More than two years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the nuclear non-proliferation regime and other multilateral institutions controlling weapons of mass destruction are in a deep state of crisis. This crisis is different from previous ones because international and domestic trends towards competition and polarisation interact and reinforce each other: it has generally become harder to build coalitions strong enough to make the case for solutions that require some give-and-take. At the same time, these negative developments have triggered counter-movements. States parties could and should seize these opportunities to make the nuclear non-proliferation regime fit for a much tougher future.

Some multilateral arrangements, such as the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), were designed under conditions of bipolarity. Others, such as the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, were drafted in wake of the Cold War in the 1990s, under conditions of US-hegemony. As a result, they all carry the N5 signature which in many ways reflects preferences of the Global North.

Making these regimes fit for the future will thus require a willingness, particularly by the N5, to put their overall competition aside for the greater good of preventing nuclear war and limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. It will also require a collective effort by all NPT states parties to minimise the impact of three negative trends affecting multilateralism.

First, geopolitics and the deepening conflict among the N5/P5 are wreaking havoc on the NPT. The nuclear powers are much less willing to separate their political and economic competition to manage the nuclear order. The causes for this unwillingness to compartmentalise nuclear risk management vary. The United States has radically changed its foreign policy outlook four times over the last 25 years and is struggling to come to terms with the relative decline of its global influence. China is growing out of its role as a developing country and trying to muscle its way into global politics, while cherry-picking responsibilities. Russia has turned into a nationalist, aggressive power that is looking backward and inward, rather than constructively forward.

Russia’s war against Ukraine is so poisonous for international politics because it affects every level of multilateralism, from routine operations of international organisations, all the way up to the Security Council, as the guardian and ultimate arbiter of compliance with those accords.

Compartmentalisation can prevent unnecessary arms races and facilitate non-proliferation and cooperation on peaceful uses. We need an N5 compact that builds on their shared interests to avoid nuclear war. Such a compact could include an agreement by Russia and the United States to resume a dialogue on a post-New Start arms control framework. This would be essential for the success of the 2026 Review Conference; all NPT states parties should urge Russia to return to such talks. The N5 should also reaffirm their readiness to cooperate in the context of regional and subregional proliferation scenarios, just like they did for a few years in the dismantlement of Syria’s chemical weapons. And the nuclear suppliers need to agree to supply proliferation sensitive technologies only to those countries that fulfil the highest safeguards standards. This is not an ambitious agenda. But it would at least establish a floor under great power competition.

Second, and partly as a consequence of conflicts among P5, there is a long-standing trend towards informalisation in multilateralism. This extends to the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The existing NPT group structure has become largely obsolete. Instead, policy coordination happens increasingly in groups of more or less like-minded states, some with issue-specific agendas, some regional, others cross-regional. This is good news because these groups bundle interests and thus facilitate complex negotiations. But informalisation increases the inclination for forum-shopping and can reduce incentives to make compromises across the three NPT pillars. To reduce these risks, it would be important that groups of like-minded states act as transparently as possible. These groups should also report back regularly to meetings of NPT states parties and, to the degree possible, coordinate work amongst them to avoid duplication – and thus reduce incentives for forum shopping.

Third, populism has now become entrenched in many countries, including within the N5. Even where populists are not in power, the prospect of their return can paralyse politics. Populists’ foreign policy is different because such leaders mainly speak to their core domestic supporters, disregarding coalition-building. Most populists have built their brands around taking down international organisations. Accommodation of populists’ agendas is therefore futile and just reinforces their message that multilateralism is weak. NPT states parties therefore should speak out against nationalist and populist arguments and explain why such leaders are acting irresponsibly, regardless of whether they were elected democratically or self-appointed. And states parties must be prepared to take decisions by consensus minus one – or even voting, when nationalists and populists are obstructing progress.

The increasing role of emerging and disruptive technologies is often cited as a fourth independent factor affecting the crisis of multilateralism. To be sure, these technologies do increase nuclear risks (while also harbouring a potential to strengthen multilateralism). But technology does not have agency. Whether EDTs will be able to put to good or bad use depends on political choices of relevant political actors. It is therefore key that those countries that lead the way in the military use – and misuse – of EDT develop frameworks for their responsible behaviour.

Opportunities in crisis

These negative trends threaten to weaken the fabric that holds the NPT together. But they have also triggered counter-developments and opportunities which states parties should seize to make the non-proliferation regime fit for the turbulent times ahead.

First, there is a new sense of urgency around nuclear risks. Russia’s nuclear threats in its war against Ukraine, the fear around artificial intelligence influencing nuclear decision-making, and the prospect of a three sided-arms race are all drivers of an increased awareness that nuclear deterrence is dangerous and that nuclear weapons pose an existential risk. The success of Annie Jacobson’s book on nuclear war and the Robert Oppenheimer movie are indicators of this awareness, which should be turned into political action. One piece of good news is that, despite the dramatic rollback of nuclear arms control agreements, all ten nuclear risk reduction accords agreed by Russia and France, the United Kingdom, and the United States are still formally intact, providing a platform on which N5 could build future risk reduction efforts. Such discussions could, for instance, include exchanges on national failsafe reviews to improve the safety and security of their nuclear arsenals.

At the 10^th Review Conference, a de facto consensus emerged that nuclear risk reduction is neither “substitute nor precondition for nuclear disarmament”. This compromise language was not formally adopted because Russia blocked the Final Document. But it provides a baseline for multilateral discussions on ways to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons use. Thus, in the NPT context, the N5 could repeat their January 2022 statement that they “consider the avoidance of war between Nuclear-Weapon States and the reduction of strategic risks as our foremost responsibilities”. And states parties could establish an intersessional working group on EDTs to provide continuity and to bring additional stakeholders into the discussion.

The second positive development is that, despite the current severe crisis in non-proliferation and disarmament institutions, the longer-term trend towards multilateralisation of international politics appears unbroken, even if it has slowed down. In many issue areas, the insight that global commons problems – of which nuclear non-proliferation is one – can only be effectively and efficiently managed multilaterally remains a driver for institutionalisation at the global level. Given the deadlock in consensus-based fora, we see a trend towards majority-based agreements – and within some regimes, a move away from consensus-based decisions. While these types of agreements have their own downsides, the nuclear weapons states are not in a good position to criticise approaches such as the TPNW, because they are largely responsible for holding up progress in consensus-based fora. At the same time, the shifts of old groupings and alliances does provide a space for new debates. Take, for example, the issue of nuclear sharing, where Russia is now sitting in the glass house itself after its nuclear sharing agreement with Belarus.

For NPT states parties it would thus be important to frame the nuclear non-proliferation regime – and nuclear disarmament – as a necessary and rational response to a global common problem. Nuclear weapons use and nuclear proliferation are global issues that cannot be treated solely, or even primarily, as being complementary to national security. Such a reframing would require the avoidance of old stereotypes, and bringing some clarity about whether states parties see nuclear weapons as an asset or as a legacy. By attending meetings of states parties at the most senior levels, governments can demonstrate that they view nuclear weapons as an existential risk, just like global warming or the risk of misuse of artificial intelligence or biotechnology, rather than merely as a national security issue.

Third, there is a positive shift towards more accountability in international politics. This new, broader conception of accountability extends beyond existing treaty compliance mechanisms. There is a general expectation of transparency and openness and there are also new opportunities associated by exploiting (international) criminal law to strengthen international norms, including on disarmament. NPT states parties should not miss that boat and follow-up discussions on better accountability and transparency that happened at the 10^th NPT Review Conference and in the Working Group on a Further Strengthening of the Review Process. This could include dedicating time for regular and structured interrogation of nuclear weapon states’ actions on disarmament and non-proliferation. It should also include a willingness to engage with discourses around nuclear justice, including on the human and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons programmes.

The 2026 Review Conference will provide an opportunity for NPT states parties collectively and by consensus to adopt decisions that take the regime into a more successful future. But those states parties and groups of states that are willing to invest political capital into the NPT should begin to build the necessary alliances, including with civil society, now.

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.

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