As NATO leaders head to Ankara for the 2026 NATO summit, and as the US Department of War begins a NATO 3.0 review explicitly premised on Europe taking the lead role in its own defence, we ask members of the ELN network: Does the 2026 Ankara summit represent a genuine opportunity for Europeans to determine the “Europeanisation” of NATO, or could they be locked into a transition under Washington’s conditions? With Secretary Hegseth warning that some allies “will fail” the US review, what should European governments deliver in Ankara this week?______________________________________________________________________
“…the reality is that 17 of the 32 NATO allies have just reached the two percent (minimum) spending mark and will need years more before they approach the agreed five percent ceiling for defence spending.”
Stefanie Babst, Germany
ELN Senior Associate Fellow; former NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General
Donald Trump loves big numbers. The bigger, the better. $500 billion is one of his favourites. The President’s obsession with big numbers seems to be a good-enough reason for him to travel to the Turkish capital. Why else would he want to spend two days with his European and Canadian ‘paper tiger’ friends if they were not willing to put big money on the table? Better still: all attributed to his grandiose leadership?
After all, according to NATO Secretary General Rutte, Europeans and Canadians have increased their defence investments primarily because of Trump, with the promise of increased spending in the future.
However, the reality is that 17 of the 32 NATO allies have just reached the two percent (minimum) spending mark and will need years more before they approach the agreed five percent ceiling for defence spending. More importantly, NATO’s spending figures do not translate into real war-fighting capabilities and military manpower.
But the Ankara meeting will not only be a platform for large-scale number games. It is also designed to allow two aged, authoritarian strongmen to sign a lucrative bilateral deal. Erdogan is prepared to allow US companies to make huge investments in Turkey’s profitable energy market, notably gas and oil exploration in the Mediterranean and in Syria and northern Iraq, whereas Trump will likely pave the way for Turkey’s return to the F-35 fighter programme, of which Ankara was excluded after it purchased the Russian S-400 in 2019.
The playbook for the 30 European allies and Canada is curbed. They will praise NATO unity and vow to spend more money on their own and Ukraine’s defence. Their meeting in Ankara will certainly not go down in history books as a strategic landmark event.
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“Europe will determine its own strategic objectives, not copy and paste from the current leadership in Washington. But en même temps, everyone knows that Europe is not ready and will not be for some time.“
Nicholas Dungan, France
ELN Senior Network member; CEO, CogitoPraxis
The NATO 3.0 review is a US PR exercise. No European ally operates under the illusion that, when disaster strikes, Uncle Sam will ride to their rescue. Given the geopolitical performance of the current US administration, no one in Europe is awarding it bonus points for strategic foresight, clarity of purpose, combat effectiveness, or allied solidarity either.
Europe will determine its own strategic objectives, not copy and paste from the current leadership in Washington. But en même temps, everyone knows that Europe is not ready and will not be for some time. The Hague commitments on allied security expenditures already appear badly out of date, only one year on:
- the 3.5 percent commitment (expenditures on military preparedness, including weapons procurement) probably assumes the wrong kind of heavy procurement in the age of drones.
- the 1.5 percent commitment (expenditures on national resilience) appears wildly inadequate to compensate for 37 years of overdue infrastructure investment, particularly in Germany.
Consequently, in Ankara and beyond, the European attitude has to be: keep the Americans on-side as much as possible, and for as long as possible. Europeans may not feel inclined to send the Americans a charming thank you note, but they know that in a sense the US is doing Europe a favour. It’s not clear, however, if Europe will ever catch up in the tech race with the US, or China.
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“The Ankara summit will confirm that we are heading towards a more European NATO. There will be stronger European agency in security and defence.”
Klaus Korhonen, Finland
ELN Senior Network member; Former Permanent Representative of Finland to NATO
I am confident about the prospects for the NATO summit in Ankara.
Allies are seriously implementing the decisions made in The Hague summit. Europe should stay on this course, but increased spending on defence and other security-related functions is not enough. Investments have to transform into real capabilities.
Decisions in NATO are taken jointly in the spirit of unity and solidarity. The Ankara summit will confirm that we are heading towards a more European NATO. There will be stronger European agency in security and defence. The Summit Declaration will convey the idea that European countries will have primary responsibility for NATO’s conventional deterrence and defence. The United States has indicated that it will remain committed to NATO’s collective defence and, in particular, will continue to provide a robust nuclear force, with other allies also participating in NATO’s joint nuclear deterrence effort.
In my view, the US Department of War’s review on NATO 3.0 is welcome. It will provide further analysis of the alliance’s needs and the options to fulfil them. Secretary Hegseth has said that this is a constructive effort and that input will be taken from both US stakeholders and European allies.
It is crucial that the burden-shifting to Europe for conventional defence is implemented systematically and without creating gaps. I recommend using existing NATO processes, such as the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). Stability and security in Europe are in the interest of our American friends.
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“Rhetorical friction with European allies, talk of troop drawdowns and conditioning support on burden-sharing scorecards all feed a Kremlin narrative that the American security guarantee has become negotiable.”
Nona Mikhelidze, Italy
ELN Network member; Senior Fellow, Global Actors, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)
A paradox sits at the heart of NATO’s planning for Ankara. Russia is not winning in Ukraine, but that is no reason for Europe to relax; quite the opposite. Analysts describe a “paradox of escalation”, in which Moscow’s drones, sabotage, and airspace violations against NATO members increase the risk of miscalculation. A Kremlin unable to claim victory, unwilling to admit failure, but determined to continue the war, has every incentive to manufacture a larger enemy than Ukraine.
Officials already describe Moscow’s hybrid campaign as a real-time experiment, testing how much NATO will absorb before it answers with force rather than protest. The aim is not to occupy territory; Russia cannot sustain that, but to undermine credibility by exploiting the time NATO needs to reach a consensus before invoking Article 5. Washington’s recent posture has made this scenario more, not less, plausible. Rhetorical friction with European allies, talk of troop drawdowns, and conditioning support on burden-sharing scorecards all feed a Kremlin narrative that the American security guarantee has become negotiable.
This is why Ankara cannot be reduced to spending charts and procurement lists alone. The summit’s real currency is political resolve: a collective signal, addressed to Moscow and indirectly to Washington, that European governments will answer provocation regardless of how Article 5 is interpreted on any given day in the White House. That means agreeing on rules of engagement for grey-zone incidents in advance, so the alliance is not improvising. It means Europeans speaking as one on collective defence despite an unpredictable Washington. Rearmament alone will not deter Moscow if European unity remains hostage to American ambiguity. What Ankara must produce, above all, is the conviction that Europe’s defence does not pause to wait for permission.
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“Only strong, capable, war-ready defences will protect our people, deter our enemies, and allow free societies to flourish.“
George Robertson, UK
ELN Senior Network member; former NATO Secretary General
There are some who predict that this could be the last-ever summit meeting of NATO. They could not be more wrong.
To be fair, the President of the United States, the leader of the largest country in the alliance, can be lukewarm at times and, at others, positively hostile to the imbalance within NATO. That is very different from destroying the seventy-seven years of collective security that the alliance represents.
Only the US Congress can withdraw the US from NATO and, every time it is asked, Congress shows its strong support for NATO. No President has the power, or the right, to remove the US.
The Ankara Summit will, however, bring a reality check to the 32 countries in NATO – whatever the President has to say through his social media megaphone. Russia’s continuing war against its neighbour, Ukraine, has now lasted longer than the First World War. Neither side is winning; Ukraine is not losing. The ominous nature of Vladimir Putin‘s Russia casts a long shadow over the West’s collective security blanket.
The imbalance of contributions within NATO has long been to the advantage of the US – though it rarely realises it. Having 31 allies sitting with it every week adds to US influence and protection. But the non-US members urgently need to do more for their own protection.
Only strong, capable, war-ready defences will protect our people, deter our enemies, and allow free societies to flourish.
That has to be the priority at Ankara.
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“Driven by the Trump administration’s political unpredictability, the summit is likely to produce changes in burden-sharing arrangements, command structures across NATO agencies, and a new level of European strategic autonomy within the alliance.”
Ezgi Yazicioglu*, Turkey
ELN New Emerging Voices on Existential Risks (NEVER) network member
*The views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of any entity.
This NATO summit in Ankara will be historic, shaped by the United States’ second shift of focus away from NATO under Trump, alongside the notable shift in alliance priorities since the 2025 Hague summit.
This year, a highlight will be the “defence industry forum“, reflecting mounting pressure on supply chains and the urgent need for weapons, vehicles, and advanced technology within the allied sphere. It is no surprise, then, that this year’s perspective is shaped by the private sector and increasing defence procurement efforts.
Following Washington’s announcement of the “NATO 3.0 review”, allied nations are accelerating efforts towards greater defence-industry independence. As recently as April, Secretary General Mark Rutte visited Türkiye’s ASELSAN, meeting engineers working on air defence architecture, electronic warfare, and UAV payloads: a signal that a defence-industrial revolution is exactly what the alliance needs.
Across Europe, NATO members are pursuing similar paths towards independent procurement: renewing naval fleets, acquiring next-generation fighter jets, and investing in bilateral programmes. Canada’s decision to shortlist Korean and German companies for its submarine fleet, and its active negotiations for Swedish Saab Gripens over American-made F-35s, illustrate this broader trend of diversification away from US suppliers.
In short, the Ankara summit signals an operational shift in which European member states are assuming greater responsibility for their collective defence. Driven by the Trump administration’s political unpredictability, the summit is likely to produce changes in burden-sharing arrangements, command structures across NATO agencies, and a new level of European strategic autonomy within the alliance.
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The European Leadership Network itself as an institution holds no formal policy positions. The opinions articulated above represent the views of the authors rather than the European Leadership Network or its members. The ELN aims to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time, to further its charitable purposes.
