This commentary is part of a series exploring P5 perspectives on the forthcoming 2026 NPT Review Conference (RevCon). It will continue over the coming weeks and months, ahead of the RevCon, which takes place from 27 April – 22 May at the United Nations HQ in New York. These publications are part of the ELN’s project on Protecting the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In China’s view, the five nuclear-weapon states – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – share a responsibility to uphold the international nuclear order and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Rather than engaging in mutual recrimination, the P5 should take the opportunity of the upcoming NPT Review Conference (RevCon) to prioritise candid dialogue, reduce misunderstandings, and coordinate their positions to actively respond to the expectations of non-nuclear-weapon states.
Over the past year, from eastern Europe to the Middle East to South Asia, nuclear-armed states have come under direct attack, heightening the risk of escalation. Across these theatres, the nuclear taboo is weakening. Meanwhile, the international nuclear order is under growing strain. The expiration of the New START Treaty signals the collapse of the bilateral arms control architecture that underpinned Cold War stability, while initiatives such as the US “Golden Dome” risk accelerating strategic competition. Even the expansion of civilian nuclear power – driven in part by the rising energy demands of artificial intelligence infrastructure – introduces new proliferation risks.
Where Cold War bipolarity, arms control, and confidence-building measures once helped maintain stability, today’s multipolar environment is marked by competing doctrines, rapid technological change, and heightened geopolitical tension. Advanced dual-use systems and the growing role of AI further complicate decision-making and increase the risk of miscalculation.
With all five nuclear-weapon states recently updating their nuclear policies and doctrines, there is an urgent need for dialogue to prevent miscalculation and a renewed arms race. Russia’s revised nuclear deterrence principles, and updated US strategic documents all point to shifting postures, including debate in Washington over a “tripolar” nuclear order and potential arsenal expansion after New START. China’s 2025 white paper argues that Beijing is not changing its nuclear weapons policy but does provide reasons for nuclear force modernisation. Meanwhile, France has signalled plans to strengthen its nuclear forces and deepen cooperation with the United Kingdom under the Northwood Declaration, reinforcing extended deterrence in Europe.
The five nuclear-weapon states must promptly clarify the rationale behind these policy adjustments, distinguishing between aspects of nuclear modernisation that are genuinely necessary and those that may reflect overreaction driven by miscalculation and should be avoided. Ideally, the P5 should submit a joint statement to the RevCon to address the role of nuclear weapons, as they see it. Even if they are unable to reach a consensus on these matters – for instance, if some states view their own nuclear modernisation as justified while others deem it an overreaction – they can still explain to the conference how close dialogue and communication among the P5 have helped dispel certain misunderstandings and avert a more severe arms race.
Reducing nuclear risks
Avoiding nuclear war and reducing strategic risks constitute the primary responsibility of the P5. In January 2022, the leaders of the five nuclear-weapon states affirmed the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought – a concept that should be reaffirmed in the current international climate. Building on this foundation, the P5 must move from principle to practice by exploring how to implement this declaration to prevent nuclear conflict. They should also reaffirm their commitment to a moratorium on nuclear testing and uphold the global consensus against nuclear tests.
The working paper submitted by the P5 to the 2022 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) provides a solid foundation for reducing nuclear risks. At the time, the P5 offered a menu of steps NPT stakeholders can take. Of these and under current political circumstances, political statements (unilateral, bilateral or collectively) promoting restraint and reassurance should be pursed most urgently.
The P5 process itself serves as a crucial platform for enhancing strategic communication and mutual trust through dialogue, and it should never be held hostage by geopolitical factors. China and Russia already maintain a close dialogue on strategic stability. China and the United States, for their part, should leverage the coming bilateral summit to resume the strategic stability dialogue as soon as possible. Given both France and the United Kingdom are strengthening extended deterrence, China – in addition to maintaining its existing dialogues on strategic security and non-proliferation with these two nations – should also incorporate the issue of strategic stability into the broader China-Europe dialogue framework.
At this year’s RevCon, the P5 should demonstrate both their commitment to avoiding nuclear war and the concrete steps they have taken to reduce risks. As disarmament remains the most effective means of risk reduction, they should reaffirm their obligations under Article VI of the NPT. .
The P5 and extended nuclear deterrence
Regarding extended deterrence, with the exception of China – which has consistently opposed it – the other four nuclear-weapon states are actively advancing related strategies. In China’s view, extended deterrence is a stumbling block to nuclear disarmament: it compels major powers to maintain robust nuclear forces, preserves the option of first use, and, in the event of conflict, heightens the risk of a nuclear conflagration.
Extended deterrence creates a discriminatory institutional arrangement within the NPT framework, disadvantaging non-nuclear-weapon states that do not enjoy the benefits of nuclear protection. In a context of rising geopolitical tensions, their security interests risk being further marginalised. Moreover, nuclear sharing raises concerns around safety, security, and transparency. The fact that NATO’s arrangements have coexisted with the NPT does not, in itself, legitimise their continuation or expansion.
As more states seek nuclear protection, crises of confidence or heightened tensions could trigger a new wave of proliferation. The P5 should therefore explore alternatives – such as nuclear-weapon-free zones, legally binding negative security assurances, and strengthened conventional guarantees – to gradually reduce reliance on extended deterrence.
Regarding regional non-proliferation issues, China has consistently advocated for political and diplomatic approaches to resolving nuclear challenges. Unilateral sanctions and military strikes are likely to reinforce the resolve of some non-nuclear states to pursue nuclear weapons. By contrast, sustained dialogue, stronger legal and institutional frameworks, and economic and technical cooperation are often more effective in addressing the root causes of proliferation.
The Iranian nuclear issue now stands at a critical crossroads. Recent US military actions have not resolved the problem; instead, they have raised concerns that a future Iranian government may adopt a more hardline stance, increasing the risks of nuclear proliferation, or even nuclear terrorism.
Experience has demonstrated that effective non-proliferation is impossible without the collective cooperation of these five states. Unilateral actions of any kind rarely yield the desired results. All parties must stand united in the face of shared non-proliferation interests and uphold the authority of the NPT. Tianjiao Jiang
To effectively address regional nuclear proliferation, the P5 must carefully review their history of cooperation. Whether in the context of the original Iran nuclear deal, the JCPOA, or the earlier Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue, experience has demonstrated that effective non-proliferation is impossible without the collective cooperation of these five states. Unilateral actions of any kind rarely yield the desired results. All parties must stand united in the face of shared non-proliferation interests and uphold the authority of the NPT.
North Korea has declared itself a de facto nuclear-weapon state. neither unilateral sanctions nor unilateral engagement can achieve the objective of denuclearisation. The P5 should jointly formulate a phased negotiation plan which makes it an immediate priority to prevent North Korea from further developing its nuclear capabilities – including nuclear submarines and tactical nuclear weapons. Should North Korea agree to freeze its nuclear capabilities, the P5 should take reciprocal steps, such as reducing the US extended deterrence posture on the Korean Peninsula, lifting select sanctions, and providing economic and technical assistance.
How will China proceed?
Even if the P5 are unable to reach a consensus on the aforementioned issues, China will nonetheless take unilateral actions to actively advance the processes of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.
First and foremost, China will continue to push for negotiations on a treaty regarding the mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons. From the 1990s – when China first proposed concluding an international treaty centered on no-first-use – to last year, when it submitted a draft treaty to the NPT, China has demonstrated a serious and earnest commitment to encouraging all nations to abandon first-use policies. China’s ambassador for disarmament has also explicitly stated a willingness to engage in in-depth discussions within the P5 regarding the substance of such a treaty, including technical issues that may arise concerning definitions, verification, and other related matters.
For years, certain nuclear-weapon states have questioned the credibility of China’s No First Use policy, using this skepticism as a pretext to avoid discussions on the subject. China has demonstrated ample patience. Should these states persist in refusing dialogue, China could submit a relevant treaty to the United Nations General Assembly – a move likely to garner broad support from non-nuclear-weapon states, and potentially from some nuclear-weapon states as well. Such a step would advance implementation of Article VI of the NPT, reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national security policies, and support nuclear disarmament.
A no first-use treaty would also encourage nuclear-weapon states to adjust their postures and force structures – thereby strengthening incentives for disarmament – while reducing the complexity of nuclear command and control and lowering the risk of accidental use.
Secondly, China will actively participate in strategic dialogue regarding the reduction of nuclear risks and take corresponding actions to enhance strategic transparency. However, China has consistently maintained that addressing global nuclear risks requires a comprehensive approach that tackles both symptoms and root causes. The nuclear policies and strategic mindsets of certain nuclear-weapon states – particularly their readiness to contemplate nuclear war and their pursuit of nuclear superiority – constitute the fundamental sources of these risks.
Therefore, nuclear risk reduction measures are not a panacea; they cannot substitute for the consensus that must be reached among major nuclear powers on mutual vulnerability and strategic stability. As China has emphasised in its latest arms control white paper, it has never engaged in – nor will it ever engage in – a nuclear arms race with any other nation. China maintains that the modernisation of its nuclear forces is driven by concerns that the credibility of its second-strike capability has been eroded in recent years by other nuclear-weapon states.
China also intends to take a more proactive role in advancing arms control in the context of emerging technologies. The latest white paper outlines China’s positions on arms control in outer space, cyberspace, and artificial intelligence. Although these areas fall outside the scope of the NPT, the rapid development of such technologies has a profound impact on efforts to reduce nuclear risks, advance disarmament, and support the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
China supports the development of global governance frameworks for the military application of these technologies – to strengthen risk management – and has advanced a range of policy proposals to that end. It also advocates safeguarding the rights of developing countries to use technology for peaceful purposes, and contributes international public goods in areas such as AI, including open-source tools and proposals for international cooperation. By helping guide the trajectory of this technological development, China seeks to work with other states to reduce nuclear risks, improve transparency, and strengthen nuclear safety.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
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