“In terms of executing the 2026 budget, the Secretariat is facing a particular challenge in relation to much later or only partial payments of assessed contributions… we have received less than 65% of assessed contributions for 2026. I urge those States Parties that have not yet done so to pay their contributions without further delay.
Failure to pay assessed contributions in full and on time impacts OPCW operations in two fundamental ways. First, OPCW personnel are diverted from core activities to focus on financial contingency planning. Second, the financial shortfalls raise a large question mark over our ability to deliver all OPCW programmatic activities, whether funded by the regular budget or by trust funds. In short, these delays are starting to impact on delivery.”
These were the words of H.E. Sabrina Dallafior, the new Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), in her opening statement at the Executive Council session on 6 October 2026. They are carefully formulated but still clearly reflect how alarming the situation is at the OPCW. The United States, which contributes more than 20 percent of the organisation’s budget, is apparently among those States Parties lagging behind (it has not paid the $17 million it owes for 2026). As a former Director-General of the OPCW myself, I find this difficult to understand. Strengthening the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is clearly in the interest of the United States.
The OPCW will celebrate its 30th anniversary in April next year. Over its lifetime, it has consistently demonstrated it is up the task of implementing and monitoring the global prohibition of chemical weapons. It is an autonomous organisation, outside the UN system, with its own decision-making organs and its own budget. Its mandate is to ensure the full and effective implementation of the CWC, which is regarded as one of the peace dividends in the aftermath of the Cold War. The CWC, which entered into force in 1997, now has 193 States Parties. Only four countries (Egypt, Israel, North Korea, and South Sudan) are missing. The Convention is nearly universal – no other disarmament treaty has more members.
The OPCW was not well-known among the wider public until 10 October 2013, when the Norwegian Nobel Committee announced that it had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. This decision surprised many – the international media described the OPCW then as a “tiny, obscure organization in The Hague” – and thrust the organisation into the global spotlight. This recognition provided the OPCW with an opportunity to further publicise its achievements and objectives and helped strengthen the support of its membership. The prize ceremony in Oslo that year was a memorable event. I had the privilege of accepting the honour on behalf of the organisation, accompanied by a group of ambassadors from member states, including the US.
All this happened at the outset of a very challenging mission in Syria aimed at dismantling its chemical weapons programme. The prize gave a morale boost to the OPCW experts who bravely volunteered to deploy to a conflict zone. The OPCW’s enhanced visibility and credibility facilitated support from a large number of member states and the European Union for the Syria mission, including for the trust fund established for that purpose. Russia and China were among the countries that provided in-kind contributions. Syria’s declared chemical weapons stockpile was destroyed under OPCW verification in a relatively short period, with operations taking place aboard a US vessel and at facilities in several countries. The US provided crucial practical and political support, including through the destruction of approximately 600 tonnes of chemicals aboard the MV Cape Ray. Washington’s leadership during this period makes its current failure to meet its financial obligations to the OPCW all the more difficult to comprehend.
The reported incidents of use of chemical weapons in Syria were investigated by the OPCW’s Fact-Finding Mission. Contributions were provided to the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM), established by the UN Security Council (UNSC) in August 2015. When the JIM’s mandate was not renewed in 2017 by the UNSC because of the Russian veto, the Conference of States Parties established the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) in June 2018. The IIT has been doing groundbreaking work since then on investigating several cases of chemical weapons use in Syria. The OPCW team has identified the Syrian armed forces as responsible in many of them. The support of the permanent UNSC members, including the US, was crucial for this success.
As a former Director-General of the OPCW myself, I find this difficult to understand. Strengthening the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is clearly in the interest of the United States. Ahmet Üzümcü
The work of the OPCW in Syria is not over. There are gaps and inconsistencies in the initial declaration provided by Damascus. The new Syrian government is cooperating with the OPCW in addressing the outstanding issues.
The OPCW verified the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles declared by the member states. The Russian Federation and the US, the two major possessor countries, completed their destruction activities in 2017 and 2023, respectively. Both invested significant resources in this dangerous and complicated effort to safely dispose of 70,000 tonnes of chemical weapons.
While the mission in Syria and the destruction of old chemical weapons (OCW) and abandoned chemical weapons (ACW) continue, the OPCW’s main focus has now shifted to preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. Industrial inspections under Article VI of the CWC, monitoring transfers of sensitive chemicals, capacity-building for prevention and response, and training for better implementation of the CWC at the national level are among the OPCW’s routine activities. The Chem-Tech Centre in Nootdorp, Netherlands is a new state-of-the-art facility, with its laboratory and other capabilities supporting these activities.
The use of chemical weapons remains a real threat. Recent reports from Ukraine and Sudan are disturbing. The presence of a riot control agent at the front in Ukraine, determined by OPCW experts, might be an indication of its use as a method of warfare, which is strictly prohibited by the CWC. At least one reported incident in Sudan seems credible and warrants an investigation. Possible use by non-state actors also remains a serious source of concern. In fact, the White House Accord on Super Intelligence, signed by President Trump and leading frontier companies in the US on 29 September, includes some language in this regard: “[I]mplement robust internal controls to monitor the capabilities and alignment of its models during training and deployment around areas like cybersecurity, biosecurity, and chemical threats…”. AI-enabled chemical or biological weapons are considered by experts to be a security risk that cannot be taken lightly. The Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) of the OPCW has prepared a comprehensive report on this subject.
The OPCW is a mature international organisation, a repository of knowledge and expertise in the field of chemical weapons. It has repeatedly demonstrated its competence and ability to adapt to changing circumstances. The organisation will continue to contribute to international peace and security, and it deserves the support necessary to remain strong and capable. I sincerely hope that the US and other states parties in arrears will fulfil their financial obligations without further delay. Having invested enormous resources in the destruction of its own chemical weapons stockpile and played a leading role in eliminating those of other countries, Washington has every reason to ensure that the OPCW can continue its vital work.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
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