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Commentary | 14 August 2025

Network reflections: U.S.-Russia Summit

Image of Alexandra Dienes

Alexandra Dienes |Senior Researcher, FES Regional Office for Cooperation and Peace in Europe

Image of Nicholas Dungan

Nicholas Dungan |CEO CogitoPraxis, former President French-American Foundation, Adjunct Professor SciencesPo, Associate Fellow Chatham House

Image of Anatoliy Grytsenko

Anatoliy Grytsenko |Former Defence Minister; Former Chairman of the National Security and Defence Committee in the Ukrainian Parliament

Network Reflections Defence Diplomacy EU Europe Foreign policy Russia Russia-West Relations Transatlantic relations United States ELN YGLN
President Trump and President Putin are due to meet this Friday, 15 August, to discuss ending the war in Ukraine. In light of the EU leaders’ statement of 12 August, excluding Hungary, that any deal must respect Ukraine’s sovereignty, involve Kyiv and be based on a ceasefire, we asked ELN network members the following questions:
1) What can and should European governments do to ensure that Washington and Russia act upon those principles?
2) How can the EU influence the outcome of the bilateral talks, sustain transatlantic unity, and prepare for different possible outcomes?

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“Military support, however, should not be the sole focus. The EU ought to put forward its own diplomatic initiative aimed at resolving the conflict and achieving lasting peace”

 

Alexandra Dienes, Germany
Senior Researcher, FES Regional Office for Cooperation and Peace in Europe

Trump has taken the diplomatic initiative once again. As with his previous attempts earlier this year to end the war in Ukraine, the hastily organised summit with Putin in Alaska includes neither Ukrainian nor European representatives. At least they managed to insert themselves into the process by presenting their position to Trump in a joint phone call arranged by Merz ahead of the summit. This step reflects a legitimate concern that Trump might concede Ukrainian territory to Putin.

Trump’s stated goal is to achieve a ceasefire – yet it remains unclear what leverage he actually has, and what the “very severe” consequences would be if Russia did not halt its war against Ukraine. Europe has no direct influence over the outcome of the bilateral talks and must therefore prepare for a range of scenarios.

If the meeting fails to deliver the desired result – or if Trump walks away – Europe (the EU and the UK) must ensure the continued provision of military aid to Ukraine. At present, Europe is already supplying more military assistance than the United States, as Trump has refused to authorise any new aid packages and has even required European allies to shoulder the costs of previously committed US deliveries.

Military support, however, should not be the sole focus. The EU ought to put forward its own diplomatic initiative aimed at resolving the conflict and achieving lasting peace. While Ukraine and its European allies rightly reaffirm the principle of territorial integrity, Merz’s remarks after the phone call with Trump demonstrated the pragmatic approach required for any future settlement: Ukraine is prepared to negotiate over territorial issues based on the current “contact line.”

If and when a ceasefire is achieved, Europe will have a key role to play, including:

  • Securing the contact line, potentially with its own troops;
  • Rebuilding Ukraine and supporting its long-term path toward EU accession;
  • Providing security guarantees or long-term military aid to ensure Ukraine’s defence capability;
  • In the event of territorial concessions that must not be legally recognised, assisting Ukraine to regain these territories through diplomatic means;
  • Maintaining pressure on Russia.

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“’Together’ means talking to Trump with Zelensky always included. Emphasise Europeans’ unity even in any bilateral discussions with Trump”

Nicholas Dungan, France
CEO & Founder, CogitoPraxis

1. Stay ‘stronger together’: show Trump a united front. This means talking to Trump together. ‘Together’ means talking to Trump with Zelensky always included. Emphasise Europeans’ unity even in any bilateral discussions with Trump (Emmanuel Macron, take note). Trump was impressed by European leaders in The Hague and said so: ‘These people really love their countries’. Capitalise on it. Keep Meloni onside and out front in discussions.

2. Make it about Ukraine and nothing else. Keep telling Trump this is ‘war in Europe’ and existential for every member of the Coalition of the Willing (not just the EU per se). Trump was impressed by hearing that from European leaders in The Hague. Refocus the discussion again and again on Ukraine, not Russia-USA great-power politics, not Trump and Putin.

3. De-link the Ukraine discussion from other issues of disagreement with the USA, such as Gaza or tariffs. Include Rutte and NATO in everything. Let Mark be the Trump-whisperer. Treat Trump as their grand NATO partner. He also said in The Hague: ‘They want to protect their country, and they need the United States, and without the United States, it’s not going to be the same.’ Focus on Trump, the potential peacemaker.

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“These two steps will convince everyone that the EU is not only concerned about its security, but is ready to make strong and quick preventative steps to ensure its security and sustain peace in Europe.”

Anatoliy Grytsenko, Ukraine
Former Defence Minister

The EU statement contains the right words and is well diplomatically shaped. Still, I have doubts whether the statement is convincing enough for the presidents of the US and Russia to prevent them from making a ‘deal’ with harmful consequences for both Ukraine and Europe.

To be convincing for the two leaders as well as for other players (like China and India on the one hand, plus Iran and North Korea on the other), the EU wording must be backed by two quick and strong practical steps:

1) Delivery of a dozen powerful air-defence systems with a few hundred rockets to Ukraine — for quick protection of the key cities, pieces of infrastructure and energy objects.

2) Declaration of the EU’s (or Coalition of the Willing) readiness to quickly deploy its military grouping of the army corps plus an adequate air component on the Ukrainian territory — to back Ukraine’s defence forces in the case of breaking a possible ceasefire agreement by Russia and preventing the aggressor from further offensive operations westward in Ukraine.

These two steps will convince everyone that the EU is not only concerned about its security, but is ready to make strong and quick preventative steps to ensure its security and sustain peace in Europe.

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“The outcome of Russia’s imperialistic war against Ukraine must primarily be decided by Ukraine.”

Imants Lieģis, Latvia
Former Defence Minister

Next week marks the anniversary of the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 23rd August 1939, when two large powers carved up Europe. The fate of Ukraine cannot be decided in a similar fashion. It seems that President Trump may agree. The diplomatic prowess of European leaders, including the EU and NATO, has been on display since the announcement of the August 15th meeting between the US President and Russia’s autocratic ruler.

Leverage over President Trump has been carefully crafted following his return to office in January this year. Many of Europe’s leaders must patiently and persistently continue to engage with him on a personal level. This is crucial both for support to Ukraine and for the US’s ongoing involvement in the defence of Europe. In parallel, as agreed at the NATO Hague Summit, Europeans need to ramp up on defence spending and capabilities to keep the Transatlantic link firm.

The outcome of Russia’s imperialistic war against Ukraine must primarily be decided by Ukraine. The bravery, sacrifices, and determination of its people show how to stand up to tyranny. In defending their territory, they defend the principles and values of freedom and democracy on which NATO and the EU have evolved.

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“[T]he EU can still recover its geopolitical might. For that, it needs to find a down-to-earth way of combining deterrence vis-à-vis Russia with smart diplomacy towards Moscow and Minsk”

Yauheni Preiherman, Belarus
Director, Minsk Dialogue Council on International Relations

The upcoming US-Russia summit in Alaska reflects some painful facts about the EU’s real weight in global and even European geopolitics today. While the EU and some of its member states are key to certain dimensions of the Russia-Ukraine war, overall, they remain sidelined in the grand geopolitical constellation of this war. This results not just from the decades-long structural European dependence on the American security umbrella, but also from Brussels’s own multiple misplaced polices of recent years that have effectively lowered the EU’s leverage even in its immediate neighbourhood.

Given these hard realities, there is little the EU can realistically do right now to ensure that its position really influences the outcome of the bilateral talks in Alaska or any future Russian-American engagement. This is not to say that Trump and Putin will necessarily reach any major agreements that will fundamentally contradict the EU leaders’ statement of 12 August. If anything, the forthcoming summit appears unlikely to become a historic game-changer. But, importantly, whatever happens in Alaska and later will to a larger extent be shaped by the significance of the US-Russian bilateral relationship to both Washington and Moscow than by the EU’s statements and efforts.

The EU’s belief that by simply increasing sanctions and other elements of pressure against Russia, it can somehow secure a seat around the table has always looked unfounded and now appears to have been proven empirically wrong. European sanctions certainly bite the Russian economy, but they fail to force Moscow to change behaviour and, more importantly, to increase the EU’s own leverage. Nor can the EU’s recently unveiled rearmament plans quickly translate into serious political weight.

Yet, the EU can still recover its geopolitical might. For that, it needs to find a down-to-earth way of combining deterrence vis-à-vis Russia with smart diplomacy towards Moscow and Minsk. In other words, the EU needs another “Harmel moment” to lower its geopolitical vulnerabilities and improve its security.

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“The meeting in Alaska is not only about Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity but also about the future of European Security.”

Carsten Søndergaard, Denmark
Former Ambassador to Russia, Former Permanent Representative to NATO

The meeting in Alaska is not only about Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity but also about the future of European Security.

There should be no illusions that we are in for the long haul.

If the meeting goes wrong, it will undoubtedly have a very negative impact on transatlantic relations.

Europe is sidelined, but Europe itself is to be blamed for that. Too many Europeans still believe that soft power eventually will do the trick. Speeches don’t do it.

What can be done?

First, an open and direct transatlantic dialogue which makes clear how allies read the situation and where the red lines are. Two messages: a) Russia must be brought to understand that it cannot win, and b) there are options that Europe will not support.

Second, Europe must increase its own military capabilities and deliveries of weapons to Ukraine.

Third, sanctions should be strengthened. There are too many taboos. The Russian frozen assets are still untouched. More can be done about oil sanctions.

Fourth, Europe should be ready to participate in and sustain a force (“coalition of the willing”), which could eventually contribute to security guarantees.

Let’s face it, there will be no peace without a credible military deterrence.

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The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.