In its 79th session (2024), the UN Committee on Disarmament and International Security (1st Committee) adopted with an overwhelming majority a resolution through which the Secretary General is tasked to seek the views of Member States on the establishment of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts (GSTE) on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (NDV).
Indeed, both the technical and political aspects of NDV have been a longstanding item in international fora, prominently in the United Nations.
Throughout the discussion, it was recognised that the primary purpose and objective of Nuclear Disarmament Verification is to enable an evidence-based assessment of compliance by states parties to the obligations of a specific treaty and to ensure that appropriate and timely counter-measures can be taken in case of non-compliance, inter alia, to deny the violator the benefits of the violation.
Given the lack of substantive progress in pursuing disarmament commitments and obligations as required by Article VI of the NPT, the argument was brought forward that detailed further work on NDV only constitutes a distraction from the central issue of nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, and from a different perspective, it was argued that NDV can only be considered in detail, once a concrete nuclear disarmament instrument has been agreed upon.
However, given the fundamental security implications of nuclear disarmament, states relying on nuclear weapons in their security strategies can only be expected to engage in sustained nuclear disarmament if treaty obligations are verifiably and irreversibly adhered to. This requires effective and efficient NDV.
In the past, the more technical aspects of NDV were prominently explored in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), which has aspired since 2014 to identify and develop practical solutions to the technical and procedural challenges associated with effectively verifying nuclear disarmament.
Before this background, further open-ended scientific and technical work in the framework of the United Nations seems to be the order of the day. A GSTE, whose “merits, objectives mandate and modalities” still need to be agreed upon, seems to be a promising venue.
However, NDV, beyond its technical aspects, is an essential political element of nuclear disarmament since it prepares the ground for and enables disarmament agreements. It is also an integral part of the implementation of such agreements and ensures that progress achieved in disarmament becomes irreversible.
Most recently, the UN Groups of Governmental Experts of 2019 (A/74/90) and 2023 (A/78/120) considered in depth the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament.
The overarching political objectives of NDV, beyond the implementation of specific arms control and disarmament norms, can be defined as improving the international security environment by generally re-establishing strategic trust, building confidence between nuclear weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) and among NWS themselves, elevating the nuclear threshold, reducing the risk associated with any use of nuclear weapons, and thus serving as an intermediate step to engage in substantive discussions towards further nuclear arms control and disarmament norms and a world without nuclear weapons.
The following conceptual elements are of particular relevance in this context and especially underpin the consideration of how NDV would indeed advance Nuclear Disarmament:
Principles of NDV: Action 2 of the 2010 Action Plan acknowledged the three principles of nuclear disarmament: transparency, verifiability, and irreversibility. The principle of transparency underpins the other two principles. Without transparency, nuclear disarmament cannot be verified, nor would NPT States Parties have complete confidence that nuclear disarmament measures have been accomplished in an irreversible manner.
Definition of NDV: Verification can be considered as the policy process of using available and collected data to assess whether a state party complies with the provisions of a specific arms control or disarmament agreement.
Objectives of NDV: For NDV to be considered effective, it would have to be able to detect a militarily significant violation of the underlying arms control or disarmament agreement in time. The success of the process is dependent on the subject and scope of NDV and the verification methods and instruments. The verification mechanism includes institutional, legal and technical arrangements, the skills and training of the inspectors, and the concluding assessment of the procedure by a verification authority/body.
Scope of NDV: The scope of NDV should ideally cover the entire life cycle of a nuclear weapon. This could include material production, testing facilities, weapons assembly, weapons stockpile, weapons disassembly, storage disposition and the remaining fuel cycle. Furthermore, a conclusion will have to be reached if means of delivery, as well as nuclear command and information structures, should be part of the scope of NDV. Furthermore, the required verification measures may differ in terms of the applicable disarmament scenario. The closer we move to reaching and maintaining global zero, the higher the requirements in terms of transparency and intrusiveness will become.
Governance of NDV: Appropriate and effective governance will have to be a core element of further discussions of NDV. The various approaches to NDV include unilateral verification, a cooperative approach with active assistance from the inspected party, national verification – possibly open to third parties, verification by an international body, verification only by states parties, and an approach open at least in principle to other relevant/affected parties.
Compliance Mechanism:
An effective NDV should form the basis for and create the ability to respond effectively to non-compliance and possibly include an ability to deny the violator the benefits of the violation. Therefore, an effective political and/or legal mechanism will have to be considered to decide about appropriate consequences. Relevant issues for a compliance mechanism would include, inter alia, the appropriate forum, who should participate in the decision making.
Considering that the deteriorating international security environment and lack of progress in the pursuit of nuclear disarmament obligations, obviously, the question arises if continued work on NDV, indeed, is not only a distraction from exactly these obligations. Given however, that effective NDV is indeed a necessary prerequisite for eventual progress in nuclear disarmament, it is quite appropriate to pursue interim measures, such as NDV, to pave the way.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image credit: Wikimedia Commons / United States Navy
