This commentary is part of the European Leadership Network’s special coverage of the 2026 NATO Summit, which will take place in Ankara on 7-8 July 2026. The series brings together expert voices to examine the key security challenges, strategic questions, and policy debates shaping the future of the alliance before and after the summit.
The upcoming NATO Summit in July in Ankara provides an opportunity to reflect on the past, present, and future of the alliance. Regardless of the length or content of the declaration to be issued, the allies, the United States and Europeans alike, should have a candid exchange of views and carefully listen to each other’s concerns.
When I stepped into NATO headquarters for the first time in September 1986, the alliance had 16 members. Spain, which joined in 1982, was the most recent one. Today, the number of members is 32. Hundreds of political leaders have attended high-level NATO meetings since its inception. Since President Truman proclaimed the entry into force of the Washington Treaty in August 1949, Trump has served as both the 45th and now 47th US President. In spite of occasional serious disagreements, no political leaders on either side of the Atlantic have until recently questioned the continued relevance of NATO. On the contrary, every opportunity had been used to emphasize its effectiveness in maintaining peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area during the Cold War and its aftermath, as well as its ability to adapt to changing circumstances. There is ample justification for cherishing the value of the NATO over the past 77 years of its existence. Yet, the alliance is also faced with serious challenges.
The geopolitical situation has changed significantly over the past decade. The rise of China as an economic, political, and military superpower has shifted the focus of the US to the Indo-Pacific region. The US pressure on European allies to assume greater responsibility has intensified. One must acknowledge that the Trump administration has been successful in securing concrete commitments from Europeans and Canada to increase their defence expenditures. The approach of future US administrations on this matter might be more subtle and elegant, but it is likely to be similar in substance. Therefore, the process of achieving a more balanced sharing of the burden of European defence should be pursued, though it will inevitably be gradual and take time. Meanwhile, hasty steps must be avoided in order to maintain the credibility of the alliance in critical times.
As a matter of priority, the European allies should address their shortfalls in the conventional military field, also drawing lessons from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East and fill the gaps in a coordinated manner. In doing so, the spirit of cooperation and complementarity as well as a common sense of purpose should prevail, rather than a competition driven by commercial interests. Multinational projects could help accelerate this process, render it less costly and enhance the required standardization of armaments possessed by allies. Involving the non-EU members of NATO in these projects would be beneficial for all.
With respect to nuclear deterrence, the situation appears to be more complex. Although the US is likely to reduce further its conventional forces in Europe, there is no indication that it will diminish its extended nuclear deterrence. This should be welcomed. The concept of forward deterrence revealed by the French President in early March is apparently aimed to be complementary to NATO’s nuclear deterrence (it was reportedly shared with the US government before its announcement). A close coordination on operational matters between the US and France as well as the UK is required. Ideally, France should participate in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) of NATO and coordination could take place there. This would be practical since the nine European allies that already joined the French initiative also sit at the NPG. However, in view of the French doctrine which jealousy keeps the autonomy of decisionmaking, this doesn’t look likely. Most important is, how this duality is being perceived in Moscow. Does it reinforce the deterrence in their eyes or weakens it because of the risk of creating confusion?
There is ample justification for cherishing the value of the NATO over the past 77 years of its existence. Yet, the alliance is also faced with serious challenges. Ahmet Üzümcü
The war in Ukraine is the most immediate challenge facing the allies. Russia cannot be allowed to win the war. The outcome of this conflict will have serious implications for the entire world. For instance, if Ukraine, with the help of Western countries, succeeds in repelling the Russians, we could expect China to act with greater restraint on potentially explosive international issues. If not, a more assertive Chinese posture would not be surprising. It is therefore in the interest of all allies, including the US, to continue pressuring Russia through sanctions and other means and to help ensure an acceptable outcome for Ukraine.
We have recently observed that the US government was dismayed by the position of NATO allies in response to the US-Israeli war on Iran, especially their refusal to support efforts aimed at ensuring safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. It would be neither fair nor realistic to expect NATO to become involved in a conflict outside its area. I vividly remember that a draft decision incorporating some very modest contributions to the US-UK military invasion of Iraq in 2003 was bitterly divisive among allies. With regard to protecting alliance territory, NATO assets were successfully used to intercept four ballistic missiles launched by Iran against Turkey. Whether some NATO members could extend support or not depends, of course, on the sovereign decisions of their governments. In the absence of a UN Security Council resolution and a credible legal basis, democratic countries would face great difficulty in undertaking such an initiative.
The value of political consultations at NATO should not be underestimated. Even though NATO as such is unlikely to get involved in military operations in the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific, or anywhere outside its area, it will still serve as an excellent platform in which to exchange views and give an opportunity to influence the positions of other allies as well as dialogue partners. For instance, the fact that Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand are regularly invited to high level meetings of NATO provides the US and others the possibility to address the security challenges emanating from the rise of China.
Crises within NATO are always welcomed by its adversaries. Every effort should be made to reconcile differences through consultations behind closed doors. Maintaining the solidarity and cohesion of the alliance is in the interest of the entire membership. If some European countries have joined NATO over the past few years, and others aspire to do so, it is mainly because of its reassuring strength, unity and credible deterrence. There is no reason to disappoint them.
NATO is once again in the process of adapting to a changing international environment. I have no doubt that it will succeed in achieving its objectives, provided that the allies devote more time and energy to political consultations, resolve their differences through dialogue, and refrain from unilateral actions and statements blaming one another. In doing so, the alliance’s unity and solidarity, which can never be taken for granted, can be maintained under US leadership – perhaps less than before in terms of military capabilities, but more on political grounds.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image credit: NATO / Flickr
