This commentary is part of a series exploring P5 perspectives on the forthcoming 2026 NPT Review Conference (RevCon). It will continue over the coming weeks and months, ahead of the RevCon, which takes place from 27 April – 22 May at the United Nations HQ in New York. These publications are part of the ELN’s project on Protecting the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The 11^th Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will begin in New York at the end of April. There are many contentious issues among state parties regarding the implementation of the treaty and ways forward. Amid heightened global tensions, no tangible progress has been made on nuclear disarmament since the 2022 RevCon. The issue of proliferation is still officially at the forefront of the Treaty, but member states have very different views on how to respond to ongoing proliferation crises. The Twelve-Day War has, in particular, increased polarisation of positions on the Iranian case. The question of peaceful uses is also hotly debated in the wake of Russian strikes on the Ukrainian power plant of Zaporizhzhia, Israeli-US strikes in Iran, and the contestation of the use of nuclear energy as a sustainable energy source.

These points of disagreement mean that adopting a final document reviewing the implementation of the Treaty over the past period and outlining upcoming objectives will likely be an impossible task. However, this does not mean that states parties should not do their best to promote a constructive conference and set objectives for these three weeks of meetings.

Seen from Paris, balancing the three pillars of the NPT remains a priority and justifies diplomatic efforts conducted at the national level, with like-minded countries, and within the P5. Going forward, France can contribute to a positive RevCon by focusing on several elements.

First, work with the P5 has been inevitably slow and challenging since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Some members of the group have indicated that it would be impossible to adopt any new measures in this framework in the current strategic circumstances. This should not prevent other members from continuing to push for the adoption of concrete elements, particularly regarding strategic risk reduction. In this context, France, in close coordination with the United Kingdom – which is currently chairing the P5 – can usefully put forward the risk-reduction measures it considers most important. The ability to preserve the group and keep communication open (for example, in discussions around doctrines) is, in itself, a confidence-building measure.

Second, while the adoption of specific common actions remains unlikely, it is still important to propose measures that may help reduce risks. We should use the current period to discuss this among P5 members and generate interest, which may increase the likelihood of adoption later. The support and funding of the Young Professional Network, a track 2 group created at France’s initiative in 2021, is also crucial to advancing ideas and training experts who may be instrumental in negotiating arms control measures in future decades.

Lastly, most of the work done by the P5 needs to remain confidential to ensure it remains a forum where its members can talk openly about sensitive matters. However, it is possible to brief the NPT community to some extent on the group’s progress. France, like some other members, has been willing in the past to engage with non-nuclear weapon states and civil society representatives. This engagement needs to continue, while recognising the challenges faced by the P5 and the reasonable objectives it can pursue in the short term.

With like-minded countries, in particular EU and NATO allies, but also global partners, France has traditionally worked on all pillars to promote various issues at the RevCon, including nuclear disarmament verification, strategic risk reduction, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the North Korean proliferation crisis, or the use of nuclear technology for non-energy purposes. Creating trans-regional partnerships with non-nuclear weapon states on these subjects has proved an effective way to demonstrate that, despite the geopolitical tensions among major powers, progress is still possible across several important topics across the pillars. This year, this will take the form of side events and working papers.

France, like the other P5 members, will have to position itself on the many political discussions that will arise during the three weeks of the conference. Many of the disagreements are well-known and have already sparked heated debates at previous review conferences or preparatory committees (lack of progress in disarmament, Middle East WMD free zone, Ukraine, …). The wild card in 2026 will largely come from Washington, as many US positions are still unknown at this stage. For European states and other partners, it might be necessary to adjust and react to US positions during the Conference, with few opportunities to consult and harmonise their statements beforehand.

They will have to decide how and to what extent they can preserve unity within NATO, and which issues they need to defend with positions clearly at odds with US priorities. This will likely pertain to nuclear testing and the CTBT, support to Ukraine in its opposition to Russian occupation of nuclear power plants, or the issue of sustainable development.

For France, constructive participation in the RevCon will therefore require delicate balancing. At the P5 level, preserving dialogue despite strong opposition remains a priority, but must not prevent calling out behaviours of concern related to the NPT. During the conference, flexibility will be required to avoid political disputes unrelated to the Treaty without ignoring the issues at its heart, namely, ongoing proliferation crises. In the end, what will matter the most will be the readiness of all states parties to confirm their commitment to the principles of the Treaty in a challenging geopolitical environment.

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes. 

Image credit: Alamy, Framarzo