Following the heated Trump-Vance-Zelensky meeting in the Oval Office on Friday, 28 February, and subsequent gatherings of European leaders, we asked members of our Network what key defence capabilities Europe should prioritise to strengthen its security architecture.
________________________________________________________________________________________
“The list of critical capabilities provided by Americans but missed by Europeans is long, though well-known…But Europe also lacks mass. This means it suffers from both a lack of quality and quantity.”
Robert Ondrejcsák, Slovakia
ELN Executive Director
When former US Defense Secretary Robert Gates paid his farewell visit to NATO Headquarters, I was invited to dinner as the head of the Slovak delegation. His words that evening resonate today. His message was dramatic: the last generation of American politicians for whom European security was the top priority, holding a special place in their foreign policy and security identity, was leaving. He predicted that his successors would divide attention between Europe, the Asia-Pacific, Middle East, and emerging strategic regions. Not only attention but, more importantly, key military capabilities.
The so-called “pivot to Asia” began and accelerated under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump (first term), and Joe Biden. The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 slowed the process but did not reverse it. The dramatic meeting in the Oval Office was a brutal manifestation of this new strategic reality and sounded the final alarm for Europeans.
The list of critical capabilities provided by Americans but missed by Europeans is long, though well-known: strategic enablers, long-range precision strike capabilities, intelligence, robust logistics, missile defence… But Europe also lacks mass. This means it suffers from both a lack of quality and quantity. In addition to capabilities, it is short on battle-proven manpower (with Brits and French the rare exceptions), command and control, artillery, missiles, air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities. So, in addition to lacking strategic capabilities, Europe needs to build more robust structures and increase the number of its existing forces. It simply doesn’t have enough. One of the most important lessons Ukraine has taught is that numbers and mass still matter.
________________________________________________________________________________________
“Europeans should prioritise the military capacities it lacks but do so while seeking to reduce its dependence on the US progressively.”
Nathalie Tocci, Italy
Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali
What has become amply clear over the last few weeks, with the meeting between President Trump, President Zelensky and Vice-president JD Vance representing the tragic climax, is that at best, Europe is alone in confronting Russia; at worst, it must do so with the US siding with Moscow. This means that Europeans should prioritise the military capacities it lacks but do so while seeking to reduce its dependence on the US progressively.
Europe needs to develop its strategic enablers, most notably in aerial refuelling, heavy lift, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, electronic warfare, airborne surveillance, maritime patrolling, space-based capabilities, suppression of enemy air defence, and air/missile defences. Simply acquiring capacities from the US could be sufficient if Washington were only unconcerned about European security.
Instead, if the US plan is to actively undermine Europe and can, therefore, weaponize military dependences, the goal should be to reduce dependence and engagement with the US progressively. In these circumstances, action should be based not just on the best-case scenario of US benign neglect but also on the very real worst-case scenario in which the US seeks to undermine European security.
________________________________________________________________________________________
“As Europe rightfully thinks about bringing its defence and security preparations to meet the challenges it is facing, the challenge is not merely about procuring more assets. Will Europe be able to maintain strategic coherence? “
Ziya Meral, Turkey
Lecturer in International Studies and Diplomacy, SOAS
There is a short and a long answer to this fundamental question. The short answer is that the capabilities of European states vary and have substantial gaps; thus, the list is long. The long answer is that the need is not simply about more tanks, armoured vehicles, air defence systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and ammunition, but also about supply chains and logistic structures to sustain a prolonged conflict and systems and structures developed to utilise and maintain them as Europe. The latter is easier said than done. Interoperability of different systems and management of complex supply chains and operations are not easy processes to align and use effectively when such a large number of nations are involved, especially some of them being non-NATO states. There is then the issue of intelligence sharing and command structures.
In other words, as Europe rightfully thinks about bringing its defence and security preparations to meet the challenges it is facing, the challenge is not merely about procuring more assets. Will Europe be able to maintain strategic coherence? Will it be able to balance national interests and politics with the needs of a wider alliance? And finally, given the political realities within each of those countries, how long will their governments be able to justify prioritising defence expenditure or a more robust posture against Russia? Without wider European social buy-in, merely a high-level defence focus would have a weak basis.
________________________________________________________________________________________
“The politics of this moment demand speed and determination to swiftly recalibrate defence capabilities in the face of growing uncertainty.”
Catherine Ashton, United Kingdom
Labour Peer; former EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
Before any choices can be made, the political will to act together and stay together is essential. Meetings of European leaders need to focus on what they are prepared to do and how they will fund and organise to achieve their goals. The politics of this moment demand speed and determination to swiftly recalibrate defence capabilities in the face of growing uncertainty.
There are several practical decisions to be made. First, to organise the interoperability of forces and equipment. There are many examples where capabilities are lost due to incompatible kits or systems. Second, to ensure economies of scale in purchasing power by removing barriers to design and manufacture. Third, exploiting the capabilities of individual nations or manufacturers across countries and sharing knowledge and expertise through training and joint development. Fourth, boosting a common security strategy to protect critical infrastructure and resist cyber warfare. There are many more decisions of this kind, but swift action in these areas sends a strong message of the seriousness of Europe’s plans.
Most of all, work needs to be done to help protect Ukraine and to allow it to deal with any negotiations from a position of strength. That also means using all its diplomatic tools to re-engage US support and bolster support from allies across the world.
________________________________________________________________________________________
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
