This commentary is part of a series exploring P5 perspectives on the forthcoming 2026 NPT Review Conference (RevCon). It will continue over the coming weeks and months, ahead of the RevCon, which takes place from 27 April – 22 May at the United Nations HQ in New York. These publications are part of the ELN’s project on Protecting the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Russia arrives at the 2026 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) in a visibly stronger position than it occupied just a year earlier, at the 2025 PrepCom. This shift is largely the result of actions taken by other states – above all the United States and Israel – and Moscow’s decisive response to them. Russian officials now speak with greater confidence and appear to see an opportunity to consolidate alliances and expand support across the Global South within the NPT framework.

The most significant developments since spring 2025 were the 12-day US-Israeli military operation against Iran last summer, followed by a six-week war in spring 2026 that could yet resume (a ceasefire remains in place at the time of writing), as well as the expiration of New START. Together, these events have reshaped the diplomatic landscape ahead of the RevCon.

NPT, war, and the UN Charter

At the April 2026 session of the Commission on Disarmament, Russia’s representative unequivocally described US and Israeli actions as violations of international law – standing in contrast to most European states, which limited themselves to expressions of regret. He further characterized the strikes as a “direct attack on the NPT”, arguing that “non-proliferation rhetoric” had been used as a pretext for aggression. In doing so, he drew explicit parallels with the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, similarly justified on non-proliferation grounds.

Russia’s advance national report on NPT implementation (published March 2, 2026) uses comparable language in reference to the 2025 operation, though it does not yet address the 2026 war. Stronger language will almost certainly appear in the final version.

A Foreign Ministry statement of February 28, 2026 was even more direct: the motives of Washington and Tel Aviv, it argued, “have nothing to do with the non-proliferation regime” but instead reflect an effort “to destroy the constitutional order and eliminate the leadership of a state they do not like”. This theme has been reinforced by Russia’s Permanent Representative to International Organizations in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov, who accused the US and its partners of treating non-proliferation as a tool for settling political scores with states pursuing independent policies.

Notably, recent Russian statements have dropped any reference to a Middle East WMD-free zone. Moscow appears to regard the issue as effectively closed following what it characterizes as aggression by a non-NPT state against an NPT member.

Two related arguments have been central to Russia’s messaging.

First, Moscow insists that efforts to dismantle Iran’s civilian nuclear program violate its rights under Article IV of the NPT. Any resolution, it argues, must be diplomatic and must recognise Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy, with safeguards as the only legitimate subject of negotiation. From this perspective, the collapse of the JCPOA following the US withdrawal in 2019 should have been addressed through a new agreement grounded in that principle – a principle Russia argues has never been accepted by the US, Israel, or European powers. Russian officials have also blamed the EU-3 for provoking Iranian escalation and undermining IAEA-led diplomacy.

Second, Russia maintains that a state’s right to civilian nuclear energy is independent of the nature of its political regime. This reflects a broader commitment to the UN Charter principle of sovereign equality, rooted in the post-Westphalian international order. Any attempt to condition nuclear rights on regime type is, in Moscow’s view, a violation of fundamental international law.

On both points, Russia’s position closely aligns with China’s. At the RevCon, the two are likely to coordinate closely, potentially strengthening their appeal among Global South states.

Another issue Moscow will emphasise is the targeting of nuclear facilities. In addition to damage inflicted on Iranian enrichment infrastructure in 2025, the 2026 conflict reportedly included strikes on the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Russia underscores that these facilities were under IAEA safeguards and monitored by inspectors. This argument also intersects with longstanding disputes over the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, where Moscow may now find a more receptive audience.

The threat of proliferation

Russia’s view of the future of the NPT is decidedly pessimistic, and its concern appears genuine: non-proliferation is identified as a top priority in its 2023 Foreign Policy Concept paper, reflecting the view that a growing number of nuclear-armed states increases the likelihood of nuclear use while eroding the privileged position of the P5.

Moscow also warns that weakening international regimes could make force the primary tool of non-proliferation. This, in turn, risks accelerating proliferation: states targeted by force may seek nuclear weapons for protection, while US allies could face fewer constraints.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has articulated this concern starkly. Responding to the US-Israeli attack on Iran he warned that “more and more countries adhere to the view that only possession of nuclear weapons can be a reliable guarantee of defence against illegal attempts at their security”. This, he said, “carries serious proliferation risks”. Russian statements at the Commission on Disarmament have echoed this warning, suggesting that events around Iran could push non-nuclear states to seek “alternative, non-conventional” means of ensuring security.

Lavrov has also pointed to North Korea as a case in point. In late 2025 he argued that Pyongyang had drawn “relevant conclusions” from US actions long ago (probably referring to the second war in the Gulf in 2003), and that its nuclear capability has effectively deterred military action. While stopping short of endorsing North Korea’s program, he emphasised that Russia “understood” its motivations. This line of argument is likely to feature prominently at the RevCon.

At the same time, Russia has advanced new claims about Western proliferation risks. These include allegations, based on a report by the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, that the United Kingdom and France are considering covert transfers of nuclear weapons components to Ukraine, as well as claims that the European Commission, with support from several EU member states, is exploring the development of a nuclear weapons industrial base. These narratives build on earlier Russian accusations regarding Ukrainian “dirty bomb” efforts.

Russia’s advance national report on the NPT adopts a more restrained tone, but still warns of a “radical deepening of coordination” among European nuclear states, including the planning of nuclear weapons use and “joint [nuclear] operations against the background of… development of the issue of creating a ‘pan-European joint nuclear capability’ in addition to the American nuclear ‘umbrella’”.

The report also strongly criticises the possible expansion of nuclear sharing arrangements in Europe, as well as AUKUS – a program under which the US will build nuclear-powered submarines for Australia – and similar initiatives involving Japan and South Korea. In Moscow’s framing, these developments contribute to proliferation risks, even if they fall short of formal treaty violations.

Article VI matters

The role of nuclear weapons has continued to grow since the last RevCon, and all nuclear-weapon states will be strongly criticized by non-nuclear members of the NPT for not implementing Article VI. Available documents show that Moscow plans to weather that criticism by laying the blame on its opponents – the Western P3 – and justifying reliance on nuclear weapons by their aggressive plans. Western nuclear-weapon states will do the same, and the now-familiar dynamic is unlikely to change.

Similarly, the Russian position on nuclear disarmament will remain unchanged: it will continue to place it in the context of general and complete disarmament and argue that steps toward disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, “cannot be separated from a broader political-military and strategic context” (to quote the advance version of the national report).

That said, the specific context of the 2026 RevCon appears more favourable to Russia than in previous years, and it will likely weather criticism better – certainly better than the US.

Although arms control regimes are broadly eroding – with the last US-Russian arms control treaty, New START, expiring in February without any new agreement in sight or negotiations underway – Russia has, and will, argue that it proposed to the US an informal arrangement to observe the treaty’s numerical and qualitative limits, a proposal Washington rejected. Russia has stated that it will continue to adhere to New START limits so long as the US does not exceed them. Western accusations of violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty will not only be rejected but also countered with reference to Russia’s moratorium on the deployment of INF-range missiles and its proposal to make that moratorium multilateral and verifiable.

With respect to the future, Russian official documents limit themselves to recognising that arms control remains important and that Russia is prepared to pursue it when appropriate conditions are created.

Russia’s pledge not to increase its nuclear forces following New START’s expiration will look restrained and reasonable, particularly against the backdrop of France’s announcement of an unspecified increase in its nuclear arsenal, widely expected US plans for a buildup in response to new Chinese strategic capabilities, and expectations that the UK may follow France’s example.

Russia is also likely to reference US discussions of a possible resumption of nuclear testing as a threat to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), while continuing to emphasise its own commitment to the treaty. The earlier withdrawal of CTBT ratification, which brought its status in line with that of the US and China (signed but not ratified), has been overshadowed by Washington and may be close to being forgotten.

The national report and other documents pay significant attention to risk reduction and confidence-building measures (CBMs). On the former, Moscow strongly advocates the establishment and maintenance of reliable direct communication links between governments and militaries and supports the continued implementation of legacy CBMs, such as advance notification of missile launches, but offers little beyond that.

Available information on P5 discussions of risk reduction and CBMs suggests that Russia has been reluctant to engage more deeply. The national report and related documents help explain this approach, arguing that “mechanical enhancement of transparency is not an unquestionable means of reducing strategic risks” and warning that a careless policy in this area could have the opposite effect.

P5 divisions and China-Russia alignment

Overall, there are unlikely to be surprises in discussions of Article VI at the RevCon. The P5 are unlikely to issue any joint statements, and initiatives in this area appear highly improbable. At the same time, one should not expect a “united front” among the nuclear-weapon states in response to criticism from non-nuclear-weapon states, as has sometimes occurred in the past. Instead, divisions are likely to emerge between a Western grouping and a China-Russia alignment.

Arguably, the most interesting aspect of the RevCon will be the nature of Russian-Chinese interaction. The positions of the two countries appear to have grown even closer, and the need for coordination more urgent. Their approaches to one of the most visible and pressing issues – the war in Iran – are nearly identical, and not necessarily as a result of coordination, but because they share similar concerns and policy preferences. They also align closely in their confrontation with the West and in their views on security challenges in both Asia and Europe.

As noted above, Russia fully shares China’s concerns about AUKUS and similar developments, and refrains from criticizing Beijing’s reluctance to engage in arms control, insisting that this is a matter for China to decide. The list could be extended. In all, the RevCon is likely to reveal significantly closer cooperation between Moscow and Beijing, alongside deeper fault lines between them and the P3.

Given the low likelihood of any consensus outcome at the RevCon, debates are expected to be more contentious, mutual criticism sharper, and political maneuvering more intense. All key players – particularly the P5 – will seek to win support from Global South states. In this environment, Russia is likely to be better positioned than in previous years. Across the three pillars of the NPT – Articles I and II, Article IV, and Article VI – its position appears strongest and most persuasive on the first two, and less exposed on the third compared to other P5 states, especially Western nuclear powers. The Russian delegation is therefore likely to approach the conference with a degree of confidence, anticipating an intense political contest less constrained by consensus-building and more focused on consolidating influence among Global South states.

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes. 

Image credit: olrat / Alamy