider
First, the details of the proposal remain unclear. Europeans should urge the US to seek clarification at an early date and to take control of the process, rather than leaving it subject to one-sided Russian domination. Crucially, how would both sides manage the extension in the absence of any formal verification?
Second, European states could urge the US to insist that an unsuspension of New START would be a first step during the remaining months, before agreeing on an extension. A possible extension should also be linked to future conversations around arms control and strategic stability. The extension should not be seen as an end in itself.
Third, European leaders should urge the US to make the resumption of date exchanges and inspections a key priority in future talks, as well as the involvement of China in future negotiations.
To conclude, the issue of extension has the potential to be a divisive one between different European states. It is unlikely that they will come to a joint position; this is not crucial. While their interest in arms control and risk reduction between the US and Russia is high, their influence on the process is limited. However, any opportunity should be used to urge Washington to ensure that this is not a process that unilaterally benefits Russia, but rather something that leads to a solid follow-up agreement with robust verification measures.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image credit: Alamy, Associated Press
