The NPT enters its 2026 Review Conference (RevCon) preparation under deep strain. Years of stalled disarmament progress, renewed great-power competition, and rising interest in proliferation have hardened polarisation within the NPT and left debates increasingly stagnant. As State Parties prepare for the May 2026 Review Conference, engaging with emerging technologies (ETs), which are already transforming military programs, as well as verification and civilian nuclear programs, offers a way to break entrenched debates.

Despite promising breakthroughs like antineutrino detection and AI-driven monitoring, State Parties at the 2025 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) once again sidelined the applications of ETs for civilian purposes, such as detection and verification. This mirrors a broader policy and academic discourse that is fixated on the escalation risks of disruptive developments in the field of emerging technologies, while overlooking their positive applications. A more comprehensive discussion of ETs at the 2026 RevCon, covering both military and civilian uses, offers an opportunity to demonstrate the treaty’s ability to evolve, reduce asymmetries among States, and promote innovation in non-proliferation and peaceful applications.

Status of emerging technologies in the NPT

ETs encompass a broad set of tools, from artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and autonomous systems, that have not yet reached full maturity but are rapidly influencing both militaries and industry. Within the NPT, however, discussion has focused overwhelmingly on military applications, including AI-enhanced nuclear command, control, and communications systems (NC3) and hypersonic delivery platforms. Nuclear-weapon states such as the United States, Russia, and China have already integrated elements of these capabilities. This has prompted broad discussions in diplomatic and expert communities about the risks of AI-enabled NC3 systems, arms racing, and proliferation. This risk-centric framing with a special emphasis on the escalation risks of AI-nuclear integration also dominates the NPT debate. The 2022 Review Conference (RevCon) draft final document called for “intensify[ing] regular dialogue” on the implications of ETs on nuclear risks. At the 2025 PrepCom, Thailand warned that AI-enabled nuclear command-and-control systems risk “catastrophic escalation.” Brazil argued that the integration of AI into NC3 raises the chance of nuclear use, while Kazakhstan emphasised the danger of “miscalculation and misuse” of emerging disruptive technologies.

While ETs’ destabilising impacts on nuclear stability deserve attention, they overshadow the conversation and neglect that these technologies are already embedded in civilian nuclear infrastructure. Within the NPT, only a small number of delegations, including through a recent working paper by the Stockholm Initiative, have tried to broaden the discussion beyond risks, focusing on ETs’ potential to support nuclear verification. The question of how emerging technologies can support nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear technology has, however, received little attention from NPT States Parties.

Opportunities from ETs

A more grounded debate on ETs at the RevCon starts with understanding how they are already transforming the NPT’s verification regime and civilian nuclear energy efforts. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has incorporated elements of machine learning, robotics, remote sensing, and digitalisation into its safeguard programs, providing a foundation for future multilateral initiatives. Yet, gaps persist in scaling beyond pilot programs and national initiatives.

Non-proliferation: As an international safeguards inspectorate, the IAEA utilises AI and machine learning tools to enhance the efficiency of the safeguards process, including the analysis of open-source information, the detection of nuclear materials, and the processing of large datasets. The Agency is also exploring avenues for AI in monitoring and detection capabilities, addressing emerging proliferation risks, and establishing governance frameworks for AI oversight; however, many initiatives remain at early implementation stages.

At the national level, there is broader recognition of ETs’ contributions. The US State Department’s International Security Advisory Board notes AI and associated technologies present “new opportunities to further enhance US nuclear proliferation detection,” including early warning of emerging weapons programs and shifts from civilian to military intentions. US national laboratories already employ machine learning to support forensic analysis of nuclear materials by comparing the IAEA database with unknown samples to trace illicit nuclear trafficking. Blockchain-based platforms allow for nuclear material accounting and control. SLUMBAT, developed by the Australian Safeguards and UNSW, monitors nuclear material transactions to improve diversion detection. These innovations reveal more proliferation indicators, strengthening the NPT’s goal of preventing nuclear weapon spread, especially among peaceful energy users. Other innovations focus on real-time monitoring. The UK’s Boulby Underground Lab hosts the Water Cherenkov Monitor for Antineutrons (WATCHMAN) project, which uses antineutrino detectors. This technology detects reactor power and fuel changes, which helps detect undeclared reactors. Such technologies could enhance current proliferation measures and support cases in which on-site inspections are not feasible.

Peaceful use: The IAEA is exploring applications of AI and digital tools for enhancing safety and security of nuclear facilities, but this remains at an exploratory stage due to safety, cybersecurity, regulatory, and legal considerations. These constraints highlight the significant gaps that must be addressed before emerging technologies can be scaled in multilateral settings.

National operators and research institutions drive the majority of innovation in this space. South Korea’s Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP), France’s Électricité de France (EDF), and the US’s Oak Ridge and Argonne National Laboratories already employ AI systems in routine nuclear power plant operations to support reactor design, diagnose mechanical issues, and streamline regulatory information, thereby improving safety and optimising oversight. Experimental platforms are looking to expand AI integration by creating a “digital twin” of reactors, with efforts being made by Purdue University, KHNP, and Rosatom. These tools utilise machine learning to enable researchers to simulate, monitor, and remotely control the reactor in real-time, providing a potentially more affordable and low-risk option for training, diagnostics, and regulatory compliance. As global energy demand rises, AI-driven tools have the potential to enable safer and more reliable plant operations.

Other technologies are tackling nuclear energy’s enduring challenge: waste management. The Swiss start-up Transmutex develops transmutation technology that converts long-lived radioactive waste into stable isotopes, potentially reducing highly radioactive waste in nuclear power plants by up to 80 percent and shortening decay times to under 500 years. Similarly, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s 2022 nuclear fusion ignition marks a milestone toward power generation that produces minimal waste and no greenhouse gas emissions. These breakthroughs could make nuclear power more politically viable, particularly in states that must balance climate goals with public resistance to long-term waste.

The way ahead for the RevCon

While progress on ETs may not resolve political divides within the NPT, meaningful engagement at the NPT RevCon offers a practical way to reassert the treaty’s relevance while advancing transparency and peaceful innovation. To foster a more constructive debate on the civilian applications of ETs, the P3 and the Vienna Group of 10 could join forces to form an informal coalition in the run-up to and during the RevCon. This would not only enable them to build bridges between nuclear-weapons states and non-nuclear-weapons states, but also allow them to promote three complementary steps to align and scale IAEA, national, and private initiatives at next year’s conference.

First, these states should make an effort to rebalance the narrative portraying emerging technology as inherently destabilising by demonstrating how it can advance equity, global development, and transparency under the NPT. Governments should highlight ETs’ benefits for safeguards and lowering barriers to nuclear energy in national statements, working papers, and multilateral dialogues. Second, to bridge knowledge gaps between scientific and policy communities, these states, in collaboration with the IAEA, should call for a dedicated technical dialogue on the impacts of AI on verification and non-proliferation at the RevCon. Third, in partnership with the IAEA, the coalition should move beyond AI pilot programs and knowledge-sharing platforms by spearheading an “AI-Nuclear Safety Center” under the Peaceful Uses Initiative. This could provide hands-on AI training, joint research, and regulatory support for power plant operators in developing countries.

By incorporating ETs into the NPT RevCon, State Parties can reassert the treaty’s relevance, rebalance the three pillars, and break out of entrenched debates. Revisiting longstanding challenges regarding non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology through the framework of ETs may be one of the few practical paths to relieve pressure on the NPT by opening space for innovation and debate across the three pillars.

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.

Image credit: Wikimedia Commons / Seventh Ministerial Meeting on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)