In today’s security landscape, does the UK’s reaffirmation and reinvestment in its nuclear deterrent in the 2025 Strategic Defence Review strengthen national and allied security, undermine long-term global non-proliferation and disarmament objectives, or lie somewhere in between?
“The nuclear genie was already wriggling out of its bottle. A renewed emphasis on the utility of nuclear deterrence by the UK will add momentum.”
General the Lord David Richards of Herstmonceux, United Kingdom
Former Chief of the Defence Staff
The possession by the UK of an up-to-date, capable nuclear deterrent with a credible employment doctrine will enhance national and allied security. The downside is that it is very expensive, absorbing a minimum of between 0.5% to 0.7% of the current 2.3% GDP overall defence budget. This means the UK spends much less on conventional capability than other non-nuclear NATO nations, spending an equivalent amount of money on defence. Ironically, the resultant relative shortage of conventional capability means that an earlier resort to nuclear weapons might be needed in order to stop a large-scale attack. In the case of NATO, SACEUR’s deployment options need to take this into account when allocating ‘troops to task’.
The other half of the question concerns long-term non-proliferation and disarmament objectives. I fear that the UK’s decision will not be helpful in this respect. The nuclear genie was already wriggling out of its bottle. A renewed emphasis on the utility of nuclear deterrence by the UK will add momentum.
“Whether one likes the idea of reintroducing a nuclear option that the UK let go three decades ago or not, it would constitute a solid possibility to strengthen the “European pillar of NATO”. It would also present a significantly more feasible alternative to some of the ideas periodically floated, including the highly complex question of expanding the French nuclear “umbrella”…”
Julia Berghofer, Germany
Senior Policy Fellow
The SDR partly answered the debate around European nuclear deterrence in the wake of concerns about the continued reliability of US security guarantees. The document recommended that the UK begin discussions with the US and NATO on the “potential benefits and feasibility of enhanced UK participation in NATO’s nuclear mission” and suggested stocking up the RAF fleet with nuclear-capable F-35A fighter jets. Considerations on purchasing F-35A aircraft seem to underscore recent rumours that HMG might be willing to bring back a British airborne nuclear deterrent.
Whether one likes the idea of reintroducing a nuclear option that the UK let go three decades ago or not, it would constitute a solid possibility to strengthen the “European pillar of NATO”. It would also present a significantly more feasible alternative to some of the ideas periodically floated, including the highly complex question of expanding the French nuclear “umbrella”. Unlike other “solutions,” such a step would be compatible with NATO policy while not crossing the threshold of moving nuclear sharing eastwards. In the present circumstances, such a direction would still present a measured answer to ongoing Russian aggression.
“The Strategic Defence Review notes that the United Kingdom should work with allies to deter nuclear use ‘at any scale’, but without touching on whether that implies a change to its own (i.e. strategic) nuclear arsenal.”
Henrik Larsen, Denmark
Non-Resident Research Fellow, International Center for Defence and Security, Estonia
The Strategic Defence Review rightfully acknowledges that Russia’s war-fighting strategy relies on the threat of limited nuclear use to terminate a conflict on terms that it finds acceptable. Indeed, the worst-case scenario for NATO to face is one in which Russia establishes a fait accompli and then threatens limited nuclear escalation to deter the alliance from liberating seized territory.
The Strategic Defence Review notes that the United Kingdom should work with allies to deter nuclear use ‘at any scale’, but without touching on whether that implies a change to its own (i.e. strategic) nuclear arsenal. To strengthen allied security, it might have been appropriate to make explicit the need for dedicated tactical nuclear weapons to deter Russian contemplation about limited nuclear escalation. European tactical nukes will be essential should the United States sow doubt about its commitment to NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement.
The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
Image: Flickr JohnED76
