Thanks to Donald Trump’s bullying, concepts of a “European pillar” and “European Army” are slowly dying their logical death, making way for a more productive “European NATO” future. But what kind of structure would this entail over the next five to 10 years?

American allies launched a six-month “US Force Posture Review” of the US military presence in Europe this summer, but the trajectory is already known. US forces in Europe numbered 300,000 in the 1980s, compared with 80,000 today. This decades-long downward trend could mean approximately 50,000, or even fewer, by 2030. The terms of reference for the posture review call for an irreversible shift in the defence burden, accelerating NATO’s transition to a model in which European nations assume primary responsibility for the conventional defence of Europe, with the US retaining primary responsibility for deterring Russia from the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons in Europe.

The review is also seeking unimpeded access, basing, and overflight rights from European allies to support US global interests and military reach beyond Europe. Washington’s priorities can therefore be inferred: some naval bases should be retained in the Mediterranean to reach Israel and Middle Eastern partners with logistical ease, and in northern Europe to take advantage of the new Arctic route.

The obvious place, then, to trim US basing is in the middle: Central and Eastern Europe.

This US conventional withdrawal would be accompanied by the all-too-classic desire to hand over command responsibilities to the more Atlanticist pupils in the room. The Germans and Italians are consequently receiving excessive attention and grooming.

Matthew Whitaker, the current US ambassador to NATO, explicitly suggested at a security conference in Berlin in November that Germany should eventually take over the post of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). This aspiration for German leadership is a core element of the US vision for NATO 3.0 and would have profound and potentially destabilising consequences for the European military balance of power (ironically, a situation that the US presence in Europe was meant to prevent). As for Italy: one may question if it is wise to entrust command of the Mediterranean to a country that accounts for 13 percent of Europe’s naval tonnage, according to IISS data?

But let us Europeanise NATO even further. The KFOR model of rotating command responsibility may offer a solution.

For many years in Kosovo during the 2000s, the Germans, French, and Italians rotated every September to head this successful peacekeeping operation (the COM KFOR role). The number two position was often assigned to Portugal, Austria, or Türkiye through the force-generation process (Deputy Commander, DCOM KFOR). The number three position, Chief of Staff (COS), was always held by an American one-star officer. It made sense because the US accounted for 10 percent of KFOR, while European countries contributed 80 percent of the forces deployed.

Following this rotational logic, a European NATO should therefore not have commands of fixed nationalities. A new NATO command for the Mediterranean should instead rotate among the three countries with the greatest naval tonnage in the alliance that also border that sea: France, Italy, and Türkiye. Deputy Commander (DCOM) would then rotate among Spain, Greece, and Portugal. The US would hold the Chief of Staff role (COS) to coordinate with Europeans and preserve its own interests in the area.

In order to redistribute NATO commands in the fairest and most economical way, Europeans should abandon the old Soviet/NATO triad of tactical, operational, and strategic commands. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated, on both sides, that such lumbering, inflexible structures are quickly overtaken by realities on the ground. What Europe needs is a single, strong strategic command led by a rotation of five countries: the UK, France, Germany, Poland, and Italy. Below it would sit more numerous, decentralised tactical commands that address concrete threats instead of serving Cold War bureaucratic habits.

A NATO in which Europeans (and Canadians) assume primary responsibility for conventional defence cannot look like one in which the US assumes full responsibility for NATO. European defence needs to look European, however complicated that may be.

But who has the budgetary and military weight to lead these tactical commands, given that they would fuse today’s operational commands across land, naval, and air tactical domains? We see six potential formations:

1. A new Arctic and Western Approaches Command led by the UK, Norway, and Sweden;
2. A new North-East Command led by Germany, Poland, and Finland;
3. A South-East Command led by Czechia, Romania, and Hungary, in which Ukraine would act as a partner;
4. An Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea Command led by Türkiye, Greece, and Italy;
5. A Western Mediterranean and Atlantic Command led by France, Spain, and Portugal; and
6. A natural disaster command led by all NATO nations on a rotating basis.

In redesigning NATO in European interests, we emphasise the principle of rotating command, which already has a precedent within NATO. And with little conventional US presence, the US need not exercise supreme military leadership.

The US Force Posture Review is driven by the idea that European allies have for far too long neglected their own defence. This is both a simplification and an exaggeration. In fact, after the Cold War, NATO collectively downplayed defence against Russia in favour of so-called “crisis management” interventions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya. This downgrading of NATO’s primary defence function was initiated by the United States as part of its global war on terror. In downgrading Europe’s defences, Europe was blindly following America’s lead.

Only since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 has NATO gradually reverted to a focus on collective defence. As part of this restoration, the SACEUR has developed plans (still a long way from fulfilment) for the defence of NATO territory. This entails a force model of 300,000 rapidly deployable conventional forces. About 80 percent of these are already European and Canadian.

Europe is therefore already carrying a substantial share of its own defence.

In effect, the United States is decoupling from the defence of Europe. If US troops are no longer visibly deployed on the front line alongside their allies, sharing the risks of defending NATO territory, a fundamental question follows: as Europeans and Canadians assume primary responsibility for NATO’s conventional defence, will the US also relinquish primary control?

The signs are negative.

Judging by the questionnaire the Pentagon issued to all allies as part of the Force Posture Review, the US expects to pass primary responsibility for NATO’s conventional defence to the Europeans, while expecting subservience to US defence planning and policy. Yet faced with this once-in-a-generation strategic rupture, it seems the Europeans have no plan.

While American diplomats, generals, and admirals tour Europe this autumn with contradictory impulses, Europeans need to show backbone by proposing their own definition of a European NATO. Taking such initiative would be the sign of a confident Europe. It would probably annoy Washington in the short term, but all parties would gain in the medium to long term – in financing, in operational clarity and, ultimately, in alliance cohesion.

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.

Image credit: Michele Ursi / Alamy