As the new year begins, members of the European Leadership Network’s senior and next-generation leaders networks reflect on the issues and policy developments they believe will shape 2026.
________________________________________________________________________________________
“2026 will also see the United Nations decide who leads the organisation into the next decade. At a time of growing divisions, with conflicts multiplying around the world and some of its powerful members disintermediating the UN, the organisation needs renewed leadership…”
Arancha Gonzalez, Spain
Dean, Sciences Po; former Minister of Foreign Affairs
In 2026, two elections could make a significant difference. The first is the midterm elections in the United States, which could dramatically alter the course of American politics. A Democrat win would likely mean stronger congressional oversight of President Trump’s foreign policy, a greater emphasis on alliances and international cooperation, and potential constraints on unilateral or isolationist moves. The exact extent of these constraints would depend on whether they retake one or both chambers of Congress.
2026 will also see the United Nations decide who leads the organisation into the next decade. At a time of growing divisions, with conflicts multiplying around the world and some of its powerful members disintermediating the UN, the organisation needs renewed leadership, a fresh perspective, and new inspiration that has not been tested until now, a woman Secretary-General. The members’ choice will reflect the kind of multilateralism the United Nations represents, its capacity to advance conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and its influence in fostering sustainable development or addressing new challenges cooperatively, such as digital governance or disinformation. In a nutshell, whether the organisation demonstrates its value added or risks further marginalisation
________________________________________________________________________________________
“I must mention Greenland. The Trump administration’s policy is clear. The question is how it will be pursued. Denmark is a NATO ally, and Greenland is part of the Kingdom. Will the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark be respected?”
Carsten Søndergaard, Denmark
Former Ambassador to the Russian Federation and NATO
I have a long list, but I will mention only three points.
My first point is the Trump administration’s foreign policy. Its view is clearly hemispheric. What will be the consequences of the intervention in Venezuela? What does it mean to run the country? If history provides guidance, then major problems lie ahead. When can we expect pushback from Congress?
But more importantly, how do Moscow and Beijing perceive it? Can they count on a free pass in their neighbourhood? And do some neighbourhoods overlap?
Second, Ukraine. The war is likely to continue. The United States will probably distance itself from the conflict; hence, it is up to Europe to do more. The recent meeting of the European Council did not send good signals. Okay, money has been found for funding Ukraine for a couple of years, but leadership is definitely in short supply, and for some EU countries, the conflict is far away.
Third, being a Dane, I must mention Greenland. The Trump administration’s policy is clear. The question is how it will be pursued. Denmark is a NATO ally, and Greenland is part of the Kingdom. Will the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark be respected? That is, unfortunately, the question…
________________________________________________________________________________________
“Key state parties are breaking from decades-long leadership policies by treating multilateralism solely through commercial and political lenses, often ignoring its strategic importance.”
Almuntaser Albalawi*, Jordan
Associate Fellow, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt; Researcher, UNIDIR
*The views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of any entity.
State parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will convene in April 2026 for the Eleventh Review Conference to review past commitments to disarmament and non-proliferation. If fortunate, they aim to agree on a way forward to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and address evolving global nuclear risks.
Expectations remain modest amid global tensions and uncertainty. A third consecutive failure to reach consensus on a substantive final document, however, would further undermine the treaty’s relevance and increasingly render the review process a less credible space for engagement on nuclear risks.
The usual factors for failure persist, but the most dangerous is disengagement. Key state parties are breaking from decades-long leadership policies by treating multilateralism solely through commercial and political lenses, often ignoring its strategic importance. This shift toward transactional interests underscores the need to reaffirm why the NPT remains highly relevant from both economic and security perspectives.
As the world potentially embraces a new nuclear energy renaissance driven by technological advances in fuel and reactor systems and motivated by market leadership ambitions (by the very same key NPT states), the NPT remains essential to safeguard the peaceful nature of the commercialisation of these systems worldwide.
As it has successfully curbed proliferation in the past and facilitated strategic arms control, the NPT can still address evolving nuclear threats with greater political and normative authority and reduced transaction costs than ad-hoc bilateral agreements.
_______________________________________________________________________________________
“2026 may mark a turning point: either a continuation of a polarised European security environment or a cautious rebuilding of an inclusive, principle-based order.”
Thomas Greminger, Switzerland
Director, Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP); Former Secretary General, OSCE
In 2026, Switzerland will assume the Chairpersonship of the OSCE for the third time in thirty years. It was not easy in 1996 and 2014, but this time could be even more challenging. Much will depend on developments in Ukraine. Movement towards a conflict settlement in Ukraine could create opportunities for the OSCE, such as monitoring and verifying a ceasefire, ideally together with the UN, and possibly election monitoring.
If the OSCE were again entrusted with an important task in managing conflict, it would inevitably receive more attention from policymakers. This is a prerequisite for taking on further important roles in the gradual rebuilding of a European security order that is not exclusively based on confrontation and deterrence. This could include a range of elements, such as restoring dialogue formats, urgent military risk reduction, confidence- and security-building measures, and arms control agreements, particularly in hotspots such as the Black Sea, the Baltic, and the Russia-NATO contact line.
There also needs to be a discussion on strengthening existing institutions or establishing new ones for security dialogue and cooperation, as well as setting principles for European security. An inclusive OSCE platform would be the ideal venue to address these core questions. However, this requires that the war in Ukraine largely aligns with OSCE principles, that the OSCE regains recognition as a relevant security cooperation platform, and that it is empowered and revitalised to tackle these issues.
Ultimately, 2026 may mark a turning point: either a continuation of a polarised European security environment or a cautious rebuilding of an inclusive, principle-based order.
________________________________________________________________________________________
“In 2026, the defining policy frontier will be how states and institutions balance artificial intelligence with indispensable human judgment.”
Tinatin Japaridze, Georgia/US
Director of Geopolitics at Anadyr Horizon
As artificial intelligence continues to advance at speed, 2026 will mark a turning point in how governments, organisations, private-sector companies and societies integrate AI into core decision-making. The debate will move past abstract anxieties and prior efforts to resist adoption—an increasingly futile approach, akin to earlier attempts to halt general-purpose technologies. Instead, attention will shift toward how AI can be embraced in ways that genuinely serve human needs, while ensuring that human expertise remains central.
AI offers unprecedented capacity to analyse data at scale, automate routine tasks, and surface insights previously beyond human reach. Yet it remains fundamentally a tool: powerful, but lacking moral reasoning, contextual understanding, and accountability beyond what humans assign to it. Therefore, we can expect one of the most consequential policy developments in 2026 to focus not only on the technology itself, but on governance frameworks that institutionalise human-in-the-loop approaches. An approach that embeds domain expertise, establishes enforceable standards of oversight, and draws clearer lines of human responsibility for AI-influenced decisions and outcomes.
For policymakers, the challenge will shift from whether to adopt AI to how it can be deployed to either augment—and, in some cases, supercharge—human judgment rather than replace it. The future will not be humans versus AI, but a deliberate synthesis of machine scale and human values: creativity, ethical reasoning, and accountability, ultimately designed to unlock AI’s promise while safeguarding trust, legitimacy and democratic norms.
________________________________________________________________________________________
“Regarding the Russian war against Ukraine, 2026 will be a decisive year. We will see if the USA and Europe can muster the will and unity required to make Putin opt for peace.”
Kirsti Kauppi, Finland
Ambassador Emerita
The development of frontier technologies, in particular AI, will be the most consequential issue to follow in 2026. The impact of AI applications on individual lives, societies and economies is beginning to become visible. There are three aspects that might reach a critical moment in 2026: the AI “bubble” will burst, fizzle out, or balloon even further; the role of AI development and application in geopolitical competition will take clearer shape; and the huge implications of the immense power held by the tech oligarchs will cause alarm.
The tech revolution will continue and gather pace far beyond 2026. Regarding the Russian war against Ukraine, however, 2026 will be a decisive year. We will see if the USA and Europe can muster the will and unity required to make Putin opt for peace. Will there be an agreement that has a realistic chance of holding and is credible and just enough for the Ukrainians to feel that their sacrifices have not been in vain? In any case, their struggle “to win the peace” will continue after the fighting ends through reconstruction, maintaining unity and staying the course as a free and open society. In the event of peace in Ukraine, will Europe continue and accelerate the necessary efforts to assume substantive responsibility for the continent’s security? We will also be able to see more clearly in 2026 what the NSS of Trump II will mean in practice for Europe.
________________________________________________________________________________________
“If any of the EU member states’ leaders believe that their country’s position is relevant because they alone can make a difference, they are very wrong; they can’t.”
Goran Svilanović, Serbia
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs; former Secretary-General of the Regional Cooperation Council
I thought we entered a New Year, but I awoke to a new era. The US intervention in Venezuela can be viewed from several angles: 1. a security move and a clear signal to adversaries worldwide (“Look at me, I can do what none of you can!”); 2. a move with significant geopolitical consequences (“the start of the end of trans-Atlanticism”); 3. as a violation of UN principles (some might call it neo-colonialism); 4. as a challenge to the liberal idea of democratic governance; 5. or as a combination of all, or none, of these.
From Belgrade, I focus on Europe’s stance towards this “New America.” My recommendation to my country’s leaders and those of neighbouring nations is to stay aligned with one clear direction in 2026: the EU.
Easier said than done.
The EU struggles with unclear positioning and a lack of unity as it prepares to confront a challenge nearly as significant as Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. I mention this because the differing stances among EU member states make it easier for the leaders of accession countries to decide with whom to align. If any of the EU member states’ leaders believe that their country’s position is relevant because they alone can make a difference, they are very wrong; they can’t. Their personal or national stance may be important domestically, but irrelevant globally. The EU alone matters. My advice is to engage immediately in the 27 format and respect all member states, as a united EU remains a significant player capable of garnering support beyond the 27, including from nuclear powers. The EU should lead now; otherwise, its silence or noise risks irrelevance.
________________________________________________________________________________________
“Doubts about extended deterrence and alliance credibility are real, and we are likely to see increased political and rhetorical hedging, expanded reassurance debates, and proposals for new nuclear arrangements framed as pragmatic adaptations.”
Olamide Samuel, Nigeria/UK
Network and Engagement Specialist, Open Nuclear Network
Nuclear risk in 2026 will be shaped less by imminent proliferation than by the growing normalisation of nuclear weapons in security discourse. As great-power competition intensifies and arms-control frameworks continue to erode, nuclear weapons are increasingly treated as tools for managing instability rather than as sources of systemic risk. This shift places non-nuclear-weapon states in a structurally vulnerable position, exposed to catastrophic consequences over which they have little control.
Doubts about extended deterrence and alliance credibility are real, and we are likely to see increased political and rhetorical hedging, expanded reassurance debates, and proposals for new nuclear arrangements framed as pragmatic adaptations. These trends may appear stabilising, yet they risk further entrenching deterrence logics while obscuring the transboundary humanitarian, environmental, and economic consequences of any nuclear use.
The April–May 2026 NPT Review Conference will reflect these tensions, though deep polarisation limits expectations for meaningful progress. The central challenge for 2026 is not preventing imminent proliferation but arresting the gradual acceptance of nuclear weapons as normal, manageable instruments of policy.
________________________________________________________________________________________
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
