After four weeks of negotiations and debates, the NPT Review Conference concluded on 22 May 2026. As in previous sessions (2015 and 2022), no final document could be adopted, but the New York meeting provided an opportunity to observe, on the one hand, the steady increase in areas of disagreement between delegations and the hardening of diplomatic positions that make compromise increasingly difficult. On the other hand, the genuine commitment of a very large proportion of its members to the Treaty was also on display.
While the failure to adopt a final document has gathered the most attention, this should not be considered the yardstick by which to measure the success of the conference. It was expected, and must not divert from all the issues that were discussed and debated in New York for a month.
Some elements are more concerning than the failure to agree on the final text, and several issues may be looked upon with some hope.
Among the negative trends, I would note the following.
The difficulty to mobilise. Pessimism prevailed even before the start of the meeting, and little was expected in terms of a tangible outcome. This RevCon was less well attended than usual, with smaller delegations and less senior representation, and only four countries dispatched a minister to deliver their initial statements – far fewer than at previous RevCons. Gradual disengagement from NPT mechanisms, reflected in reduced attendance at meetings, is understandable, especially for smaller delegations, but it raises questions about the Treaty’s relevance, inclusivity, and authority. This risk is compounded by the fact that countries with limited diplomatic resources may increasingly feel that other forums should be given priority.
The diverging view on the purpose of the Treaty. Discussions during the Review Conference illustrated persistent disagreements over the purpose of the NPT and the relative importance of its three pillars. These differences were particularly visible in the position advanced by the United States, which argued that the Treaty is primarily a non-proliferation instrument and challenged interpretations that place nuclear disarmament at its centre. This vision is strongly contested by many countries, particularly from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which tend to view nuclear disarmament as the more urgent issue. A great number of countries, however, defend a vision of equally important pillars. Differences of sensibilities on the respective importance of the three pillars (non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear technology) have always existed and are manageable. But diametrically opposed visions of the NPT and what it stands for are a barrier to mobilising member states behind the norms it is meant to establish.
The conference also revealed growing frustration with the review process itself. This sentiment was reflected not only in criticism from non-nuclear-weapon states but also in remarks from the US questioning the continuing relevance of the review process. Such concerns further complicate efforts to sustain broad engagement with the Treaty and its institutions.
Gradual disengagement from NPT mechanisms, reflected in reduced attendance at meetings, is understandable, especially for smaller delegations, but it raises questions about the Treaty’s relevance, inclusivity, and authority. Emmanuelle Maitre
Conflicting understandings and manipulation of proliferation risks. The NPT was initiated and promoted in the context of the Cold War because of the conviction of the US and the Soviet Union that their shared interests in curbing proliferation should be set above their geopolitical interests. Moreover, the non-proliferation regime was developed as a set of tools to address proliferation crises with the help of cooperative diplomatic instruments. This conviction of a shared non-proliferation interest and in the normative power of the NPT have deteriorated rapidly in recent years. Since the beginning of its war against Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated that it views upholding proliferation norms as secondary to its war aims. At the Review Conference, this led to Moscow throwing its support behind North Korea (obtaining in particular the absence of mention of Pyongyang in the final document) and to Iran (siding with Tehran on most issues at the RevCon, among which procedural matters but also the question of access to uranium enrichment technologies, export control and more substantially the question of how to refer to Iran’s status with regard to the NPT). The US, meanwhile, by way of its unprovoked military intervention alongside Israel against Iran, has not only damaged the credibility of international law but also made visible its preference for military force rather than diplomacy to address proliferation concerns. Within this volatile context, proliferation issues remain at a fever pitch and more polarising than in previous years.
These issues are serious and carry the risk of damaging the credibility of the Treaty in the short and medium term. Yet, several elements should be celebrated as a testament to the resilience of the NPT, even in these very challenging times.
But there were some positives.
A vast majority of states still chose to take part and contribute actively to the process, submitting papers and negotiating until the final day. To some extent, it is worth noting that the US, under an administration openly hostile to multilateralism, and despite its very rigid positions, still supported the adoption of the recommendations to strengthen the review process apart from the final document and made some constructive proposals on peaceful uses (Project ASCENT to promote non-power applications of nuclear energy). More importantly, as in 2022 during the previous Review Conference, a large majority of non-nuclear-weapon states explicitly supported the NPT throughout the process, even to the point of being prepared to adopt a final outcome document in which their priorities and concerns, notably on disarmament, had been largely watered down or neglected. In this context, the fact that compromise appeared almost possible on the final version of the document can be seen as a positive development. Most delegations, and in particular the non-aligned movements or the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) made significant concessions in an effort to achieve what many, if not most, had considered impossible at the outset. This would not have happened had states not remained genuinely committed to the NPT.
Several key issues were discussed in a relatively constructive manner and attracted broad support during the conference. This was particularly true of proposals to improve the NPT review process, preserve meaningful human control over nuclear weapons in the age of AI, update arms control mechanisms, and strengthen risk-reduction dialogue among the P5. Although consensus ultimately proved elusive, it is nevertheless encouraging to observe the willingness of most states to continue working on new issues and advancing shared priorities.
The repeated failure of Review Conferences to produce a final document can only serve to dampen the commitment and motivation of delegations to participate in such events. However, as Mexico pointed out in its closing remarks, this should not be confused with the failure of the NPT itself. The Treaty continues to function, and the vast majority of its member states, particularly non-nuclear-weapon states, continue to implement it conscientiously. Despite the disappointment felt by many delegations at the end of the four-week conference, the state of the NPT remains largely unchanged and is influenced far more by developments outside the corridors of the United Nations. This does not mean that Review Conferences and preparatory committees are useless: even in the current context of entrenched positions, they allow discussions on these essential issues and give states a chance to voice their priorities and perspectives regarding proliferation. However, their impact is necessarily reduced when, on the margins of these meetings and notwithstanding their official commitments to the Treaty, states carry out activities that violate their obligations or, at the very least, run counter to the purposes and principles of the Treaty.
From this perspective, the ability to resolve the Iranian proliferation crisis through diplomacy, as well as the resilience of the norm against nuclear testing, will be key factors in preserving the regime’s legitimacy in the short term – more important than the recent failure of the RevCon to adopt an outcome document.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image credit: Newscom
