The recent strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities have deepened uncertainty about the nuclear non-proliferation outlook both in the Middle East and globally. The attacks already appear to have reduced Iran’s willingness to cooperate with the IAEA and possibly its engagement within the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Much depends on whether a renewed diplomacy with the anticipated talks between the US and Iran can achieve a breakthrough. If it fails, Iran, incentivised by recent attacks, is likely, at least in the short term, to double down on nuclear hedging and ambiguity. This consequential step could prompt other regional states to revise their nuclear policies and ambitions. It could also potentially lead to a new case of NPT withdrawal, trigger renewed contestation over the treaty’s effectiveness and legitimacy, and further diminish trust in multilateral regimes and organisations.
While many experts rightly emphasise the urgency of containing damage by saving diplomacy and calling out violations of unilateral actions, it is equally important to move beyond ad-hoc solutions toward more sustainable approaches. This requires embedding any new diplomatic solution within a broader and long-term strategy that includes steps toward a regional arms control framework in the Middle East – one that addresses the underlying drivers of proliferation, including persistent mistrust and threats of other WMD programs in the region. Any new agreement should also support the goal of establishing a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East by promoting and incentivising regional arms control dialogue and expanding regional cooperation on peaceful uses of science and technology as part of a larger roadmap toward collective regional security.
The trajectories
Assessing the aftermath of the US and Israeli strikes on Iran remains challenging, as information about the damage is still unknown. Still, two facts are clear at this point: the attacks disrupted the already fragile yet ongoing rounds of Iran-US nuclear talks; second, despite the varying views on the damage inflicted, it is widely believed that Iran retains the knowledge and some capability to rebuild its program and weaponise, should it decide to. This is particularly plausible if Iran moved its large stockpile of highly enriched uranium before the strikes.
Two diverging trajectories will further determine the implications of the twelve-day war. The first is a de-escalatory one, in which damage is controlled with revived diplomacy as Iran and the US, influenced by recent events, show more flexibility. This could take the form of a renewed zero-weaponisation framework based on breakout limits and intrusive monitoring. Such a framework would have to involve broader scrutiny of weaponisation activities beyond nuclear material production that addresses concerns about the future of Iran’s nuclear program, yet remains acceptable to Tehran. The second trajectory, which appears increasingly to be unfolding, is far more dangerous and confrontational: if diplomacy fails, Iran could permanently reduce its cooperation with the IAEA and reconsider its engagement in the NPT and other regional arms control talks – loosening the last fewest guardrails restraining nuclear proliferation at a time of emerging trends of global armament and fading confidence in nuclear diplomacy and multilateralism.
High stakes: The non-proliferation regime and the Middle East Free Zone
Iran may further escalate the situation by invoking the right to withdraw from the NPT, becoming the second state in the region, alongside Israel, to stand outside the NPT. Iran’s recent decision, following the war, to cut cooperation with the IAEA amid allegations that safeguards information has been used in targeting Iran’s scientists and facilities can be seen as a precursor to withdrawal from the NPT.
A potential withdrawal by Iran would not only undermine efforts toward the universalisation of the NPT, but it could also open the door to more profound disputes regarding targeting safeguarded nuclear facilities, the right to peaceful uses, and the basis for withdrawal in cases of unilateral coercive or military actions. This would create serious tensions and further risk the already fragile robustness of the NPT.
Even if Iran stops short of withdrawal and keeps a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the attacks could still have caused substantial damage to the non-proliferation efforts. Should Iran reduce and delay international verification of its nationwide nuclear activities, including at the three key sites that were bombed, the international community would be left without the limited, yet vital, assurances previously provided by the IAEA. Such a scenario risks enhancing ambiguity surrounding Iranian enrichment activities and the fate of the over 400 kg stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
The fallout will not be limited to the NPT. Tensions will likely surface within the IAEA as the possibility of invoking the snapback mechanism, which restores sanctions on Iran, increases. These tensions could spiral if Iran’s non-compliance is referred to the Security Council for action. Iran could seek escalation at the IAEA General Conference, where similar events, such as Israel’s strike on Iraq’s safeguarded reactor in 1981, triggered a major diplomatic rift that almost led to Israel’s suspension and US withdrawal from the IAEA. Pressure and growing international concern over targeting safeguarded facilities may lead more states to condemn the attacks or scrutinise Israel’s nuclear programme, risking further division within another vital non-proliferation forum.
This trajectory is also consequential to the Middle East as it could disrupt a fragile momentum toward regional arms control, particularly the efforts toward the Middle East WMD-Free Zone. Although Iran, despite Israel’s absence, has actively participated in the five UNGA-mandated conferences to establish such a Zone, its continued engagement may depend on how the situation unfolds and how states react, especially regional states. Without Iran’s active and serious engagement, and in the absence of Israel, the credibility and progress of the Zone conference process could be further undermined.
The long-term consequences of the attacks should thus be a deep concern. The strikes set another dangerous precedent for targeting safeguarded nuclear facilities, one that may be echoed in future conflicts. They also reinforce dangerous narratives, similar to those during the Ukraine-Russia war, such as politicised international institutions and the perception that giving up or not possessing nuclear weapons is a liability in today’s geopolitical environment. If left unchallenged, these narratives will grow to erode trust in global institutions and norms that have upheld the non-proliferation regime for decades.
Moving beyond damage control
The escalatory trajectory is not inevitable. There is still room for mitigation, particularly by multilateralist European states and others who recognise the dangerous implications of unilateral actions on the non-proliferation regime. These states have both the ability and incentives to help contain the damage and revive diplomacy by using their economic and political leverage to oppose further escalation and incentivise parties back to negotiation.
There is still room for mitigation, particularly by multilateralist European states and others who recognise the dangerous implications of unilateral actions on the non-proliferation regime. Almuntaser Albalawi
A diplomatic solution is still possible, as both the US and Iran continue to express interest in a negotiated deal publicly. The high stakes and damage inflicted during the twelve-day war should further motivate serious consideration of diplomatic alternatives. An agreement based on a zero-weaponisation framework, not necessarily with a complete ban on enrichment, could serve as a realistic basis for negotiation. In particular, this could address the most contentious aspect, enrichment, by building on a proposal allowing limited low-enrichment under strict international oversight, as a phased approach that later integrates it into a joint regional arrangement.
The future of Iran’s nuclear program is also closely interlinked with other regional dynamics. Therefore, addressing Iran’s nuclear program should be accompanied by a broader regional arms control process that offers a sustainable and practical path to mitigating the wider proliferation threats while opening the door to further regional cooperation and integration. A regional uranium enrichment consortium, for instance, would not only mitigate the concerns over Iran’s nuclear intentions. It could also help provide a framework for managing other regional states’ domestic enrichment ambitions while supporting legitimate aspirations for peaceful uses and technology.
For any such approach to be lasting and effective, it must be part of a broader regional roadmap. This should clearly define steps towards a collective security architecture in the Middle East, similar to ASEAN or OSCE, with aspects like regional cooperation and the WMD-Free Zone serving as key stepping stones.
Such a roadmap can be advanced through inclusive regional dialogues involving experts and officials, using Track-1.5 and Track-2 formats to develop realistic proposals and build necessary buy-in. While this is an ambitious long-term endeavour, it offers the most practical alternative to the unsustainable status quo and growing proliferation threats.
Initiatives like the UNIDIR Middle East WMD-Free Zone project, funded by the European Union, provide a strong model for supporting such a goal. Since its launch in 2019, the project has engaged numerous experts and officials from all over the region, including Israelis and Iranians, in direct dialogues to bridge gaps and advance cooperative solutions. It has also produced policy research informing discussions on regional arms control.
At a time when such efforts are scarce, the international community should continue to support and scale up such initiatives that have proven to be essential for sustaining dialogue and strengthening regional partnerships as stepping stones toward improving the non-proliferation outlook in the Middle East.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image: Wikimmedia commons, Hamed Saber
