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Commentary | 8 November 2024

Network reflections: What will Trump’s election mean for European security?

Image of Valeriia Gergiieva

Valeriia Gergiieva |Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH) at the University of Hamburg

Image of Bernard Norlain

Bernard Norlain |Former Air Defense Commander and Air Combat Commander of the French Air Force

Image of Marc Finaud

Marc Finaud |Associate Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy - Vice President, Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament (IDN)

Image of Irina Busygina

Irina Busygina |Research Fellow, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies

Image of Shane Ward

Shane Ward |McHenry Fellow, Georgetown University Center for Security Studies

Network Reflections Europe Russia Russia-West Relations Security United Kingdom United States Russia-West relations ELN NEVER YGLN
This week, Donald Trump won the 2024 US presidential elections, beating Kamala Harris to become the 47th President of the United States. We asked members of the ELN’s networks: What now for European security?

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“Trump’s promise to end the war in Ukraine ‘within 24 hours’ could lead European partners to develop a nuclear deterrent strategy independent of the US.”

Dr Valeriia Gergiieva
Researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH) at the University of Hamburg

The outcome of the 2024 US Presidential election is already causing a wave of turbulent predictions for the future of European security. A particularly concerning aspect of President Trump’s approach was his stance during the campaign on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. His promise to ‘end the war within 24 hours’ signals a potential shift in US policy that could impact the prospects for an enduring peace and territorial integrity in Ukraine and could potentially lead to European partners developing a nuclear deterrent strategy independent of the US.

President-elect Trump’s proposed ‘peace plan’ is a warning of America ‘freezing’ its military and humanitarian support, which could potentially necessitate Ukraine to accept Russia’s war demands and lead to decades of instability across the continent. He might use his recurrent threat to withdraw from NATO as a psychological push to force European partners to acquiesce to his strategy. This may lead European leaders to conclude that a nuclear deterrent independent of the US is the only meaningful way to maintain peace and security across the continent.

The absence of meaningful international condemnation of the alleged deployment of North Korean troops in the Kursk region signals a potential unchecked escalation of the war. Recent Ukrainian engagement with North Korean troops in the Kursk Region signals a dangerous escalation of hostilities.

Trump’s admiration for Putin and his unwillingness to challenge Putin’s expansionist drive offers little hope for constructive outcomes and resurrects haunting memories of the Sudetenland.”

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“Trump’s return to power may create an opportunity for the Europeans to take the initiative and convince the US president that it would be less dangerous and less costly to promote new negotiations with Russia and China, especially on reducing the risk of nuclear war.

Bernard Norlain
President of Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament (IDN) and Former Air Defense Commander and Air Combat Commander of the French Air Force

Marc Finaud
Associate Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy and Vice President, Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament (IDN)

“The memories of Trump’s first term and his statements regarding NATO, insufficient military spending by the Europeans, and lack of US support in case of Russian aggression contribute to concerns about the future. Given the risk of US disengagement from Europe, some see the continent as compelled to strengthen its strategic autonomy. Some even advocate a “European nuclear deterrent” that could substitute the American nuclear umbrella to face Russia’s aggressive nuclear rhetoric. The idea of “Europeanization” of nuclear deterrence, raised after Macron’s offers, would be unrealistic considering the French doctrine. It could also be contrary to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Germany will certainly wait to see the new Trump administration’s attitude towards NATO. The prospects of ending the Ukraine war, as Trump claims, will also play an important role in Berlin’s decisions. In recent years, Germany was less assertive on arms control and disarmament, but that aspect is still considered at least as important to it as nuclear sharing. Trump’s return to power may thus create an opportunity for the Europeans to take the initiative and convince the US president that it would be less dangerous and less costly to promote new negotiations with Russia and China, especially on reducing the risk of nuclear war. The Europeans could also cooperate among them better on defence industry projects and conventional deterrence.”

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“Like in 2003, a bold, top-down approach to unite Europe may help avoid the worst outcome of a fragmented Europe that will neither be able to support Ukraine nor preserve the institutions it needs to provide for its own and global security.”

Oliver Meier
Policy and Research Director at the ELN

“The breakup of the German government on the day after Donald Trump’s election will paralyse Berlin for months. While the timing is coincidental, both developments have the same root cause: the rise of populism. In the US, populist Trump has polarised the country. In Germany (and elsewhere in Europe), populist parties have fragmented the political landscape to a degree that forming coalitions with a coherent worldview has often become impossible.

These developments make it much harder for Berlin to pursue two key German security goals: maintaining the cohesion of European and international institutions and a safer Europe, including a free Ukraine.

Pragmatically, German political leaders have been putting out an open hand to the incoming Trump administration. But they are well aware that Trump’s answer is likely to be a clenched fist, particularly on economic and security issues.

The good news: German mainstream parties do not differ on the need for a Zeitenwende and further investments in security and defence. The bad news: The inclination to do separate deals with Washington, at the expense of EU and NATO cohesion, will likely increase in Berlin and elsewhere. At the same time, Trump’s victory will be a boost to populists across Europe.

What to do? For inspiration, European mainstream parties can look back 20 years. In 2003, Europe’s big players opposed the George W. Bush administration’s neoconservative agenda and the US invasion of Iraq. The EU adopted the first European Security Strategy, which outlined an alternative vision of “effective multilateralism” and paved the way for a more coherent EU foreign and security policy. Such a bold, top-down approach to unite Europe may again help avoid the worst outcome of a fragmented Europe that will neither be able to support Ukraine nor preserve the institutions it needs to provide for its own and global security.”

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“Without a unified Europe that makes bold choices together, it is likely that splintering will occur again, where some opt to prioritise their bilateral relations with an unreliable Washington.”

Sahil V. Shah
Senior Iran Policy Advisor, ELN

“European leaders have been deliberating on Trump-proofing European security for several years. The experience of his first term, punctuated by watershed moments like the US abrogation of the Iran nuclear deal, led to deep discussions on European strategic autonomy but not enough action to implement it. Now faced with a litany of “scary scenarios” that could take place after Trump’s return, Europe will first need to think quickly about how to use best the remaining time Biden, a staunch transatlanticist, has in office, namely to keep Ukraine’s fight against Russian imperialism resilient. But what happens after Trump, a well-known NATO sceptic, sits back down behind the Resolute desk? What happens if the Democratic Party cannot usher in new leadership that resonates with the American public and other Trump-like figures continue to succeed him?

Without a unified Europe that makes bold choices together, it is likely that splintering will occur again, where some opt to prioritise their bilateral relations with an unreliable Washington. European disunity will engender duplication, duplication will inspire dependency, and dependency will create deficiency. The appointment of an EU defence commissioner and the convening of the European Political Community in Budapest this week offer opportune moments to showcase unity in balancing resolve for increased self-sufficiency and continued cooperation with Washington. However, serious discussions must continue on the many creative proposals to strengthen European political and military coordination, leadership structures and talent pipelines, and national and integrated capabilities. Charles Michel said it best: “Extraordinary times demand extraordinary decisions.” It’s time to make them.”

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“The EU’s decision-making process is slow and complex. Trump is capable of sharp and quick moves which could greatly outpace the EU’s ability to reform, and that could be detrimental to European security.”

Irina Busygina
Research Fellow, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies

“The victory of Trump and the Republicans is not a big surprise, but for European security, it certainly increases uncertainty. Today’s world is much more dangerous and unpredictable than in 2016 when Trump first took office, and as a result, “political time” moves much faster now. For EU countries, Trump’s victory reinforces the incentives for greater autonomy to form their own full-fledged defence policy. However, the EU’s decision-making process is slow and complex, requiring lengthy negotiations, coordination and harmonisation. Trump is potentially capable of making sharp and quick moves. Trump’s moves could greatly outpace the EU’s ability to reform, which could be detrimental to European security. Trump is expected to solve conflicts, in particular, to stop Russian aggression against Ukraine. However, the path drawn by Trump – peace by force, through coercion of both sides of the conflict – seriously contradicts the views and approaches of European political elites. Trump’s plan may also either not work or, more likely, not lead to sustainable results, extinguishing the conflict only temporarily. After some time, Russian aggression will continue, but it will then be a “European problem,” and Trump will consider his task accomplished.”

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“Europe needs to rapidly scale up investment in its own collective security, but with significant economic challenges and falling public endorsement for ongoing support for Ukraine across Europe, building support for increasing defence spending will not be easy.”

Evie Aspinall
Director, British Foreign Policy Group

“Trump has consistently made clear his desire for Europe to take on a greater share of its own security. His election should be the wake-up call that Europe needs to rapidly scale up investment in its own collective security. Across Europe, there will be some difficult conversations about how to quickly scale up investment, not least how to increase support for Ukraine to put Ukraine in the best position possible before Trump becomes President and potentially tries to freeze the conflict.

With significant economic challenges and falling public endorsement for ongoing support for Ukraine across Europe, building support for increasing defence spending will not be easy. This will only be compounded by the fact that more authoritarian leaders such as Viktor Orban of Hungary, a vocal sceptic of support for Ukraine, will be emboldened by Trump’s win and no doubt will be more vocal than ever in their opposition to support for Ukraine. At a time when Europe urgently needs to come together for defence, it may find it harder than ever to do so.”

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“Europe’s investment in its own defence is up since 2021, and the Alliance is larger and more united than ever before. Europe now needs strong democratic leaders to step up; after years in the political wilderness, Britain may be the leading candidate.”

Shane Ward
McHenry Fellow, Georgetown University Center for Security Studies

“Unlike 2016, the reality of a President Donald Trump is not a total surprise for Europe. However, Europeans can be forgiven for fearing the worst from a president who has said he would “encourage” Russia to attack NATO members who did not pay their dues, especially as the war in Ukraine remains at stake. His victory not only brings into doubt US security commitments to Kyiv but also support for a continent facing its own populist wave and growing insecurity on its eastern flank.

Amidst fear, there is optimism – and opportunity. Trump’s relationship with NATO is transactional and unpredictable, a typically bad mix for deterrence. But Europe’s investment in its own defence is up markedly since 2021, and the Alliance is larger and, thanks to Russia, more united than ever before. Europe now needs strong democratic leaders to step up, and after years in the political wilderness, Britain may be the leading candidate. Its special relationship with Washington and Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s ambition to reimagine London’s role on the continent provides the groundwork, while its modest nuclear arsenal is the only other committed to NATO’s deterrence mission. It alone cannot replace Washington. But keeping European defence moving forward together – and Trump engaged – is a critical task that the whole continent must now reckon with.”

The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.