Nuclear weapons harm humans – not only when used in war. Since the onset of the nuclear age, hundreds of thousands of people have suffered as a result of activities related to nuclear weapons development and production, including uranium mining, nuclear waste disposal, and nuclear weapons testing. Efforts to seek recognition and redress for affected individuals and communities have recently received growing public attention and have been addressed across various international fora. Yet, engagement with the issue has so far been limited where the nuclear order is “at home”: within the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But NPT members can do more to further the cause of nuclear justice – not for purely altruistic reasons, but also in their own best interest.
Increasing awareness of nuclear legacies
Within the framework of the NPT, states have historically struggled to address the humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons and have largely remained silent on the associated legacies of the nuclear past. However, there is an increased international interest in past and ongoing harm caused by nuclear weapons and in addressing its legacies. This interest has spread well beyond the membership of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), as reflected in two recent events.
On 10 December 2024, the Japanese organisation Nihon Hidankyo, founded by atomic bomb survivors (Hibakusha), will receive the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize. In announcing the award, the Norwegian Nobel Committee recognised that “[t]he Hibakusha help us to […] grasp the incomprehensible pain and suffering caused by nuclear weapons” and that “[t]he fates of those who survived the infernos of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were long concealed and neglected”. The committee thus not only drew attention to the fates of the Hibakusha but also acknowledged their long-standing struggle for nuclear disarmament and their struggles for both recognition and material redress for the harm caused by nuclear weapons.
Less noticed, a month earlier, the UN Human Rights Council released a report on “Addressing the challenges and barriers to the full realization and enjoyment of the human rights of the people of the Marshall Islands, stemming from the State’s nuclear legacy”. While the report specifically addresses the human rights implications of US nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands, it also draws attention to the ongoing consequences of nuclear weapons and human rights violations due to nuclear testing in many other places.
Coming to terms with the nuclear past: TPNW and beyond
Already during the negotiations on the TPNW, the testimonies of those affected by nuclear weapons were used to establish historical evidence on the consequences of nuclear weapons use and testing and were an important motivation for the treaty. Reflecting these efforts, the TPNW is the first international framework in which nuclear justice is institutionalised, obliging its members to engage in victim assistance and environmental remediation (Articles 5 and 6). These “positive obligations” address a significant gap as bilateral measures to redress harm from nuclear weapons use and testing by nuclear weapons states have fallen short in multiple ways: compensation programmes for affected communities are highly fragmented and restrictive, and to date, no nuclear weapon state has officially apologised for the consequences of nuclear weapons testing (with the exception of the US, which has apologised to its own citizens, but not to the citizens of the Marshall Islands).
Yet, for the foreseeable future, the TPNW will continue to be shunned by nuclear weapon states and many allied states benefitting from the latter’s nuclear umbrellas. This implies that key players are unlikely to formally sign up to the treaty’s victim assistance and environmental remediation principles. At the same time, divisions over the TPNW have added to already existing rifts within the membership of the NPT, which is being strained by crises ranging from Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine war to regional proliferation threats, nuclear modernisation and nuclear build-ups. In this situation, taking up the issue of nuclear justice within the NPT framework can fulfil a dual purpose: broaden support for the cause of nuclear justice beyond the TPNW membership while at the same time serving as a bridge-building initiative between TPNW supporters and opponents in the NPT membership.
Bringing discussions about the nuclear past into the NPT
One practical avenue for cooperation could lie in the proposed international trust fund to support communities and states affected by nuclear weapons, currently being discussed by TPNW members under the leadership of Kazakhstan and Kiribati. If such a fund were to be established, it could help streamline existing assistance programmes and tailor support to the needs of affected communities. If opened up to non-TPNW members, it could also represent an important instrument of cooperation between the NPT and the TPNW. Such a cooperative approach is important, as some states are already pursuing unilateral initiatives – for fear of being too closely aligned with the TPNW. This, however, could be counterproductive as it could lead to a fragmentation of victim assistance and environmental remediation.
The aim should be to mainstream “nuclear justice” within the NPT, i.e. to include language on the consequences of nuclear weapons use and testing and the importance of coming to terms with nuclear harm with regard to different topics and in all documents. Jana Baldus and Caroline Fehl
In addition to facilitating cooperation and dialogue with the TPNW, states should strengthen efforts to address the nuclear past within the NPT Review process itself. In the run-up to the forthcoming NPT Review Conference, the aim should be to create joint statements on the topic, which highlight processes on coming to terms with the nuclear past and underline states’ willingness to continue working on the topic. Even more easily, the topic could be integrated in existing working papers or declarations on issues such as nuclear testing or nuclear education. For instance, by highlighting the concrete consequences of resuming nuclear weapons testing, including underground testing, NPT members could help strengthen the anti-testing norm and emphasise the continued importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The aim should be to mainstream “nuclear justice” within the NPT, i.e. to include language on the consequences of nuclear weapons use and testing and the importance of coming to terms with nuclear harm with regard to different topics and in all documents, similar to nuclear education and gender equality.
To realise this, the broadest possible participation of civil society in the NPT conferences is essential. Under no circumstances should access for affected communities be made more difficult; on the contrary, their contributions should be made central to the NPT conferences.
Prospects for discussions
The draft outcome document of the 2022 NPT Review Conference already contained a section welcoming the increased attention to processes of victim assistance and remediation, as well as noting the presentation “of evidence on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in fact-based discussions”. This section was included in the document despite massive opposition from some nuclear weapons states, especially France, but later fell victim to Russia’s rejection of the outcome document.
Building on this progress, states should aim to include endeavours to come to terms with the nuclear past in the outcome document of the upcoming NPT Review Conference. Such a section could include positive references to the 2023 and 2024 UN General Assembly resolutions on “Addressing the legacy of nuclear weapons” and the Human Rights Council report on nuclear legacies in the Marshall Islands. At best, such a section would also refer to and support the TPNW, especially the intersessional process to create an international trust fund.
However, to enable a genuine reappraisal of the nuclear past, states that are currently shying away from the TPNW – including European NATO members – must be prepared to cooperate with TPNW proponents and put aside their anxiety about participating in TPNW-inspired initiatives. Coming to terms with the nuclear past is a task for the entire international community, but also one that not only the nuclear weapon states but also the nuclear ‘umbrella states’ bear a special responsibility for.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image credit: jeremy sutton-hibbert / Alamy Stock Photo
